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Author: Zhilan Feng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find the REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.
Author: Zhilan Feng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find the REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.
Author: John M. Griffith
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
This study focuses on REIT CEO compensation. We utilize five different definitions for CEO compensation: salary, bonus, cash compensation, total compensation, and option awards. To capture the determinants of CEO compensation, we use the following performance measures: three-year stock returns, MVA (market value added), and Tobin's q. We also examine the impact of managerial power on compensation. We utilize a panel data set to capture both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Our panel data set captures both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Previous work on REIT executive compensation has chiefly looked at compensation data on cross-sectional basis. We find performance and size do not influence the CEO's salary while, risk, term, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Contrary to previous findings and our expectations, bonuses are not influenced by risk, CEO power, or size.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This research examines the relation between incentive-based compensation and subsequent Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) performance as well as the determinants of incentive-based compensation for REITs. I propose that REITs either rely on incentive-based compensation to substitute for poor corporate governance practices or may not need to rely excessively on incentive-based compensation to align managers and shareholder interests, given their heavily regulated nature and their corporate governance practices. Using a sample of publicly traded equity, hybrid, and operating REITs for the 1999-2003 period, I find a negative relation between incentive based compensation awards and subsequent stock returns for REITs. Interestingly, this relation is not found when return on assets (ROA) is the measure of performance. These results imply that excessive incentive-based compensation negatively impact future REIT performance from a market perspective, but not an accounting perspective. With regard to the determinants of incentive based compensation, I find that CEO ownership, board of director characteristics, and institutional ownership are consistent determinants of the level of incentive based compensation awarded to REIT CEOs. Overall, the results imply that REIT corporate governance practices substitute for incentive-based compensation, but still, the level of incentive-based compensation paid to REIT CEOs is excessive up to the point that it negatively affects subsequent REIT performance.
Author: Magdy Carolina Noguera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 88
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Book Description
JEL classification. G30; G32; G34.
Author: Jennifer Carpenter
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1475751923
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 159
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Book Description
Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Author: Chinmoy Ghosh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
In a perfect world where the board of directors is independent of CEO influence, CEO pay-for-performance compensation contracts should be a function of performance only. If the CEO can influence board structure through his ownership of company stock or chairmanship of the board, however, performance contracts are sub-optimal and agency problems arise, which allow the CEO to extract rent and demand compensation in excess of the equilibrium level. As such, models of compensation contracts must include board and ownership structure variables, in addition to the traditional economic determinants. Our analyses with REITs corroborate this notion. Our data demonstrate that the structure of REIT boards are not independent of CEO influence, and significant agency problems exist allowing the CEO to design boards that reward him at the cost of shareholder wealth. CEO compensation in REITs depends significantly on the usual economic measures of performance including firm size and return on assets; more importantly, CEO compensation is higher in REITs where the board is weak in monitoring because of large size, and older directors; the effect of a blockholder is adverse, however. This study provides additional evidence to the growing literature that observed board structures are ineffective in monitoring and governance.
Author: Zhilan Feng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Our objective in this paper is to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and CEO compensation structure of REITs. Based on detailed analyses of data on institutional ownership, performance, CEO and board characteristics over the 10 year period 1998-2007, we find significant evidence that large institutions influence governance through CEO compensation -- greater institutional ownership is associated with greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation (higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation), and higher cash and total compensation for CEOs. Further, we find that institutions are less active when managers are performing in a superior fashion. Two important conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, similar to unregulated firms, institutional owners do act as monitors in REITs. Broadly, this result suggests that governance is necessary for REITs. Second, institutional investors set a high pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs, but are willing to pay higher cash compensation to induce managers to take risk.
Author: Frederick D. Lipman
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0470223790
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Book Description
Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Author: Jeongil Seo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
Author: Alexander Kostyuk
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1785606824
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 299
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Book Description
This book argues for a correct balance between risk and reward and for Directors' remuneration to be equitable to all parties and stakeholders. By examining the current theories, practices and regulations and explaining them in detail it provides a state of the art overview of one of the key corporate governance issues of our time.
