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Author: Fang Zhong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
While there is an ever increasing adoption of e-sourcing, where a buyer auctions off procurement contracts to a small group of pre-qualified suppliers, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of dynamic bidding process on procurement outcomes and bidding behavior. To extend the knowledge of this important issue, in this thesis, we explore empirically the value of online procurement auction on cost reduction, quality management, and winner selection from the buyer's perspective. We also explore how incumbent status affects the procurement outcomes. From suppliers' perspective, we characterize their bidding behavior and examine the effect of incumbent status on bidding. First, we collect detailed auction and contract awarding data for manufacturing goods during 2002-2004 from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. The rich data set enables us to apply statistical model based cluster technique to uncover heterogeneous bidding behavior of industry participants. The distribution of the bidding patterns varies between incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers. We also find that the buyer bias towards the incumbent suppliers by awarding them procurement contracts more often and with a price premium. Next, focusing on recurring auctions, we find that suppliers bid adaptively. The adaptive bidding is affected by the rank of suppliers' final bids. Finally, with field data of procurement auction for legal services, we demonstrate that service prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events. Most interestingly, the cost savings are achieved without the sacrifice of quality. Incumbent winners' quality is higher, on average, than the quality of buyer's supplier base before the auctions, while non-incumbent winner's quality is lower. These findings imply that the main value of online procurement auctions for business services comes from incumbents in the form of reduced price and enhanced quality. We find that after adjusting for incumbents' higher quality, incumbent bias disappears. Our results also imply that the buyer might possess important information about the incumbents, through past experiences, that cannot be easily included in the buyer's scoring function due to uncodifiability.
Author: Fang Zhong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
While there is an ever increasing adoption of e-sourcing, where a buyer auctions off procurement contracts to a small group of pre-qualified suppliers, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of dynamic bidding process on procurement outcomes and bidding behavior. To extend the knowledge of this important issue, in this thesis, we explore empirically the value of online procurement auction on cost reduction, quality management, and winner selection from the buyer's perspective. We also explore how incumbent status affects the procurement outcomes. From suppliers' perspective, we characterize their bidding behavior and examine the effect of incumbent status on bidding. First, we collect detailed auction and contract awarding data for manufacturing goods during 2002-2004 from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. The rich data set enables us to apply statistical model based cluster technique to uncover heterogeneous bidding behavior of industry participants. The distribution of the bidding patterns varies between incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers. We also find that the buyer bias towards the incumbent suppliers by awarding them procurement contracts more often and with a price premium. Next, focusing on recurring auctions, we find that suppliers bid adaptively. The adaptive bidding is affected by the rank of suppliers' final bids. Finally, with field data of procurement auction for legal services, we demonstrate that service prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events. Most interestingly, the cost savings are achieved without the sacrifice of quality. Incumbent winners' quality is higher, on average, than the quality of buyer's supplier base before the auctions, while non-incumbent winner's quality is lower. These findings imply that the main value of online procurement auctions for business services comes from incumbents in the form of reduced price and enhanced quality. We find that after adjusting for incumbents' higher quality, incumbent bias disappears. Our results also imply that the buyer might possess important information about the incumbents, through past experiences, that cannot be easily included in the buyer's scoring function due to uncodifiability.
Author: Maria A. Wimmer
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642035159
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 426
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Electronic Government, EGOV 2009, held in Linz, Austria, in August/September 2008 within the DEXA 2009 conference cluster. The 34 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 119 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on reflecting e-government research, administrative reform and public sector modernization, performance management and evaluation, aspects in government-to-citizen interactions, and building blocks in e-government advancements.
Author: Tunay I. Tunca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The use of multi-attribute auctions for procurement of products and services when both price and quality matter is becoming more frequent. Such auctions often employ scoring rules and are open-ended in winner determination. Yet there is a significant gap in the literature on studying the efficiency of these procurement mechanisms. In this paper, providing a theoretical model and utilizing data from legal service procurement auctions, we study how open-ended scoring auctions can be used effectively in procurement, and demonstrate the roles supplier quality and incumbency play in this process. We demonstrate that open-ended auctions can generate substantial savings to a buyer without compromising quality. We study the underlying mechanism and show how the auction format can work to achieve such performance. We find that the buyer's revealed preferences significantly differ from her stated preferences. Finally, we contribute to the understanding of the role of incumbency in procurement auctions by providing evidence that what may be perceived as incumbency bias can in fact be a revelation of preference for quality.
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1599046385
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 522
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Book Description
Author: Cinthia Konichi Paulo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
The second chapter analyzes the phenomenon of jump bidding, when a bidder places a bid that is larger than necessary to outbid the current winning bid. Models that explain this type of behavior say that jump bidding arise as a signaling strategy to communicate strength to competitors. However, using a large dataset of procurement auctions that spans across different industries, the predictions of those models do not match the patterns observed in the data. I find that winners place smaller jumps on average, which contradicts the signaling strategy and suggests that jumps might not be monotonic in the bidders' valuations.
Author: Barbora Máková
Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
ISBN: 9783659399855
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
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Book Description
This book presents an empirical analysis of price determinants and bidders' behavior in online auctions eBay.de and Aukro.cz. We focus on the effect of sellers' feedback rating score and the phenomenon of sniping. Buyers in online auctions cannot personally inspect the quality of the product, so they have to rely on seller's honesty. In this setting, seller's rating may significantly contribute to the final price formation. Sniping is a bidding strategy, whereby a bidder waits until the last moment of the bidding period to place her bid. The impact of sniping on the final price and parameters affecting the probability of sniping are examined in this paper. The empirical results for both auction web sites show that seller's feedback rating score has significant impact on the final price. The tests regarding sniping provided significant results only for the eBay auction. The effect of sniping on final price is not clear since we obtain different results for different specifications, but we found out that the experience of a bidder increases the probability of placing snipe bid. The study should be especially useful to all users of internet auction portals.
Author:
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0323988881
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 784
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Book Description
Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Saumyanil Deb
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 214
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Book Description
This dissertation investigates the seller's decision on whether or not to reveal bidder information in online auctions. It makes a novel contribution to the literature by investigating the relationship between bidder information asymmetry and bidder experience level. Bidder information is a signal about the experience level of bidder. Bidder experience affects the strategic decisions of both buyers and sellers. Using data from 500 Egyptian antique auctions (a common value auction) and 500 laptop auctions (a private value auction), following main results are identified. First, sellers reveal bidder information more often in private value auctions than in common value auctions. Second, in common value auctions, sellers earn higher average prices when they conceal bidder information. In private value auctions, sellers generate higher average prices when proportionally more inexperienced bidders are present, regardless of whether or not they reveal bidder information. Then, in common value auctions, late bidding is observed more frequently when bidder information is revealed. Late bidding is relatively less common in private value auctions than in the common value auctions, regardless of whether or not sellers reveal bidder information.
