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Author: William J. Congdon
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815704984
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 260
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Book Description
Argues that public finance--the study of the government's role in economics--should incorporate principles from behavior economics and other branches of psychology.
Author: William J. Congdon
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815704984
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 260
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Book Description
Argues that public finance--the study of the government's role in economics--should incorporate principles from behavior economics and other branches of psychology.
Author: John A. Nyman
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804744881
Category : Health & Fitness
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.
Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Author: Thomas G. McGuire
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 012811326X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 659
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Book Description
Risk Adjustment, Risk Sharing and Premium Regulation in Health Insurance Markets: Theory and Practice describes the goals, design and evaluation of health plan payment systems. Part I contains 5 chapters discussing the role of health plan payment in regulated health insurance markets, key aspects of payment design (i.e. risk adjustment, risk sharing and premium regulation), and evaluation methods using administrative data on medical spending. Part II contains 14 chapters describing the health plan payment system in 14 countries and sectors around the world, including Australia, Belgium, Chile, China, Columbia, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland and the United States. Authors discuss the evolution of these payment schemes, along with ongoing reforms and key lessons on the design of health plan payment. - Provides a conceptual toolkit that describes the goals, design and evaluation of health plan payment systems in the context of policy paradigms, such as efficiency, affordability, fairness and avoidance of risk selection - Brings together international experience from many different countries that apply regulated competition in different ways - Delivers a practical toolkit for the evaluation of health plan payment modalities from the standpoint of efficiency and fairness
Author: Guy Thomas
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110710033X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 285
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Book Description
A novel book that argues that, contrary to received wisdom, some adverse selection in insurance markets is beneficial to society as a whole. It is for all those interested in public policy arguments about insurance and discrimination: policymakers, academics, actuaries, underwriters, disability activists, geneticists and other medical professionals.
Author: Konstantinos Giannakas
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 1609621425
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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Book Description
This book presents a multi-market framework of market and policy analysis that explicitly accounts for the empirically relevant heterogeneity in consumer preferences and producer characteristics. The explicit consideration of consumer and producer heterogeneity represents a significant departure from the representative consumer and producer that have been at the center of most of the literature on market and policy analysis, and enables the distributional impacts of changes in market conditions and policies to be fully identified. The framework is used to analyze the system-wide market and welfare impacts of a number of changes in market conditions (like changes in consumer preferences, costs and market structure) and policies (like subsidies and taxes) on one of the products in the system. Consistent with a priori expectations, the use of the framework unveils impacts masked by the conventional market and policy analysis.
Author: Andreas Fagereng
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484370066
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 69
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Book Description
We provide a systematic analysis of the properties of individual returns to wealth using twelve years of population data from Norway’s administrative tax records. We document a number of novel results. First, during our sample period individuals earn markedly different average returns on their financial assets (a standard deviation of 14%) and on their net worth (a standard deviation of 8%). Second, heterogeneity in returns does not arise merely from differences in the allocation of wealth between safe and risky assets: returns are heterogeneous even within asset classes. Third, returns are positively correlated with wealth: moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the financial wealth distribution increases the return by 3 percentage points - and by 17 percentage points when the same exercise is performed for the return to net worth. Fourth, wealth returns exhibit substantial persistence over time. We argue that while this persistence partly reflects stable differences in risk exposure and assets scale, it also reflects persistent heterogeneity in sophistication and financial information, as well as entrepreneurial talent. Finally, wealth returns are (mildly) correlated across generations. We discuss the implications of these findings for several strands of the wealth inequality debate.
Author: Howard C. Kunreuther
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521845726
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 343
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Book Description
This book examines the behavior of individuals at risk and insurance industry policy makers involved in selling, buying and regulation.
Author: Annette Hofmann
Publisher: VVW GmbH
ISBN: 3862981134
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191
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Book Description
The focus of this thesis is on consumer diversity. Incorporating consumer heterogeneity into economic analysis is well-established in industrial organization literature; this aspect is, however, often neglected in microeconomic insurance models. A first new approach lies in analyzing risk interdependencies. When risks are interdependent, an agent's decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilities faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on others. We analyze an insurance market with externalities of loss prevention. It is shown in a model with heterogenous agents and imperfect information that a monopolistic insurer can achieve the social optimum by engaging in premium discrimination. An insurance monopoly reduces not only costs of risk selection, but may also play an important social role in loss prevention. This result can be empirically confirmed. We also deal with the impact of intermediation on insurance market transparency and performance. In a differentiated insurance market under imperfect information, uninformed consumers may become informed about product suitability by consulting an intermediary. We analyze current broker compensation systems: commissions and fees. While insurers' equilibrium profits are equivalent under both systems, social welfare under fees is first-best efficient. Both systems may offer the opportunity to increase profits via collusion. Under a commission system, collusion enables insurers to separate consumers into groups purchasing different contracts. Insurers may then extract additional rents from some consumers. This might explain why intermediaries tend to be compensated by insurers in practice. Finally, we study optimal monopoly pricing given imperfect information and heterogenous policyholders. Die in englischer Sprache verfasste Arbeit ist der mikroökonomischen Analyse von Versicherungsmärkten gewidmet. Zunächst werden einige wichtige theoretische Grundlagen der Versicherungsnachfragetheorie beschrieben. Eine zentrale Erweiterung des Basismodells stellen interdependente Risiken dar. Bestehen Risikointerdependenzen, so sind alle Maßnahmen, die die Schadenshäufigkeit reduzieren, mit positiven externen Effekten verbunden. Es wird gezeigt, dass im Gleichgewicht das realisierte Präventionsniveau unterhalb des optimalen Niveaus angesiedelt ist. Aufgrund der Externalitäten kommt es zu einem Marktversagen und nur ein Monopolversicherer kann eine differenzierte Prämienstruktur herbeiführen, die zum optimalen Präventionsniveau führt. Dieses Ergebnis kollidiert mit dem Ergebnis, dass wettbewerbliche Versicherungsmärkte zu einer höheren Gesamtwohlfahrt führen, es lässt sich jedoch empirisch stützen. Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt der Arbeit liegt auf unvollkommenen Versicherungsmärkten, wobei heterogene Versicherungsnachfrager mit unterschiedlichen Produktpräferenzen und Informationskosten unterstellt werden. In einem solchen Markt erhöhen Versicherungsvermittler die Markttransparenz und damit auch die Gewinne der Versicherer. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Analyse verschiedener Vergütungsformen der Vermittler. Ein Vergütungssystem auf Basis von Beratungshonoraren ist einem Provisionssystem aus wohlfahrtsökonomischer Perspektive vorzuziehen. Aus Sicht der Versicherer kehrt sich dieses Ergebnis allerdings um, sobald es zur Kollusion zwischen Versicherern und Vermittlern kommt. Der letzte Schwerpunkt liegt in der Analyse einer optimalen Preispolitik eines Versicherungsmonopolisten bei heterogenen Nachfragern, die sich durch ihre Risikopräferenzen und damit ihre individuelle Zahlungsbereitschaft für Versicherungen unterscheiden.
Author: Willard G. Manning
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 9780833008640
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 99
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Book Description
"Supported by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services."
