Do Managers Bias Their Forecasts of Future Earnings in Response to Their Firm's Current Earnings Announcement Surprises? PDF Download
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Author: Stephen P. Baginski
Publisher:
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Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Approximately 90 percent of managers' earnings forecasts are issued simultaneously with their firm's current earnings announcement - a practice referred to as the “bundling” of earnings information. We examine whether managers bias these forecasts conditional on the news conveyed in current earnings, and offer three findings. First, managers appear to release optimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released negative current earnings news. Second, managers appear to release pessimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released large positive current earnings news. Third, these results (especially for optimistic bias when current earnings news is negative) are stronger when managers: (1) face less analyst monitoring and lower litigation risk, which constrain the ability to bias their forecasts, and (2) face greater career concerns, which create incentives to alter investor perceptions about current earnings. Additional analysis suggests that investors are unable to identify the management forecast bias, but that they unravel the bias subsequently as it is revealed. While no archival study can ascertain management intent, we provide several results that cast doubt on the idea that this management forecast bias behavior is purely unintentional. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers issue biased forecasts with the earnings announcement to influence perceptions of their firm's current earnings news.
Author: Stephen P. Baginski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Approximately 90 percent of managers' earnings forecasts are issued simultaneously with their firm's current earnings announcement - a practice referred to as the “bundling” of earnings information. We examine whether managers bias these forecasts conditional on the news conveyed in current earnings, and offer three findings. First, managers appear to release optimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released negative current earnings news. Second, managers appear to release pessimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released large positive current earnings news. Third, these results (especially for optimistic bias when current earnings news is negative) are stronger when managers: (1) face less analyst monitoring and lower litigation risk, which constrain the ability to bias their forecasts, and (2) face greater career concerns, which create incentives to alter investor perceptions about current earnings. Additional analysis suggests that investors are unable to identify the management forecast bias, but that they unravel the bias subsequently as it is revealed. While no archival study can ascertain management intent, we provide several results that cast doubt on the idea that this management forecast bias behavior is purely unintentional. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers issue biased forecasts with the earnings announcement to influence perceptions of their firm's current earnings news.
Author: Lawrence D. Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Managerial behavior differs considerably when managers report quarterly profits versus losses. When they report profits, managers seek to just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. When they report losses, managers do not attempt to meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. Instead, managers often do not forewarn analysts of impending losses, and the analyst's signed error is likely to be negative and extreme (i.e., a measured optimistic bias). Brown (1997 Financial Analysts Journal) shows that the optimistic bias in analyst earnings forecasts has been mitigated over time, and that it is less pronounced for larger firms and firms followed by many analysts. In the present study, I offer three explanations for these temporal and cross-sectional phenomena. First, the frequency of profits versus losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. Since an optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is less likely to occur when firms report profits, an optimistic bias is less likely to be observed in samples possessing a relatively greater frequency of profits. Second, the tendency to report profits that just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage profits' (and analyst estimates) in this manner reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. Third, the tendency to forewarn analysts of impending losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage losses' in this manner also reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. I provide the following temporal evidence. The optimistic bias in analyst forecasts pertains to both the entire sample and the losses sub-sample. In contrast, a pessimistic bias exists for the 85.3% of the sample that consists of reported profits. The temporal decrease in the optimistic bias documented by Brown (1997) pertains to both losses and profits. Analysts have gotten better at predicting the sign of a loss (i.e., they are much more likely to predict that a loss will occur than they used to), and they have reduced the number of extreme negative errors they make by two-thirds. Managers are much more likely to report profits that exactly meet or slightly beat analyst estimates than they used to. In contrast, they are less likely to report profits that fall a little short of analyst estimates than they used to. I conclude that the temporal reduction in optimistic bias is attributable to an increased tendency to manage both profits and losses. I find no evidence that there exists a temporal change in the profits-losses mix (using the I/B/E/S definition of reported quarterly profits and losses). I document the following cross-sectional evidence. The principle reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that slightly beat analyst estimates. The principle reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that exactly meet analyst estimates or beat them by one penny. I find no evidence that managers of larger firms or firms followed by more analysts are relatively more likely to forewarn analysts of impending losses. I conclude that cross-sectional differences in bias arise primarily from differential 'loss frequencies,' and secondarily from differential 'profits management.' The paper discusses implications of the results for studies of analysts forecast bias, earnings management, and capital markets. It concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
Author: Robert Libby
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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We investigate analysts? reactions to qualitative warnings of adverse earnings, and attempt to reconcile analysts? more negative forecast revisions, as documented in previous research, and the apparently conflicting anecdotal evidence that suggests more positive responses to firms that warn. We conjecture that the inconsistency arises because warnings cause analysts to revise their earnings forecasts sequentially in response to two related signals (the warning and the earnings announcement). However, their responses to retrospective questions about the effects of warnings are the result of a simultaneous response to both signals. In our experiment, 28 financial analysts predicted future years? earnings in one of three conditions. Consistent with the anecdotal evidence suggesting that analysts evaluate warnings positively, analysts who simultaneously evaluated a warning and a later earnings announcement (the Simultaneous warning condition) forecasted higher future earnings than analysts who received no warning (the No Warning condition). However, analysts who first revised their forecasts based on the warning and then made a second revision based on the later earnings announcement (our Sequential warning condition) forecasted much lower future earnings than those in the Simultaneous warning condition, and slightly lower future earnings than in the No warning condition. This suggests that the act of sequential processing contributes to analysts more negative forecasts documented in previous archival research. Taken together, these results suggest that the positive impact of analysts' stated beliefs about firms that warn (as reflected in their responses to reporters? retrospective questions) are more than offset by the effects of sequentially processing a warning followed by an earnings announcement.
