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Author: Wulf Gaertner
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107013941
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 229
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Book Description
The first self-contained analysis of the use of questionnaire data to test theories of distributive justice.
Author: Wulf Gaertner
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107013941
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 229
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Book Description
The first self-contained analysis of the use of questionnaire data to test theories of distributive justice.
Author: Eerik Lagerspetz
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319232614
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 448
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Book Description
This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory.
Author: Allan M. Feldman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 038729368X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 401
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Book Description
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.
Author: Felix Brandt
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316489752
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 553
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Book Description
The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.
Author: Michel Regenwetter
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521829682
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
Behavioral Social Choice looks at the probabilistic foundations of collective decision-making rules. The authors challenge much of the existing theoretical wisdom about social choice processes, and seek to restore faith in the possibility of democratic decision-making. In particular, they argue that worries about the supposed prevalence of majority rule cycles that would preclude groups from reaching a final decision about what alternative they prefer have been greatly overstated. In practice, majority rule can be expected to work well in most real-world settings. They provide new insights into how alternative model specifications can change our estimates of social orderings.
Author: Alan D. Taylor
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521810523
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191
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Book Description
Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system.
Author: Edward O. Laumann
Publisher: Univ of Wisconsin Press
ISBN: 9780299111946
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 560
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Book Description
The Federal Government in the United States is a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Presidents are elected by popular vote in the nation (filtered through the electoral college), Senators are elected by popular vote in their states, and Representatives are elected by popular vote in their Congressional districts. Cabinet members and agency heads are appointed by the elected president, as are members of the Supreme Court. But this says nothing about politics. Professor Lauman and Knoke have asked, in this book, how policies were made, in the period 1977-1980, in the areas of energy and health. The question is a very different one from the question of how the positions of president and Congress are filled.
Author: Samuel Salzborn
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3531188984
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 329
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Book Description
The volume addresses major features in empirical social research from methodological and theoretical perspectives. Prominent researchers discuss central problems in empirical social research in a theory-driven way from political science, sociological or social-psychological points of view. These contributions focus on a renewed discussion of foundations together with innovative and open research questions or interdisciplinary research perspectives.
Author: Wulf Gaertner
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191569879
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Book Description
Processes of collective decision making are seen throughout modern society. How does a government decide on an investment strategy within the health care and educational sectors? Should a government or a community introduce measures to combat climate change and CO2 emissions, even if others choose not too? Should a country develop a nuclear capability despite the risk that other countries may follow their lead? This introductory text explores the theory of social choice. Social choice theory provides an analysis of collective decision making. The main aim of the book is to introduce students to the various methods of aggregating the preferences of all members of a given society into some social or collective preference. Written as a primer suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduates, this text will act as an important starting point for students grappling with the complexities of social choice theory. With all new chapter exercises this rigorous yet accessible primer avoids the use of technical language and provides an up-to-date discussion of this rapidly developing field.
Author: David Austen-Smith
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 354027295X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
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Book Description
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.
