Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality PDF Download
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Author: Ben Polak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Languages : en
Pages : 4
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Book Description
Author: Ben Polak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Languages : en
Pages : 4
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Book Description
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Adam Brandenburger
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981451344X
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 298
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Book Description
This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program OCo now called epistemic game theory OCo extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (39 KB). Introduction (132 KB). Chapter 1: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (299 KB). Contents: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (Adam Brandenburger and H Jerome Keisler); Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Intrinsic Correlation in Games (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg); Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger); Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty (Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel); Admissibility in Games (Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg and H Jerome Keisler); Self-Admissible Sets (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg). Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the fields of game theory, theoretical computer science, mathematical logic and social neuroscience."
Author: Ben Polak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: Andrés Perea
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107008913
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 581
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Book Description
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Author: Ben Polak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: Adam Brandenburger
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814513458
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 298
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Book Description
This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program — now called epistemic game theory — extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior.
Author: Eduardo Zambrano
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
In this paper I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium, there are sparse conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (correlated) rationalizability. The basic observation is that, if the actual world belongs to a set of states where the set Z of action profiles is played, each player knows her own payoffs, everyone is rational and it is mutual knowledge that the action profiles played are in Z, then the actions played at the actual world are rationalizable actions. Alternatively, if at the actual world the support of the conjecture of player i is Di, there is mutual knowledge of: (i) the game being played, (ii) that the players are rational, and (iii) that for every i the support of the conjecture of player i is contained in Di, then every strategy in the support of the conjectures is rationalizable. The results do not require common knowledge of anything, are valid for games with any number of players, and extend to refinements of rationalizability such as independent rationalizability and rationalizable conjectural equilibrium.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: World Scientific Economic Theo
ISBN: 9789811227325
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005.With his 1976 paper, 'Agreeing to Disagree', Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.