Author: Katrina Ellis
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
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It has been well-documented that prices respond quickly, if not completely, to the information in quarterly earnings announcements. In this paper we show that after conditioning on past earnings surprises, companies that meet analyst expectations have positive (negative) returns following a prior negative (positive) surprise. We attribute this price response to investors expecting to be surprised, in that they expect past earnings surprises to continue into the future. As meeting expectations is a reversal of the surprise trend, the investors react to this new information by reversing the price trend. The price response to meeting earnings forecasts appears to be due to investor overreaction, with subsequent returns undoing the overreaction.
Author: Mei Feng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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Author: Senyo Y. Tse
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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The likelihood that earnings announcements meet or beat analyst expectations differs substantially and systematically across firms. Prior research explores managers incentives to meet analyst expectations. In this paper, we examine analysts incentives to issue systematically biased earnings forecasts and thereby influence the likelihood that firms report good earnings news. We first document that forecast biases are systematically different, as large firms and firms with low forecast dispersion - labeled high-information firms - are more likely to report positive earning surprises, while small firms and firms with large forecast dispersion - labeled low-information firms - tend to have optimistically biased forecasts that often lead to negative earnings surprises. We also show that potential financing needs induce more optimistic forecasts for low-information firms, but this effect is greatly mitigated for high-information firms. We find that career concerns help explain analysts' systematic forecast bias. An analyst's career longevity is enhanced by issuing pessimistic forecasts for high-information firms and optimistic forecasts for low-information firms. Optimistic forecast bias for high-financing-need firms has no consequence for an analyst's career longevity, but optimistic bias for low-financing-need firms hurts. Our results suggest that career concerns contribute to a systematic pattern of forecasting that aligns with managerial preferences.
Author: Lise Newman Graham
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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Author: Marie Blouin
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Prior literature presents mixed evidence on whether managers can elicit a stronger market response to management earnings forecasts by including other forward looking information. There is little evidence to date on whether we should expect, a priori, a larger price change following a forecast that includes other information. I investigate three possible explanations. I posit that managers may be including other information with very surprising forecasts in order to corroborate exceptional news; however, I find no evidence to support this. Second, the disclosure of additional information with the forecast might signal a forecast of high accuracy or low bias, thus precipitating a stronger market response per unit of forecast surprise. I find no evidence of higher accuracy, but some evidence of reduced bias when forecast surprise is large and the news in the forecast is good. The real explanation appears to lie with information intermediaries. I predict and find that management forecasts with other information are more useful to analysts. I find that analysts make larger forecast revisions when other information is included with a management forecast and that subsequent analysts' forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed. Through the filter of analysts, the other information included with management forecasts of earnings gives market participants more accurate and consistent information about the future prospects of the firm.
Author: Arianna S. Pinello
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Archival studies document an asymmetrically strong market reaction to positive vis-agrave;-vis negative earnings surprises. This finding appears inconsistent with the well-known effect of loss aversion and remains unexplained. I contend that this reaction pattern can arise when investors' earnings expectations do not coincide with analyst forecasts. Numerous studies document optimistic biases in analyst forecasts. If investors perceive optimistic biases in analyst forecasts, their earnings expectations will be lower than analyst forecasts. Because the contrast between the obtained and the expected outcome determines the degree of perceived surprise, an investor expectation which is below the analyst forecast results in a larger (smaller) perceived earnings surprise than reported when the surprise is positive (negative). Investors' lower expectations relative to analyst forecasts therefore result in a stronger reaction to positive than to negative reported earnings surprises of equivalent magnitude. In a controlled experiment, I replicate the asymmetrically strong reaction to positive reported earnings surprises, and trace this reaction pattern to investors' perceptions of these surprises. I further show that when earnings surprises are measured based on investors' perception of those surprises, the differential reaction pattern reverses: investors react asymmetrically strong to negative vis-agrave;-vis positive perceived earnings surprises, consistent with loss aversion. My findings carry implications for investors and accounting researchers.
Author: Jonathan L. Rogers
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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We examine how the market's ability to assess the truthfulness of management earnings forecasts affects the extent to which managers bias their forecasts, and we evaluate whether the market's response to management forecasts is consistent with it identifying the predictable bias in forecasts. We find that managers more likely to face litigation release less optimistic forecasts than managers less likely to face litigation, and this incentive is dampened when it is more difficult to detect whether managers have misrepresented their forward-looking information. Further, when it is more difficult to detect forecast bias, we find that managers are more likely to offer forecasts that increase their profits from insider transactions and managers of financially distressed firms are more optimistic than those of healthy firms. With regard to the stock price response to forecasts, we find the market's immediate response varies with the predictable bias in good but not bad news forecasts. The market's subsequent response, however, is consistent with investors eventually identifying the bias in bad news forecasts and modifying their valuation of the firm in the appropriate direction.
