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Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428990178
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428990178
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: William Y’Blood
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252236
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Book Description
Before the Korean War, the primary mission of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer’s Far East Air Forces was air defense of the Japanese homeland. Most of the aircraft constituting Stratemeyer’s inventory were interceptors, not designed for the type of combat that would be required now that the United States was joining in the UN effort to end the war in Korea. The Joint Army/USAAF doctrine of 1946, known as Field Manual 31–35, Air Ground Operations, was also considered outdated in the present circumstance. A new approach to warfighting had to be developed in response to the strong influence of General Douglas MacArthur and other of his air officers in the Army-dominated General Headquarters Far East Command. Close air support of the ground forces as provided by Fifth Air Force came at some cost, and tempers flared in the process, but the air commanders in Korea never deprived the ground commanders of close air support if it was needed. Indeed, without the close air support provided to the airmen, the ground campaign would have been a much more bloody and difficult affair than it was.
Author: William T. Y'Blood
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Author: Francis Hoffman
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1682475905
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit’s skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.
Author: William T. Y'Blood
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Author: LTC Michael J. Chandler
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786253402
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 167
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Book Description
This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland’s impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland’s perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support “controversy.” Throughout his career, Weyland was a staunch advocate of tactical airpower. As Patton’s Airman in World War II, Far East Air Force commander in Korea, and the commander of Tactical Air Command in the mid-1950s, Weyland helped the tactical air community to carve out its role as a critical instrument of national power.
Author: Air Force History and Museums Program (U.S.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Author: John Andreas Olsen
Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.
ISBN: 1597975559
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 561
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Book Description
Presents a regional, national, and global overview of air power; Written by a cadre of military specialists who offer global perspectives; Assesses its cultural as well as military influences
Author: William T. Y'Blood
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Korean War, 1950-1953
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Christopher P. Twomey
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801459745
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
In The Military Lens, Christopher P. Twomey shows how differing military doctrines have led to misperceptions between the United States and China over foreign policy—and the potential dangers these might pose in future relations. Because of their different strategic situations, histories, and military cultures, nations may have radically disparate definitions of effective military doctrine, strategy, and capabilities. Twomey argues that when such doctrines—or "theories of victory"—differ across states, misperceptions about a rival's capabilities and intentions and false optimism about one's own are more likely to occur. In turn, these can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by making it more difficult to communicate and agree on assessments of the balance of power. When states engage in strategic coercion—either to deter or to compel action—such problems can lead to escalation and war. Twomey assesses a wide array of sources in both the United States and China on military doctrine, strategic culture, misperception, and deterrence theory to build case studies of attempts at strategic coercion during Sino-American conflicts in Korea and the Taiwan Strait in the early years of the Cold War, as well as an examination of similar issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After demonstrating how these factors have contributed to past conflicts, Twomey amply documents the persistence of hazardous miscommunication in contemporary Sino-American relations. His unique analytic perspective on military capability suggests that policymakers need to carefully consider the military doctrine of the nations they are trying to influence.
