Coordination of Capital Taxation Among a Large Number of Asymmetric Countries

Coordination of Capital Taxation Among a Large Number of Asymmetric Countries PDF Author: Tanguy Van Ypersele
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Coordination of Capital Taxation Among a Large Number of Asymmetric Countries

Coordination of Capital Taxation Among a Large Number of Asymmetric Countries PDF Author: Tanguy Van Ypersele
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries

Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries PDF Author: Susana Peralta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital levy
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Coordination of Capital Taxation Among a Large Number of Asymmetric Counties

Coordination of Capital Taxation Among a Large Number of Asymmetric Counties PDF Author: Tanguy Van Ypersele
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We examine international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. Consequences of the liberalization of the capital market on national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analyzed. A simple model, with N countries where competitive firms produce an homogeneous good using mobile capital and immobile labor is considered. Fiscal competition arises between governments that have to tax capital and labor in order to raise fixed amount of revenue. It is shown that capital mobility improves the capital allocation among countries as it enables capital owners to invest it in the country where capital is scarce. But fiscal competition leads to asymmetric capital taxation among countries and thus to a distortion on the international capital market. Two fiscal reforms are considered: the introduction of a minimum capital tax level and the imposition of a tax range, i.e. a minimum plus a maximum capital tax level. We show that the minimum tax reform is never prefered to fiscal competition by all countries while tax range reforms are unanimously accepted when it imposes convergence to the extreme taxes and it does not change the international remuneration of capital.

Reforming an Asymmetric Union: On the Virtues of Dual Tier Capital Taxation

Reforming an Asymmetric Union: On the Virtues of Dual Tier Capital Taxation PDF Author: Andreas Haufler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30

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Capital Income Taxation of Asymmetric Countries

Capital Income Taxation of Asymmetric Countries PDF Author: Michael J. Koop
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Capital Tax Competition Among an Arbitrary Number of Asymmetric Countries

Capital Tax Competition Among an Arbitrary Number of Asymmetric Countries PDF Author: Susana Peralta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21

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Tax Coordination, Tax Competition, and Revenue Mobilization in the West African Economic and Monetary Union

Tax Coordination, Tax Competition, and Revenue Mobilization in the West African Economic and Monetary Union PDF Author: Mario Mansour
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484338774
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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Book Description
We review the current state of the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s tax coordination framework, against the main objectives of the WAEMU Treaty of 1994: reduce distortions to intra-community trade, and mobilize domestic tax revenue. The process of tax coordination in WAEMU is one of the most advanced in the world—de jure at least—, but remains in many areas ineffective de facto. Nevertheless, the framework has, to some extent, succeeded in converging tax systems, particularly statutory tax rates, and may have contributed to improving revenue mobilisation. Important lessons can be drawn from the WAEMU experience, particularly in terms of whether coordination should take the form of harmonization through a top-down approach, or a softer approach of sharing best practice and limiting certain types of tax competition.

Implementing Partial Tax Harmonization in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game with Repeated Interaction

Implementing Partial Tax Harmonization in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game with Repeated Interaction PDF Author: Jun-ichi Itaya
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35

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Book Description
This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e. full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium-sized country is similar to that of the large or small country. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one, the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail. We also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non-member countries worse off, which stands in shape contrast with previous studies such as Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Bucovetsky (2009).

Capital Mobility and Tax Competition

Capital Mobility and Tax Competition PDF Author: Clemens Fuest
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1933019190
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 72

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Book Description
Tax competition and coordination is one of the most pressing issues for tax authorities in modern economies, but it is a highly controversial subject. Some argue that tax competition is beneficial by forcing governments to impose efficient tax prices on residents for the provision of public services. Further, some argue that tax competition is also beneficial by limiting the power of governments to levy taxes. Others take a different view - in a world without coordinated tax policies, governments choose sub-optimal levels of public services financed by inefficient taxes that are either too high or too low by ignoring spillovers imposed on other jurisdictions. Capital Mobility and Tax Competition draws out the most important issues of uncoordinated tax policy at the international level for cross-border transactions. The discussion focuses on mobile tax bases, specifically in relation to investment and financial transactions. The main issue for consideration in this survey is whether taxation of income, specifically capital income will survive, how border crossing investment is taxed relative to domestic investment, and whether welfare gains can be achieved through international tax coordination. This survey derives some of the key results on the taxation of international investment in variants of one model of multinational investment. Finally, the authors emphasize the problem of tax competition and financial arbitrage, an issue which is somewhat neglected in the existing survey literature.

Taxation in a Global Economy

Taxation in a Global Economy PDF Author: Andreas Haufler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521782767
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 354

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Book Description
The increasing international mobility of capital, firms and consumers has begun to constrain tax policies in most OECD countries, playing a major role in reforming national tax systems. Haufler uses the theory of international taxation to consider the fundamental forces underlying this process, covering both factor and commodity taxes, as well as their interaction. Topics include a variety of different international tax avoidance strategies - capital flight, profit shifting in multinational firms, and cross-border shopping by consumers. Situations in which tax competition creates conflicting interests between countries are given particular consideration. Haufler addresses the complex issue of coordination in different areas of tax policy, with special emphasis on regional tax harmonization in the European Union. Also included is a detailed introduction to recent theoretical literature.