Corporate Competitive Strategy and Voluntary Disclosure PDF Download
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Author: Jidong Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The relation between the motivation of voluntary disclosure and the characters of companies is important research topic in accounting research and strategy research. The paper investigates the samples from Chinese capital market during 2004-2006 and concludes some empirical results to verify and support the strategy theory that pre-literatures had document through the analysis of game theory. The findings are that there is no significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and corporate governance and there is no significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and earning quality. As the analysis of strategy theory, there is significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and corporate competitive strategy which integrates with the status of market competitive where the corporate locates. If the corporate locates in growth period of Product Life Cycle (PLC), it is more possible to disclose industry competitive information and this motivation is obvious. The findings provide the empirical evidence of strategy competitive theory. These also implicate that voluntary disclosure is related to the disclosure content, not to corporate characters such as governance and earning quality.
Author: Jidong Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The relation between the motivation of voluntary disclosure and the characters of companies is important research topic in accounting research and strategy research. The paper investigates the samples from Chinese capital market during 2004-2006 and concludes some empirical results to verify and support the strategy theory that pre-literatures had document through the analysis of game theory. The findings are that there is no significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and corporate governance and there is no significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and earning quality. As the analysis of strategy theory, there is significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and corporate competitive strategy which integrates with the status of market competitive where the corporate locates. If the corporate locates in growth period of Product Life Cycle (PLC), it is more possible to disclose industry competitive information and this motivation is obvious. The findings provide the empirical evidence of strategy competitive theory. These also implicate that voluntary disclosure is related to the disclosure content, not to corporate characters such as governance and earning quality.
Author: Patrick Roy
Publisher: diplom.de
ISBN: 3832448292
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 141
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Book Description
Abstract: In a first step, this ERP derives the theoretical necessity to provide voluntary strategic and non-financial Information. It is argued that companies are an integral part of a common environment and society, acting in a framework of interdependent relationships. A company is more and more seen as a community of interests of different groups, and it can only act in an optimal way if the demands of all groups are taken into account and its behaviour is adjusted accordingly. In this context, interest groups' demands for company Information depend an the possibilities of improvements in decision making or monitoring that arise with its use, which in turn is mainly determined by the potential of Information to reduce uncertainty in the areas of interest. For external decision-makers, uncertainty often arises from sources about which conservative company statements provide little insight. Due to the traditional, finance-oriented concept of disclosure, this is particularly true for strategic and non-financial aspects. Related additional Information that is voluntarily provided can considerably reduce uncertainty, even more so as part of audited statements. Conventional financial reporting and existing disclosure requirements will generally not nearly satisfy those information needs of user groups. Any economic action, though, should only be taken if related benefits are exceeding related costs. This priority of economicalness also holds for companies' production, processing and disclosure of Information. Therefore, it is necessary to consider as detailed as possible potential opportunities and disadvantages for voluntarily disclosing company Information both an and outside capital markets. This is done in a second major part of the present work. First, voluntary disclosure can potentially affect share prices and thereby the market value of the firm, markets not being strong-form efficient. So, by giving company Information, a higher market value can directly be induced, thereby potentially lowering the cost of capital which, for example, improves the company's competitive position in the battle for cheap additional financing. [...]
Author: Henricus Petrus Theodorus Coebergh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Yong-Chul Shin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. Firms, considering a disclosure, trade off attaining financial market valuation-related benefits vs. protecting long-term product market advantage. Based on economic theory, I propose that there are two types of strategic interaction settings relevant to disclosure: Capacity competition drives firms to disclose more; price competition drives them to disclose less. When firms are competing on capacities, firms disclose more information to lower the cost of capital needed for capital investments. In contrast, when firms are competing on prices, they disclose less information because proprietary costs are high and the benefit from any decreased cost of capital is low due to less acute need for additional capital. By estimating the signs of the slope of reaction curves to identify the type of competition facing firms in oligopoly markets, I find that the type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure over and above what pervious literature has documented as the firm's external financing needs. That is, firms engaged in capacity competition disclose relatively more information than firms engaged in price competition. Further analysis after including as benchmarks firms with no strategic interaction, shows that capacity competition firms disclose more information than no-strategic-interaction firms but that price competition firms do not disclose less information than no-strategic-interaction firms.
Author: Piet Hein Coebergh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 214
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Business leaders increasingly face pressure from stakeholders to be transparent. There appears however little consensus on the risks and payoffs of disclosing vital information such as corporate strategy. To fill this gap, this study analyzes firm-specific determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder theory and agency theory help to understand whether companies serve their interest to engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. I connect these theories and propose a comprehensive approach to measure voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Hypotheses from the theoretical framework are empirically tested through panel regression of data on identified determinants and outcomes and of disclosed strategy through annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports, corporate websites and corporate press releases by the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the Netherlands from 2003 through 2008. I found that industry, profitability, dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for size, leverage and ownership concentration. On outcomes, I found that liquidity of stock and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock. My contributions to theory, methodology and empirics offers a stepping-stone for further research into understanding how companies can use transparency to manage stakeholder relations.
Author: Daniel Ferreira
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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This paper examines voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy-specific investments.
Author: Qianhua Ling
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Lucy F. Ackert
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: Alessandro Ghio
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030422992
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 183
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Book Description
This book provides a critical analysis of the evolution of corporate disclosure. Building upon prior academic literature, it assesses the most important changes in mandatory corporate disclosure, the growing relevance of social and environmental disclosure, and revolutionary new forms of corporate communication, in particular social media. It also includes empirical analyses that shed further light on the impact of voluntary communication, i.e. social and environmental reporting and corporate social media communication, on managerial and investment decisions. Lastly, it discusses new directions for accounting and corporate governance research on the theoretical and empirical challenges of corporate disclosure. Offering a wealth of relevant and timely advice, the book will help regulators design policies that allow businesses to overcome current and emerging economic, social, and technological challenges.
Author: Patricia van de Wiele
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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