Corporate Governance, Cultural Factors and Voluntary Disclosure PDF Download
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Author: M. Akhtaruddin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 13
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Book Description
This research aims to test empirically the relationship between corporate governance, cultural factors and voluntary disclosure by the listed companies in Bangladesh. The corporate governance factors examined are proportion of independent non-executive directors (INDs), board leadership structure, management ownership, board size and audit committee size. The extent of voluntary disclosure level is measured using 68 items of information. Data are taken from annual reports of the listed companies in Bangladesh. The result shows a positive association between board size, board leadership structure, audit committee size and voluntary disclosure. However, no evidence is found to support the contention that independent directors are associated with increased disclosure, consistent with previous studies. Higher education of the CEO and CFO is positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. The result also indicates that the extent of voluntary disclosures is negatively associated with a higher management ownership.
Author: M. Akhtaruddin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 13
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Book Description
This research aims to test empirically the relationship between corporate governance, cultural factors and voluntary disclosure by the listed companies in Bangladesh. The corporate governance factors examined are proportion of independent non-executive directors (INDs), board leadership structure, management ownership, board size and audit committee size. The extent of voluntary disclosure level is measured using 68 items of information. Data are taken from annual reports of the listed companies in Bangladesh. The result shows a positive association between board size, board leadership structure, audit committee size and voluntary disclosure. However, no evidence is found to support the contention that independent directors are associated with increased disclosure, consistent with previous studies. Higher education of the CEO and CFO is positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. The result also indicates that the extent of voluntary disclosures is negatively associated with a higher management ownership.
Author: Bruce J. (Bruce Joseph) McConomy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Author: Luminita Enache
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Ira M. Millstein
Publisher: Beard Books
ISBN: 9781587982026
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 296
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Book Description
This is a reprint of a previosly published work. It deals with the constraints on corporate decison making.
Author: Elizabeth Carson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Güler Aras
Publisher: SRRNet
ISBN: 0955157714
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 249
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Book Description
Author: Tariq Hassaneen Ismail
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This study provides further insights on the key corporate governance drivers of intellectual capital (IC) disclosure in Egyptian companies. It uses IC disclosure index of three components; internal capital, external capital, and human capital to identify IC disclosure level in annual reports of the largest 100 companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Descriptive statistics, multivariate analysis, and the association between IC disclosure levels and three potential explanatory corporate governance characteristics namely: (i) board composition, (ii) ownership structure, and (iii) audit committee provide the basis for discussion. The results suggest that blockholders' ownership, government ownership and audit committee are the explanatory variables that could have significant impact on voluntary intellectual capital disclosure by Egyptian companies, whereas board independence, and management ownership has no impact on IC disclosure. Additionally, firm size and leverage do influence IC disclosure levels in Egyptian companies. The survey results may assist regulators to understand the impact of corporate governance factors on companies' IC voluntary disclosure levels and thereby help them specify ways to regulate disclosure on IC in an attempt to improve the quality of information disclosed to stakeholders.
Author: Norziana Lokman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Strategic and forward looking information (VDSFLI) is important to the stakeholders of the company because it provide strategic plan and future direction of the company. This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and VDSFLI. The VDSFLI is measured by using a disclosure index checklist of 36 items. For each item a score is awarded based on the disclosure made by the companies in annual reports. All data is collected from the annual reports of 230 public listed Malaysian companies. The findings of the study revealed that size of audit committee is positively and significantly influence the level of VDSFLI. While the other corporate governance mechanisms are not associated with the level of VDSFLI. The study provides evidence in support of the size of audit committee requirement of Regulatory Framework in Malaysia. This evidence contributes to the argument on the role of audit committee in reducing agency conflict and minimise information asymmetry problem which results in high level of VDSFLI. In addition, the bigger the size of audit committee the better because it would provide positive signal that company has in place an effective governance mechanism as a check and balance which encourage voluntary disclosure practices. It also provides direction to the preparers of the annual report to fully disclose the information voluntarily. This study bridges the gap in the literature of corporate governance by specifically focuses on VDSFLI practices in Malaysia context.
Author: Balachandran Muniandy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 424
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Book Description
Additionally, it is revealed that there are some companies that do not have independent directors on their board or audit committee. Further, the existence of an independent chairman on the board is also positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, executive director share ownership is also negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. Finally, the presence of strong governance attributes and an improved regulatory environment enhances the strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the level of disclosure. There are limitations inherent in this study. This study is primarily based on companies' annual reports. The lack of publicly available information on Malaysian listed companies restricted the chosen methodology. This study has both theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical perspective, it enhances understanding of the relationship between corporate governance attributes and agency costs. The study also offers useful insights to policy makers and regulators to facilitate their evaluation of the effectiveness of the new corporate governance code.
Author: Ana Gisbert
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
Agency conflicts between investors are particularly severe in the presence of high family and block-holder ownership. By focusing on a setting characterised by high ownership concentration, we study the role of independent directors in promoting transparency through increased disclosure. In our tests, we use a sample of Spanish firms and, consistent with prior work, we show that the presence of these directors is strongly associated with increased voluntary disclosure. Additionally, we find that when an executive director takes on chair responsibilities the level of voluntary information is reduced, creating potential conflicts with the role of independent directors. We conclude that the regulatory environment can create sufficient incentives to bring together the interests of minority and majority shareholders and guarantee an efficient monitoring role of independent directors. However, results suggest that other mechanisms should be reinforced in order to improve the role of governance control on agency relationships, particularly in the case of the concentration of chair and executive responsibilities.
