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Author: Nicholas J. Schlosser
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780393933
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces. The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.
Author: Department of Defense
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781521234419
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 138
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Book Description
Since the surge in Iraq in 2007, counterinsurgency (COIN) has been at the forefront of military and foreign affairs debates. Although COIN is not a new idea, the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought renewed attention to its theory and practice as top leaders in both the government and the military have considered the most effective strategy for these conflicts. A symposium cosponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation explored the complexities of COIN leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. From that symposium came these papers, which discuss topics such as brigade and regimental command, officer development in the military, and general officer leadership. Featuring leading COIN theorists and practitioners from the military, academic, and private sectors, this volume sheds new light on past and present COIN operations and points the way toward those in the future. This collection includes material written by David Petraeus and Paula Broadwell. Foreword * Major General Robert B. Neller, USMC * Introduction: Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond * Nicholas J. Schlosser * Part I: Counterinsurgency Leadership * Chapter 1 - Counterinsurgency Leadership: The Key to Afghanistan and Iraq * Mark Moyar * Chapter 2 - Supreme Command in Irregular Warfare * Eliot A. Cohen * Part II: Brigade and Regimental Command * Chapter 3 - The Art of Brigade Command in Counterinsurgency * H. R. McMaster * Chapter 4 - Brigade Command in Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons from the Iraq War * Peter R. Mansoor * Chapter 5 - Regimental Command in Counterinsurgency * W. Blake Crowe * Part III: Battalion Command * Chapter 6 - The Art of Battalion Command in Counterinsurgency: A Discussion * Francis J. "Bing" West * David J. Furness * William M. Jurney * Julian Dale Alford * Part IV: Officer Development in the U.S. Military * Chapter 7 - Officer Development for Counterinsurgency * Nathaniel C. Fick * Chapter 8 - The "Major" Challenge of Junior Officer Leadership Development and Talent Management * Paula D. Broadwell * Chapter 9 - Generalship and Counterinsurgency * Thomas E. Ricks * Part V: Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan * Chapter 10 - Winning in Afghanistan * David W. Barno and John K. Wood * Chapter 11 - Advising Afghan Military Forces * Jeffery M. Haynes * Part VI: The 2009 Afghan Presidential Election * Chapter 12 - The Afghan Election and the Future of Afghanistan's Leadership: A Discussion * Robert D. Kaplan * Clare Lockhart * Amin Tarzi * Jeffrey Gedmin * Part VII: General Officer Leadership in Counterinsurgency * Chapter 13 - A Conversation with General David H. Petraeus
Author: Nicholas J. Schlosser
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780393933
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 212
Get Book Here
Book Description
The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces. The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.
Author: Nicholas J. Schlosser
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780160880094
Category : Command of troops
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown once again the difference that excellent leadership can make in irregular warfare. Thrust unexpectedly into counterinsurgency situations in 2002 and 2003, American commanders had to operate under difficult and constantly changing conditions. Some adapted quickly; others adjusted over a longer period of time with the help of experience and education. Selecting the right commanders became more important than ever to unit effectiveness. We have come a long way in recent years, but opportunities for further improvement in leadership development and command selection remain. The need for leadership goes beyond today's conflicts and lies at the heart of the current debates over the future of our national security organizations and strategy.
Author: Hannah Gurman
Publisher: New Press, The
ISBN: 1595588256
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Book Description
The first book of its kind, Hearts and Minds is a scathing response to the grand narrative of U.S. counterinsurgency, in which warfare is defined not by military might alone but by winning the "hearts and minds" of civilians. Dormant as a tactic since the days of the Vietnam War, in 2006 the U.S. Army drafted a new field manual heralding the resurrection of counterinsurgency as a primary military engagement strategy; counterinsurgency campaigns followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that counterinsurgency had utterly failed to account for the actual lived experiences of the people whose hearts and minds America had sought to win. Drawing on leading thinkers in the field and using key examples from Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hearts and Minds brings a long-overdue focus on the many civilians caught up in these conflicts. Both urgent and timely, this important book challenges the idea of a neat divide between insurgents and the populations from which they emerge—and should be required reading for anyone engaged in the most important contemporary debates over U.S. military policy.
Author: Paul Joseph
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137401877
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 178
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Book Description
"Soft" Counterinsurgency reviews the promises and achievements of Human Terrain Teams, the small groups of social scientists that were eventually embedded in every combat brigade in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Author: Mark Moyar
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300156014
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 384
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Book Description
Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency which draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans. He identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been more prevalent in some organizations than others.
Author: David H. Ucko
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1589017285
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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Book Description
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.
Author: Conrad Charles Crane
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1682470202
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 329
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Book Description
When Conrad Crane retired from active duty to become a research professor, he never expected to become a modern Cassandra, fated to tell truth to power without being heeded. After the world transformed on 9/11, he warned the Army that it was not prepared to execute stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the eventual reconstruction of Iraq. Crane’s work attracted the attention of Generals David Petraeus and James Mattis, and he soon found himself in charge of a team tasked with creating the groundbreaking Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, the very counterinsurgency doctrine he had pleaded for. A unique blend of traditional and modern theory, this manual would prove to be essential to the success of the Surge in Iraq that changed the course of the war. Crane’s account of the creation and implementation of the manual addresses its many criticisms, details what went wrong in Iraq, and explains how the new doctrine was never properly applied in Afghanistan. From the debates over the content to the ways it was used in the field, Cassandra in Oz covers lessons that should be gleaned from years of global war and displays the American military as a learning organization at its best.
Author: David Kilcullen
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199746257
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 265
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Book Description
David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots-including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.
Author: John R Ballard
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612511686
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 410
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Book Description
From Kabul to Baghdad and Back provides insight into the key strategic decisions of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns as the United States attempted to wage both simultaneously against al-Qaeda and its supporting affiliates. It also evaluates the strategic execution of those military campaigns to identify how well the two operations were conducted in light of their political objectives. The book identifies the elements that made the 2001 military operation to oust the Taliban successful, then with combat operations in Iraq as a standard of comparison, the authors analyze the remainder of the Afghan campaign and the essential problems that plagued that effort, from the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2002, through the ill-fated transition to NATO lead in Afghanistan in 2006, the dismissal of Generals McKiernan and McChrystal, the eventual decision by President Obama to make the Afghan campaign the main effort in the war on extremism, and the final development of drawdown plans following the end of the war in Iraq. No other book successfully compares and contrasts the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective, analyzing the impact of fighting the Iraq War on the success of the United States campaign in Afghanistan. It is also the first book to specifically question several key operational decisions in Afghanistan including: the decision to give NATO the lead in Afghanistan, the decisions to fire Generals McKiernan and McChrystal and the decision to conduct an Iraq War-style surge in Afghanistan. It also compares the Afghan campaigns fought by the Soviet Union and the United States, the counterinsurgency campaigns styles in Iraq and Afghanistan and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the final chapter, the key lessons of the two campaigns are outlined, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making, the utility of population focused counterinsurgency practices, the challenges of building partner capacity during combat, and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.
