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Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195300793
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195300793
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Get Book Here
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Get Book Here
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Pavlo V. Prokopovych
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: Michael Maschler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108493459
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1053
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Book Description
This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 926
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Book Description
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author: Samson Lasaulce
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0123846994
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 346
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Book Description
Written by leading experts in the field, Game Theory and Learning for Wireless Networks Covers how theory can be used to solve prevalent problems in wireless networks such as power control, resource allocation or medium access control. With the emphasis now on promoting 'green' solutions in the wireless field where power consumption is minimized, there is an added focus on developing network solutions that maximizes the use of the spectrum available. With the growth of distributed wireless networks such as Wi-Fi and the Internet; the push to develop ad hoc and cognitive networks has led to a considerable interest in applying game theory to wireless communication systems. Game Theory and Learning for Wireless Networks is the first comprehensive resource of its kind, and is ideal for wireless communications R&D engineers and graduate students. Samson Lasaulce is a senior CNRS researcher at the Laboratory of Signals and Systems (LSS) at Supélec, Gif-sur-Yvette, France. He is also a part-time professor in the Department of Physics at École Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France. Hamidou Tembine is a professor in the Department of Telecommunications at Supélec, Gif-sur-Yvette, France. Merouane Debbah is a professor at Supélec, Gif-sur-Yvette, France. He is the holder of the Alcatel-Lucent chair in flexible radio since 2007. - The first tutorial style book that gives all the relevant theory, at the right level of rigour, for the wireless communications engineer - Bridges the gap between theory and practice by giving examples and case studies showing how game theory can solve real world resource allocation problems - Contains algorithms and techniques to implement game theory in wireless terminals
Author: Julio González-Díaz
Publisher: American Mathematical Society
ISBN: 1470465736
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 324
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Book Description
Game theory provides a mathematical setting for analyzing competition and cooperation in interactive situations. The theory has been famously applied in economics, but is relevant in many other sciences, such as political science, biology, and, more recently, computer science. This book presents an introductory and up-to-date course on game theory addressed to mathematicians and economists, and to other scientists having a basic mathematical background. The book is self-contained, providing a formal description of the classic game-theoretic concepts together with rigorous proofs of the main results in the field. The theory is illustrated through abundant examples, applications, and exercises. The style is distinctively concise, while offering motivations and interpretations of the theory to make the book accessible to a wide readership. The basic concepts and results of game theory are given a formal treatment, and the mathematical tools necessary to develop them are carefully presented. Cooperative games are explained in detail, with bargaining and TU-games being treated as part of a general framework. The authors stress the relation between game theory and operations research. The book is suitable for a graduate or an advanced undergraduate course on game theory.
Author: Heski Bar-Isaac
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601981589
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Book Description
Seller Reputation introduces a unifying framework that embeds a number of different approaches to seller reputation, incorporating both hidden information and hidden action. This framework is used to stress that the way in which consumers learn affects both behavior and outcomes. In particular, the extent to which information is generated and socially aggregated determines the efficiency of markets. After reviewing these theoretical building blocks, Seller Reputation examines several applications and empirical concerns. It highlights that the environment in which a transaction is embedded helps determine whether the transaction will occur and how parties will behave. Institutions, ranging from the design of online markets to norms in a community, can be understood as ensuring that concerns for reputation lead to more efficient outcomes. Similarly, the desire to affect consumer beliefs regarding the firm's incentives can help us understand strategic firm decisions that seem unrelated to the particular transactions they wish to promote. Seller Reputation concludes by considering slightly different models of reputation that lie beyond the scope of this framework, briefly reviewing the somewhat sparse empirical literature and suggesting future directions for research.
