Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union PDF Download
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Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget deficits
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor spending ministers and punish those who "defect" in a process we label "delegation, " and this procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others. Negotiated targets in the form of fiscal contracts provide an alternative in multi-party governments. Pooled time series regression results for the current European Union states in the period 1981-94 support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dichotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget deficits
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Get Book Here
Book Description
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor spending ministers and punish those who "defect" in a process we label "delegation, " and this procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others. Negotiated targets in the form of fiscal contracts provide an alternative in multi-party governments. Pooled time series regression results for the current European Union states in the period 1981-94 support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dichotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Author: J. Ayuso-i-Casals
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230271790
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 367
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Book Description
This volume contributes to empirical research on the role of national fiscal rules and institutions in shaping fiscal policies. It provides original, policy-oriented analysis on a number of questions and gives illuminating conclusions about the devices which promote sound and sustainable policy. Contributors are leading experts.
Author: Christopher L. Hughes
Publisher: Nova Publishers
ISBN: 9781600211577
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 172
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Book Description
New Research on Politics & Economics of Europe
Author: Philip Keefer
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Decision-making
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Mr.M. Cangiano
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475531095
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 468
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Book Description
The first two decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed an influx of innovations and reforms in public financial management. The current wave of reforms is markedly different from those in the past, owing to the sheer number of innovations, their widespread adoption, and the sense that they add up to a fundamental change in the way governments manage public money. This book takes stock of the most important innovations that have emerged over the past two decades.
Author: Waltraud Schelkle
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198717938
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 387
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Book Description
Creating the European monetary union between diverse and unequal nation states is arguably one of the biggest social experiments in history. This book offers an explanation of how the euro experiment came about and was sustained despite a severe crisis, and provides a comparison with the monetary-financial history of the US. The euro experiment can be understood as risk-sharing through a currency that is issued by a supranational central bank. A single currency shares liquidity risks by creating larger markets for all financial assets. A single monetary policy responds to business cycles in the currency area as a whole rather than managing the path of one dominant economy. Mechanisms of risk-sharing become institutions of monetary solidarity if they are consciously maintained, but they will periodically face opposition in member states. This book argues that diversity of membership is not an economic obstacle to the success of the euro, as diversity increases the potential gains from risk sharing. But political cooperation is needed to realize this potential, and such cooperation is up against collective action problems which become more intractable as the parties become more diverse. Hence, risk-sharing usually comes about as a collective by-product of national incentives. This political-economic tension can explain why the gains from risk-sharing are not more fully exploited, both in the euro area and in the US dollar area. This approach to monetary integration is based on the theory of collective action when hierarchy is not available as a solution to inter-state cooperation. The theory originates with Keohane and Ostrom (1995) and it is applied in this book, taking into account the latest research on the inherent instability of financial market integration.
Author: Iris Geva-May
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 0429806736
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 521
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Book Description
Volume Three of the Classics of Comparative Policy Analysis, contains chapters concerned with "Regional Comparisons and Policy Analysis" – one of the most prevailing approaches in comparative public policy. Through the prism of inter-jurisdiction comparisons of similarities and variations, they address comparisons in specific policy sectors, governance or institutional constructs, and political regimes. The foci are, nevertheless, on those comparisons between countries or regions, which help to lesson-draw by identifying and understanding the variation in policy analysis and policy making that exists within or across regions. One benefit of regional comparisons is that it often allows studies to hold constant many variables, ranging from colonial legacy to federal systems, or from language to specific traditions, and more effectively isolate dependent variables. Regional organizations like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or European Union are also considered as catalysts for regional policy approaches and harmonization, and occupy a major role in this volume. The chapters address a broad and diverse number of countries and geographical areas: Latin America, North America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, the Baltic states, the Nordic states, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Europe as a whole. "Regional Comparisons and Policy Analysis" will be of great interest to scholars and learners of public policy and social sciences, as well as to practitioners considering what can be learned or facilitated through methodologically and theoretically sound approaches. The chapters were originally published as articles in the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis which in the last two decades has pioneered the development of comparative public policy. The volume is part of a four-volume series, the Classics of Comparative Policy Analysis including Theories and Methods, Institutions and Governance, Regional Comparisons, and Policy Sectors. Each volume showcases a different new chapter comparing domains of study interrelated with comparative public policy: political science, public administration, governance and policy design, authored by the JCPA co-editors Giliberto Capano, Iris Geva-May, Michael Howlett, Leslie A. Pal and B. Guy Peters.
Author: Juliet Kaarbo
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 0472028340
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Book Description
Every day, coalition cabinets make policy decisions critical to international politics. Juliet Kaarbo examines the dynamics of these multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies in order to assess both the quality of coalition decision making and the degree to which coalitions tend to favor peaceful or military solutions. Are coalition cabinets so riddled by conflict that they cannot make foreign policy effectively, or do the multiple voices represented in the cabinet create more legitimate and imaginative responses to the international system? Do political and institutional constraints inherent to coalition cabinets lead to nonaggressive policies? Or do institutional and political forces precipitate more belligerent behavior? Employing theory from security studies and political psychology as well as a combination of quantitative cross-national analyses and twelve qualitative comparative case studies of foreign policy made by coalition cabinets in Japan, the Netherlands, and Turkey, Kaarbo identifies the factors that generate highly aggressive policies, inconsistency, and other policy outcomes. Her findings have implications not merely for foreign policy but for all types of decision making and policy-making by coalition governments.
Author: Roger D. Congleton
Publisher:
ISBN: 0190469773
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1017
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Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This second volume examines constitutional political economy and also various applications, including public policy, international relations, and the study of history, as well as methodological and measurement issues. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.
Author: Jens Kromann Kristensen
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 146481466X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 168
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Book Description
This project, based on the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) data set, researched how PEFA can be used to shape policy development in public financial management (PFM) and other major relevant policy areas such as anticorruption, revenue mobilization, political economy analysis, and fragile states. The report explores what shapes the PFM system in low- and middle-income countries by examining the relationship between political institutions and the quality of the PFM system. Although the report finds some evidence that multiple political parties in control of the legislature is associated with better PFM performance, the report finds the need to further refine and test the theories on the relationship between political institutions and PFM. The report addresses the question of the outcomes of PFM systems, distinguishing between fragile and nonfragile states. It finds that better PFM performance is associated with more reliable budgets in terms of expenditure composition in fragile states, but not aggregate budget credibility. Moreover, in contrast to existing studies, it finds no evidence that PFM quality matters for deficit and debt ratios, irrespective of whether a country is fragile or not. The report also explores the relationship between perceptions of corruption and PFM performance. It finds strong evidence of a relationship between better PFM performance and improvements in perceptions of corruption. It also finds that PFM reforms associated with better controls have a stronger relationship with improvements in perceptions of corruption compared to PFM reforms associated with more transparency. The last chapter looks at the relationship between PEFA indicators for revenue administration and domestic resource mobilization. It focuses on the credible use of penalties for noncompliance as a proxy for the type of political commitment required to improve tax performance. The analysis shows that countries that credibly enforce penalties for noncompliance collect more taxes on average.
