Essays in Industrial Organization: Regulation and Investments PDF Download
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Author: Juliane Fudickar
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Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Juliane Fudickar
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Languages : en
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Author: Luís Martins-Barata Cabral
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 210
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Author: Robert Bornholz
Publisher: North Holland
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Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Author: Burçin Ünel
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Regulation of transfer payments alone generally will not induce optimal investment levels and competitive retail prices. The last essay examines settings where input prices are negotiated by industry suppliers, rather than dictated by regulators. It shows that the input buyer may agree to pay a high price for an input because the high price serves to reduce the intensity of retail price competition with the input seller. Full exploitation of retail customers can result. However, retail price regulation, competition among buyers, and product heterogeneity all can limit the extraction of consumer surplus. It also identifies conditions under which input price negotiations will fail to produce a mutually agreeable input price.
Author: Daniel Halbheer
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Languages : en
Pages : 121
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Author: Heechul Min
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Category : Building leases
Languages : en
Pages : 116
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Author: Mario Esteban Bergara
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Author: Adriana Gama Velazquez
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Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 109
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It shows that firms with compatible networks produce higher quantities than firms with incompatible networks. However, the relationship between prices, profits and consumer surplus is ambiguous, but social welfare is always higher in markets with completely compatible networks. Finally, the third chapter analyzes the incentives to invest in R&D under two environmental policy instruments: the emission and performance standards, in a Cournot model of competition between two symmetric firms. These firms are subject to environmental regulations as their production of a homogeneous good entails pollution. Unlike a few models of output market available in the literature, this approach does not measure the environmental incentives using firms' aggregate cost savings. Instead, it compares the levels of social welfare obtained under both policy instruments. From the derived subgame perfect equilibria of the two games, each game associated with a different instrument, this chapter shows that social welfare under performance standard dominates that under emission standard. It also finds that further comparisons, in particular, the comparison of the investment in R&D, are ambiguous and not aligned with the welfare comparison.
Author: Geunwook Paek
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Languages : en
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This dissertation studies a range of important policy questions regarding market competition and pricing regulation. In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of market competition on rate of innovation in the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) market. In this industry, the market has been consolidating over the last two decades. The number of DRAM producers decreased from over 20 in the early 1990s to around 5 now. Policy makers and antitrust agencies are concerned about effects of market consolidation on innovation and consumer price. Thus, it is an important policy question to understand how allowing further mergers in this industry would affect firms' incentive to innovate. To tackle this problem, I estimate a dynamic oligopoly model where firms optimally choose investment and production levels. The model incorporates two key features of the DRAM market. First, innovation becomes increasingly more difficult as process technology advances. Second, via learning-by-doing, production costs gradually decrease with production experience at each technology generation. I find that in the earlier periods of the study, there is a higher rate of innovation in a more competitive market (i.e., duopoly or triopoly) than in a monopoly. However, the relationship is reversed as innovation becomes more difficult. Consumer welfare is always higher in a more competitive market because total production is higher and price is lower. Additional counterfactuals examine how the two industry features affect the innovation-competition relationship. In Chapter 2, I analyze the welfare effects of allowing wholesale price discrimination in the US beer industry. The current US state law requires uniform pricing in the wholesale beer market. This means that a beer distributor has to set a single price for the same product across all the retailers it serves. But some large retailers often argue that they can negotiate better price if wholesale price discrimination is allowed. Costco actually filed a suit in Washington in 2004, but the court uphold the existing regulations. This industry background suggests that understanding the effects of allowing wholesale price discrimination is an important policy question. In theory, wholesale price discrimination can increase or decrease welfare. Welfare may increase if there are differences in price elasticity of demand across markets. In contrast, welfare may decrease if there are differences in downstream costs. Thus, how wholesale price discrimination affects welfare remains an empirical question. Using retail sales and wholesale price data from the Connecticut beer market, where wholesale price discrimination is prohibited, I estimate a structural model of demand and supply. With the estimated demand parameters and firms' costs, I simulate a counterfactual policy of allowing wholesale price discrimination in this market. I find that wholesale prices increase more in markets with lower price elasticities, and with lower downstream costs. Wholesalers are better off while consumers and retailers are worse off. The total welfare decreases about 1.14% when wholesale price discrimination is allowed.
Author: Toker Doganoglu
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Category :
Languages : de
Pages :
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