Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union PDF Download
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Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget deficits
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor spending ministers and punish those who "defect" in a process we label "delegation, " and this procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others. Negotiated targets in the form of fiscal contracts provide an alternative in multi-party governments. Pooled time series regression results for the current European Union states in the period 1981-94 support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dichotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget deficits
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Get Book Here
Book Description
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor spending ministers and punish those who "defect" in a process we label "delegation, " and this procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others. Negotiated targets in the form of fiscal contracts provide an alternative in multi-party governments. Pooled time series regression results for the current European Union states in the period 1981-94 support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dichotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cabinet system
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
Author: Christopher L. Hughes
Publisher: Nova Publishers
ISBN: 9781600211577
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 172
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Book Description
New Research on Politics & Economics of Europe
Author: J. Ayuso-i-Casals
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230271790
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 367
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Book Description
This volume contributes to empirical research on the role of national fiscal rules and institutions in shaping fiscal policies. It provides original, policy-oriented analysis on a number of questions and gives illuminating conclusions about the devices which promote sound and sustainable policy. Contributors are leading experts.
Author: Sarah Sinram
Publisher: LIT Verlag Münster
ISBN: 3643911173
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Book Description
The book takes a look at social expenditure in affluent democracies in times of fiscal austerity. The study analyzes expenditure changes in nine social policy areas between 1980 - 2010, from an intra-cabinet perspective by considering the partisan affiliation of responsible spending ministers and effects of budgeting reforms. Thus, the analysis contributes to the question of whether parties or institutions matter.
Author: C. Mulas-Granados
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 023050163X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 331
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Book Description
Motivated by the proliferation of fiscal consolidation episodes in the advent of Monetary Union, this book explains the causes and consequences of fiscal policy in Europe, using theory and empirical evidence from the last four decades.
Author: Torsten Persson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262661928
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 324
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Book Description
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.
