Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Financial Analysts Forecasts PDF Download
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Author: Phillip J. McKnight
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between financial analysts' forecasts and key governance mechanisms. We test the extent that the presence and structure of a firm's audit, remuneration and nomination committee affects both analysts' forecast errors and the dispersion of the errors. We argue that independent sub-committees are likely to reduce the management's incentive to adopt earnings management strategies that distort financial analysts' forecasts. After accounting for various control factors our initial results show that the presence of an audit, remuneration, and nomination committee reduces analysts forecast errors. We also find that independent audit, remuneration, and nomination committees lead to lower analyst forecast errors. The results suggest that the presence of the non-executive directors on the firm's sub-committees reduce dispersion in analysts' forecasts and therefore a firm's value trades nearer its fundamental value.
Author: Phillip J. McKnight
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between financial analysts' forecasts and key governance mechanisms. We test the extent that the presence and structure of a firm's audit, remuneration and nomination committee affects both analysts' forecast errors and the dispersion of the errors. We argue that independent sub-committees are likely to reduce the management's incentive to adopt earnings management strategies that distort financial analysts' forecasts. After accounting for various control factors our initial results show that the presence of an audit, remuneration, and nomination committee reduces analysts forecast errors. We also find that independent audit, remuneration, and nomination committees lead to lower analyst forecast errors. The results suggest that the presence of the non-executive directors on the firm's sub-committees reduce dispersion in analysts' forecasts and therefore a firm's value trades nearer its fundamental value.
Author: Luminita Enache
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Using a sample of US biotech firms, this paper examines the joint impact of product-related voluntary disclosure and corporate governance on a firms' information environment, specifically on analysts forecast accuracy, dispersion, precision of public and private information. Moreover, we investigate whether voluntary disclosure was consistently disclosed over time. Our findings, shows that the quality of corporate governance affects information transparency and play a role in reducing the uncertainty associated with future firms' performance by increasing the precision of analysts' common information and forecast accuracy, only when voluntary disclosure is constant over time. Analysts forecast dispersion decreases when more independent directors sit on the board. Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance quality are two mechanisms that act as complement to improve the quality of information available to financial analysts.
Author: Stephen P. Ferris
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1787565378
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
Advances in Financial Economics Vol 20 is peer reviewed and focusses on International Corporate Governance.
Author: Kose John
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1783501219
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 269
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Book Description
Advances in Financial Economics Vol. 16 contains a set of empirical papers by a set of global scholars who examine corporate governance and market regulation from a variety of perspectives.
Author: Ran Barniv
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Book Description
We test the ability of analyst characteristics to explain relative forecast accuracy across legal origins (common law versus civil law). Common law countries generally have more effective corporate governance mechanisms, including stronger investor protection laws and inputs provided through higher-quality financial reporting systems. In this type of environment, investors are more willing to compete for superior investment decisions because they expect to be equitably rewarded, and investors are more likely to demand information about accounting earnings because earnings have more value relevance. The increased demand by investors for earnings information increases the economic incentives of analysts to provide more accurate earnings forecasts. We predict that analysts with superior ability and resources in common law countries will more consistently outperform their peers because appropriate market-based incentives exist. In civil law countries, where the demand for earnings information is reduced because of weaker corporate governance mechanisms and lower-quality financial reporting, we predict that analysts with superior ability will less consistently provide superior forecasts. Results are consistent with our expectations and suggest an association between legal and financial reporting environments and analysts' forecast behavior.
Author: Marleen Willekens
Publisher: Intersentia nv
ISBN: 9050954693
Category : Business ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
This book discusses the effectiveness of four traditional corporate governance mechanisms: board of directors, audit committee, internal control and audit, external audit) as monitoring and (to a lesser extent) entrepreneurial devices.
Author: Niamh Brennan
Publisher: SAGE Publications Limited
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 456
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Book Description
This major work, compiled by one of the leading academics in Europe in the area of Corporate Governance, brings together key readings in the field, focusing on those corporate governance mechanisms influencing financial reporting and accountability.
Author: _春燕、_田交_
Publisher: 西南財經大學出版社
ISBN: 7550423482
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : zh-CN
Pages : 161
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Book Description
�公司治理__受到__界和__界人士的_泛_注。_有研究_注更多的是西方成熟__体的公司治理__。在新_市__家，_中小股__益的法律保_相比成熟__体有所欠缺，如何_解控股股__中小股__富的侵占__是公司治理的一_重要__。中_公司所有__构高度集中、存在非流通股，容易_生大股__中小股_利益的侵占__。由_春燕、_田交_著的《公司治理_构与治理机制研究--基于金融危机股_分置改革的_角》_用中__据研究公司治理机制如何保_中小股_利益的__。具体__，本_研究了以下三_方面的__：(1)在全球金融危机期_公司治理机制_公司市___的影_；(2)高管更替后公司市___的_期表_；(3)公司_金股利支付与公司所有__构之_的_系。已有文___了中_公司治理_公司__的影_，本_在受到更少治理_量內生性__影_的研究_置下再一次__中_公司治理_公司__的影_。 2007—2009年全球金融危机___公司__是不可__的，采用全球金融危机期_的_据__治理机制_公司__的影_可以避免治理_量的內生性__。研 究__在金融危机前表_差一些的_有企_在金融危机期_反而表_更好了，特_是那些公司所有__构集中和_行__多的_有企_。__果表明集中的_家所有__解了金融危机期__有企_的__困境。_研究___在控制了各种公司特征_量后，管理者持股与有企_金融危机期_的市___呈_著正相__系，表明管理者持股_解了_有企_的委托代理__。最后，___聘用有__的___事_所_任__的公司在全球金危机期___了更少的市___下降。 2005年，_了消除非流通股，中______了股_分置改革，__中_的公司治理_构__了巨大_化。本_分_探究了股_分置改革前后高管更替公司的市___表_，_果表明股_分置改革前高管更替_有改_公司市___，但在股_分置改革完成后，_那些投_者股票回___的公司的高管_行更替后，公司股票__取得了_著改善。_表明在股_分置改革后，公司控股股_有_力去_戒市___表_ 差的公司高管。 本_探究了中_上市公司_金股利支付相_的侵占__，具体研究了股_分置改革前后非流通比例的改_、控股股_持股比例的改_与公司_金股利支付_化的_系。本_研究表明，在中_，由于_中小股_保__不足，加上集中的所有__构，控股股_的_机非常重要。股_分置改革在一定程度上使控股股_与中小股_的利益__一致，但是只要控股股_有_机持有充足的股份以_到他_控制公司的目的，控股股_与中小股_之_的利益_突就不_完全消除。
Author: Stephen P. Ferris
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1787565351
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
Advances in Financial Economics Vol 20 is peer reviewed and focusses on International Corporate Governance.
Author: Hamizah Hassan
Publisher: Nova Science Publishers
ISBN: 9781536126341
Category : BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
Languages : en
Pages : 251
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Book Description
Introduction and context -- Corporate governance and firm value: issues-causality, interaction and non-linearity -- Econometric methods: data, summary statistics and models -- Empirical evidence 1: causality model results -- Empirical evidence 2: interaction model results -- Empirical evidence 3: non-linear model results -- Corporate governance and firm value: findings and conclusion
