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Author: Juan Carlos Hatchondo
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ISBN:
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Languages : en
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Author: Juan Carlos Hatchondo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Dr. Leonardo Martinez
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1455225045
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
We propose a modification to a baseline sovereign default framework that allows us to quantify the importance of debt dilution in accounting for the level and volatility of the interest rate spread paid by sovereigns. We measure the effects of debt dilution by comparing the simulations of the baseline model (with debt dilution) with the ones of the modified model without dilution. We calibrate the baseline model to mimic the mean and standard deviation of the spread, as well as the external debt level, the mean debt duration and a measure of default frequency in the data. We find that, even without commitment to future repayment policies and withoutcontingency of sovereign debt, if the sovereign could eliminate debt dilution, the number of default per 100 years decreases from 3.10 to 0.42. The mean spread decreases from 7.38% to 0.57%. The standard deviation of the spread decreases from 2.45 to 0.72. Default risk falls in part because of a reduction of the level of sovereign debt (36% of the face value and of 11% of the market value). But we show that the most important effect of dilution on default risk results from a shift in the set of government''s borrowing opportunities. Our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets where the debt dilution problem could be present.
Author: Mr.Leonardo Martinez
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1455227099
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
We propose a modification to a baseline sovereign default framework that allows us to quantify the importance of debt dilution in accounting for the level and volatility of the interest rate spread paid by sovereigns. We measure the effects of debt dilution by comparing the simulations of the baseline model (with debt dilution) with the ones of the modified model without dilution. We calibrate the baseline model to mimic the mean and standard deviation of the spread, as well as the external debt level, the mean debt duration and a measure of default frequency in the data. We find that, even without commitment to future repayment policies and withoutcontingency of sovereign debt, if the sovereign could eliminate debt dilution, the number of default per 100 years decreases from 3.10 to 0.42. The mean spread decreases from 7.38% to 0.57%. The standard deviation of the spread decreases from 2.45 to 0.72. Default risk falls in part because of a reduction of the level of sovereign debt (36% of the face value and of 11% of the market value). But we show that the most important effect of dilution on default risk results from a shift in the set of government's borrowing opportunities. Our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets where the debt dilution problem could be present.
Author: Mark Aguiar
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691189242
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
An integrated approach to the economics of sovereign default Fiscal crises and sovereign default repeatedly threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador provide a unified and tractable theoretical framework that elucidates the key economics behind sovereign debt markets, shedding light on the frictions and inefficiencies that prevent the smooth functioning of these markets, and proposing sensible approaches to sovereign debt management. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default looks at the core friction unique to sovereign debt—the lack of strong legal enforcement—and goes on to examine additional frictions such as deadweight costs of default, vulnerability to runs, the incentive to “dilute” existing creditors, and sovereign debt’s distortion of investment and growth. The book uses the tractable framework to isolate how each additional friction affects the equilibrium outcome, and illustrates its counterpart using state-of-the-art computational modeling. The novel approach presented here contrasts the outcome of a constrained efficient allocation—one chosen to maximize the joint surplus of creditors and government—with the competitive equilibrium outcome. This allows for a clear analysis of the extent to which equilibrium prices efficiently guide the government’s debt and default decisions, and of what drives divergences with the efficient outcome. Providing an integrated approach to sovereign debt and default, this incisive and authoritative book is an ideal resource for researchers and graduate students interested in this important topic.
Author: Mark Aguiar
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691231435
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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Book Description
An integrated approach to the economics of sovereign default Fiscal crises and sovereign default repeatedly threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador provide a unified and tractable theoretical framework that elucidates the key economics behind sovereign debt markets, shedding light on the frictions and inefficiencies that prevent the smooth functioning of these markets, and proposing sensible approaches to sovereign debt management. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default looks at the core friction unique to sovereign debt—the lack of strong legal enforcement—and goes on to examine additional frictions such as deadweight costs of default, vulnerability to runs, the incentive to “dilute” existing creditors, and sovereign debt’s distortion of investment and growth. The book uses the tractable framework to isolate how each additional friction affects the equilibrium outcome, and illustrates its counterpart using state-of-the-art computational modeling. The novel approach presented here contrasts the outcome of a constrained efficient allocation—one chosen to maximize the joint surplus of creditors and government—with the competitive equilibrium outcome. This allows for a clear analysis of the extent to which equilibrium prices efficiently guide the government’s debt and default decisions, and of what drives divergences with the efficient outcome. Providing an integrated approach to sovereign debt and default, this incisive and authoritative book is an ideal resource for researchers and graduate students interested in this important topic.
Author: Mr.Enrique G. Mendoza
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 146230222X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Emerging markets business cycle models treat default risk as part of an exogenous interest rate on working capital, while sovereign default models treat income fluctuations as an exogenous endowment process with ad-noc default costs. We propose instead a general equilibrium model of both sovereign default and business cycles. In the model, some imported inputs require working capital financing; default on public and private obligations occurs simultaneously. The model explains several features of cyclical dynamics around default triggers an efficiency loss as these inputs are replaced by imperfect substitutes; and default on public and private obligations occurs simultaneously. The model explains several features of cyclical dynamics around deraults, countercyclical spreads, high debt ratios, and key business cycle moments.
Author:
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 9291316695
Category : Bank capital
Languages : en
Pages : 294
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Book Description
Author: Mr.Andreas A. Jobst
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475557531
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 93
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Book Description
The recent global financial crisis has forced a re-examination of risk transmission in the financial sector and how it affects financial stability. Current macroprudential policy and surveillance (MPS) efforts are aimed establishing a regulatory framework that helps mitigate the risk from systemic linkages with a view towards enhancing the resilience of the financial sector. This paper presents a forward-looking framework ("Systemic CCA") to measure systemic solvency risk based on market-implied expected losses of financial institutions with practical applications for the financial sector risk management and the system-wide capital assessment in top-down stress testing. The suggested approach uses advanced contingent claims analysis (CCA) to generate aggregate estimates of the joint default risk of multiple institutions as a conditional tail expectation using multivariate extreme value theory (EVT). In addition, the framework also helps quantify the individual contributions to systemic risk and contingent liabilities of the financial sector during times of stress.
Author: Jerome E. Roos
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691184933
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 413
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Book Description
How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries—and the dangers this poses to democracy The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece’s short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.
Author: Mr.Juan Carlos Hatchondo
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1498313310
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 25
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Book Description
We quantify gains from introducing non-defaultable debt as a limited additional financing option into a model of equilibrium sovereign risk. We find that, for an initial (defaultable) sovereign debt level equal to 66 percent of trend aggregate income and a sovereign spread of 2.9 percent, introducing the possibility of issuing non-defaultable debt for up to 10 percent of aggregate income reduces immediately the spread to 1.4 percent, and implies a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of 0.9 percent. The spread reduction would be only 0.1 (0.2) percentage points higher if the government uses nondefaultable debt to buy back (finance a “voluntary” debt exchange for) previously issued defaultable debt. Without restrictions to defaultable debt issuances in the future, the spread reduction achieved by the introduction of non-defaultable debt is short lived. We also show that allowing governments in default to increase non-defaultable debt is damaging at the time non-defaultable debt is introduced and inconsequential in the medium term. These findings shed light on different aspects of proposals to introduce common euro-area sovereign bonds that could be virtually non-defaultable.
