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Author: Piero Gottardi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Piero Gottardi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Rohit Rahi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric information as a limiting case. Trade takes place in asset markets that may or may not be complete. We show that equilibria are characterized by two forms of inefficiency, price inefficiency and spanning inefficiency, and that generically both of them are present. Price inefficiency arises whenever equilibrium prices reveal some information. It formalizes and generalizes the so-called Hirshleifer effect, by showing that generically an interim Pareto improvement is possible even conditional on the information that is available to agents in equilibrium; the primary source of the inefficiency is a pecuniary externality. Spanning inefficiency, on the other hand, arises if prices are not fully revealing and markets are incomplete relative to the uncertainty faced by agents in equilibrium. In this case, an ex-post improvement can generically be implemented by providing agents with more information, thus expanding their risk-sharing opportunities and reducing informational asymmetries, even though this additional information restricts the set of allocations that are incentive compatible and individually rational.
Author: Giulio Seccia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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A simple example shows that although non-convexities might prevent the existence of a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, they need not prevent the existence of a non-informative one. Indeed, the economy in this example does not possess any fully revealing equilibria, but does have a continuum of non-informative ones. Keywords and Phrases: Asymmetric information, Non-convex economies.
Author: Piero Gottardi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise traders. The rate at which equilibria in finite replica markets with n traders approach the equilibrium in the continuum economy is 1/[square root]n, slower than the rate of convergence to price-taking behavior (1/n); and the per capita welfare loss is dissipated at the rate 1/n, slower than the rate at which inefficiency due to market power vanishes (1/n[squared]). The model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing.
Author: Simon Messner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Costs, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: Aviad Heifetz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Roger Guesnerie
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262262903
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 498
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A theoretical assessment of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis through subjecting a collection of economic models to an "eductive stability" test. The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) dominates economic modeling in areas ranging from monetary theory, macroeconomics, and general equilibrium to finance. In this book, Roger Guesnerie continues the critical analysis of the REH begun in his Assessing Rational Expectations: Sunspot Multiplicity and Economic Fluctuations, which dealt with the questions raised by multiplicity and its implications for a theory of endogenous fluctuations. This second volume emphasizes "eductive" learning: relying on careful reasoning, agents must deduce what other agents guess, a process that differs from the standard evolutionary learning experience in which agents make decisions about the future based on past experiences. A broad "eductive" stability test is proposed that includes common knowledge and results in a unique "rationalizable expectations equilibrium." This test provides the basis for Guesnerie's theoretical assessment of the plausibility of the REH's expectational coordination, emphasizing, for different categories of economic models, conditions for the REH's success or failure. Guesnerie begins by presenting the concepts and methods of the eductive stability analysis in selected partial equilibrium models. He then explores to what extent general equilibrium strategic complementarities interfere with partial equilibrium considerations in the formation of stable expectations. Guesnerie next examines two issues relating to eductive stability in financial market models, speculation and asymmetric price information. The dynamic settings of an infinite horizon model are then taken up, and particular standard and generalized saddle-path solutions are scrutinized. Guesnerie concludes with a review of general questions and some "cautious" remarks on the policy implications of his analysis.
Author: Stephen Morris
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In a static economy with symmetric information, the informational requirements for competitive equilibrium are very weak: markets clear and each agent is rational. With asymmetric information, the solution concept of competitive equilibrium has been generalized to rational expectations equilibrium. But now common knowledge of market clearing and rationality is required. This paper proves versions of these results in a formal model of knowledge.
