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Author: Jacob Gyntelberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Author: Jacob Gyntelberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Author: Philippe Auffret
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 256
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Author: Dmitry Orlov
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This thesis studies the investment and financing decisions of firms in dynamic markets with asymmetric information. In the first chapter I analyze the effects of time-varying market conditions and endogenous entry on the equilibrium dynamics of markets plagued by adverse selection. I show that variation in gains from trade, stemming from market conditions, creates an option value and distorts liquidity when gains from trade are low. An improvement in market conditions triggers a wave of high-quality deals due to the preceding illiquidity and lack of incentives to signal quality. When gains from trade are high, the market is fully liquid; high prices and no delay in trade attract low-grade assets, and the average quality deteriorates. My analysis also reveals that illiquidity can act as a remedy as well as a cause of inefficiency: partial illiquidity allows for screening of assets and restores efficient entry incentives. I demonstrate model implications using several applications: early stage financing, initial public offerings, and private equity buyouts. Chapter 2, which is a joint work with Ilya Strebulaev and Haoxiang Zhu, reexamines the classic yet static information asymmetry model of Myers and Majluf (1984) in a fully dynamic market. A firm has access to an investment project and can finance it by debt or equity. The market learns the quality of the firm over time by observing cash flows generated by the firm's assets in place. In the dynamic equilibrium, the firm optimally delays investment, but investment eventually takes place. In a ``two-threshold'' equilibrium, a high-quality firm invests only if the market's belief goes above an optimal upper threshold, while a low-quality firm invests if the market's belief goes above the upper threshold or below a lower threshold. However, a different ``four-threshold'' equilibrium can emerge if cash flows are sufficiently volatile. Relatively risky growth options are optimally financed with equity, whereas relatively safe projects are financed with debt, in line with stylized facts. Finally, Chapter 3, which is based on an ongoing work with Ilya Strebulaev and Haoxiang Zhu, extends the analysis of Chapter 2 by allowing cash accumulation within the firm. We consider a firm whose managers possess superior information about the firm's value relative to the rest of the market and analyze the optimal timing of equity issuance. We show that equilibrium features socially inefficient, but privately optimal, delay of investment and equity financing of positive NPV projects. Waiting allows high quality firms to accumulate internal cash and increase investors' beliefs, therefore, reducing the cost of adverse selection. In the dynamic equilibrium low quality firms delay investment as well in hope of being mistaken for the high quality ones. However, when market beliefs are sufficiently low and/or internally accumulated level of cash is sufficiently high the low quality firm prefers to reveal itself.
Author: Dan Luo (Researcher in corporate finance theory)
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation consists of three pieces of research in theoretical corporate finance. The first one studies multi-agent design problems. Agents are concerned about each other's decisions and can communicate strategically with each other. The principal would like to motivate agents' participation decisions by affecting their communication. I employ such a multi-agent perspective on economic design to understand practices such as syndication. The second and the third ones take a more applied approach and study agency problems in specific corporate finance settings. They shed light on information design in corporate governance and dynamic interactions in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), respectively.
Author: David De Angelis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates' productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more costly to contract on CEO actions. The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important considerations in designing DMs contracts.
Author: Sukwhan Ahn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate debt
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Author: Cristian Voicu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780549038238
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 163
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In the third essay, joint work with George P. Baker, we examine wage policies that provide incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital, when these investments require non-contractible employee effort. The firm-specific and general investments are substitutes in the employee's utility function, even if they are not in the cost function. The firm-specific investment jumps discontinuously from zero to a positive level as the wage policy is adjusted. The firm can be in one of three possible regimes: stable, fragile, or no profitable wage policy. The model also explains why human resource departments strive to create employee affiliation. Furthermore, we derive closed form solutions for human capital investments and optimal wage policies in a multiple period model.
Author: Leonard L. Lundstrum
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Author: Jason Donaldson
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: John R. Minahan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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