Empirical and Theoretical Analysis of Public Procurement Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Jun Nakabayashi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Endogenous growth (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 144
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Book Description
Abstract: Spending approximately 10 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), governments are the biggest buyer of goods and services for many countries. Sound public procurement policies and practices are essential not only to good governance, but also to a strong and stable economy. On the other hand, due to the fact that more than 99 percent of all businesses are small in most of the countries, the involvement of small businesses are vital for the governments seeking to establish competition, innovation and value for money in the delivery of public goods and services. In fact, small businesses are likely to be disadvantage in production costs and lack in knowledge of available contract opportunities. Moreover, since it naturally would fit better to the small businesses, many of them serve to government contracts as subcontractor. In this thesis, I analyze public procurement auctions both empirically and theoretically, focusing on the role and impact of small businesses in government procurement market.
Author: Jun Nakabayashi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Endogenous growth (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Get Book Here
Book Description
Abstract: Spending approximately 10 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), governments are the biggest buyer of goods and services for many countries. Sound public procurement policies and practices are essential not only to good governance, but also to a strong and stable economy. On the other hand, due to the fact that more than 99 percent of all businesses are small in most of the countries, the involvement of small businesses are vital for the governments seeking to establish competition, innovation and value for money in the delivery of public goods and services. In fact, small businesses are likely to be disadvantage in production costs and lack in knowledge of available contract opportunities. Moreover, since it naturally would fit better to the small businesses, many of them serve to government contracts as subcontractor. In this thesis, I analyze public procurement auctions both empirically and theoretically, focusing on the role and impact of small businesses in government procurement market.
Author: Elon Strömbäck
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers' cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.
Author: Tunay I. Tunca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The use of multi-attribute auctions for procurement of products and services when both price and quality matter is becoming more frequent. Such auctions often employ scoring rules and are open-ended in winner determination. Yet there is a significant gap in the literature on studying the efficiency of these procurement mechanisms. In this paper, providing a theoretical model and utilizing data from legal service procurement auctions, we study how open-ended scoring auctions can be used effectively in procurement, and demonstrate the roles supplier quality and incumbency play in this process. We demonstrate that open-ended auctions can generate substantial savings to a buyer without compromising quality. We study the underlying mechanism and show how the auction format can work to achieve such performance. We find that the buyer's revealed preferences significantly differ from her stated preferences. Finally, we contribute to the understanding of the role of incumbency in procurement auctions by providing evidence that what may be perceived as incumbency bias can in fact be a revelation of preference for quality.
Author: Stéphane Saussier
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319680501
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 241
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Book Description
This book investigates the economic decisions behind the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The first part of the book discusses different forms of public procurement contracts, in particular in France and the UK, and provides an economic analysis of the potential advantages and pitfalls of public-private partnerships. This exploration of PPPs’ efficiency also includes an examination of the financing conditions of public procurements, as well as regulatory requirements. By reviewing empirical studies on PPPs, the second part of the book compares their advantages over purely public solutions and offers practical guidance on their implementation. Practitioners will also learn best practices on how to involve stakeholders in calls for bids.
Author: Janne Tukiainen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789521048319
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Maria Monica Wihardja
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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Book Description
We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders are unobservable and non-contractible ex-post. We show examples of equilibrium bids and bribes of N two-dimensional-type bidders in an incomplete information game where the type space is discrete and strategy space is infinite. The equilibrium bid and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly chosen, constraining efficiency. In fact, no mechanism can be efficient in this auction. The empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders increases the percentage cost efficiency at a decreasing rate and it starts to decrease the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.
Author: Cinthia Konichi Paulo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
The second chapter analyzes the phenomenon of jump bidding, when a bidder places a bid that is larger than necessary to outbid the current winning bid. Models that explain this type of behavior say that jump bidding arise as a signaling strategy to communicate strength to competitors. However, using a large dataset of procurement auctions that spans across different industries, the predictions of those models do not match the patterns observed in the data. I find that winners place smaller jumps on average, which contradicts the signaling strategy and suggests that jumps might not be monotonic in the bidders' valuations.
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1599046385
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author: Bin Yu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 144
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Book Description
This dissertation addresses the empirical analysis of procurements based on the auction theory, which is known as the structural-form analysis of procurement auctions.
