Repeated Games and Reputations PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Repeated Games and Reputations PDF full book. Access full book title Repeated Games and Reputations by George J. Mailath. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Get Book Here
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Get Book Here
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Ulrich Schulz
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642788602
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 538
Get Book Here
Book Description
A social dilemma is a game which at first glance has only inefficient solutions. If efficient solutions are to be achieved, some kind of cooperation among the players is required. This book asks two basic questions, closely intertwined with each other: 1. How is cooperation possible among rational players in such a social dilemma? Which changes in the social context of a social dilemma situation are necessary in order for players to rationally choose the cooperative option? 2. How do real players actually behave in social dilemma situations? Do they behave "rationally" at all? Or, conversely, what kind of reasoning, attitudes, emotions, etc. shape the behavior of real players in social dilemmas? What kind of interventions, what kind of internal mechanisms within a real group may change players' willingness to cooperate? These two general questions mark the broad spectrum of the problem which has been, over the last three decades, investigated in various disciplines, and which has brought many new ideas and new observations into the study of the old question of social order in a world of born egoists. Accordingly, this volume contains contributions by biologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists, mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers.
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400822300
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 247
Get Book Here
Book Description
Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that landmark book. It collects seven essays, originally published in a broad range of journals, and adds an extensive new introduction to the collection, along with new prefaces to each essay and a useful new appendix of additional resources. Written in Axelrod's acclaimed, accessible style, this collection serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modeling in the social sciences and as an overview of the current state of the art in the field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the Prisoner's Dilemma to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modeling, a powerful technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system. The Complexity of Cooperation is essential reading for all social scientists who are interested in issues of cooperation and complexity.
Author: Ines Dombrowsky
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782543053
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book asks under which conditions cooperation is in the interest of the riparian countries sharing international waters, and how institutions must be designed to realize potential gains of cooperation.
Author: Robert W. Sussman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351477889
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 353
Get Book Here
Book Description
Scientific developments have increasingly been transforming our understanding of the place of human beings in nature. The contributors to this book focus on the current status of research on sociality and the evolution of cooperative and altruistic behaviour in non-human and human primates. They examine questions related to the evolution, cultural viability, and hormonal underpinnings of human sociality in specific detail, and describe patterns of sociality that shed light on human social behaviour.
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Basic Books
ISBN: 0786734884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Get Book Here
Book Description
A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Author: Vincent Buskens
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
ISBN: 3110647613
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 492
Get Book Here
Book Description
The problem of cooperation is one of the core issues in sociology and social science more in general. The key question is how humans, groups, organizations, institutions, and countries can avoid or overcome the collective good dilemmas that could lead to a Hobbesian "war of all against all". The chapters in this book provide state of the art examples of research on this crucial topic. These include theoretical, laboratory, and field studies on trust and cooperation, thereby approaching the issue in three complementary and synergetic ways. The theoretical work covers articles on trust and control, reputation formation, and paradigmatic articles on the benefits and caveats of abstracting reality into models. The laboratory studies test the implications of different models of trust and reputation, such as the effects of social and institutional embeddedness and the potentially emerging inequalities this may cause. The field studies test these implications in applied settings such as business purchasing and supply, informal care, and different kinds of collaboration networks. This book is exemplary for rigorous social science. The focus is on effects of social conditions, in particular different forms of social and institutional embeddedness, on social outcomes at the macro level. Modelling efforts are applied to connect social conditions to social outcomes through micro-level behavior in ways that are easily overlooked when argumentation is intuitive and impressionistic. The book sets forth a mixed-method approach by applying different empirical methods to test hypotheses about similar questions. Several contributions re-evaluate the theoretical strengths and weaknesses following from the laboratory and field studies. Improving the theory in light of these findings facilitates pushing the boundaries of social science .
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061940
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Get Book Here
Book Description
This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Author: Gideon Doron
Publisher: SAGE
ISBN: 1446234312
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 194
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book brings an exciting and innovative new approach to the study of politics today. It introduces political bargaining, a process at the heart of all political and economic exchanges in contemporary society and the very essence of politics itself, to provide a new framework and fresh insights to modern political science. The authors trace the prevalence of bargaining processes in politics from the abstract level of individual human interaction and the `state of nature′ to the more concrete political or institutionalized level. They introduce students to theory -- the basic models of game theory, rational choice theory and positivist approaches; practice -- the practical manifestations of political bargaining in everyday national and international political life; and process -- its setting, the interests of the players involved, the conditions and properties that affect their calculations and, consequently, their ability to obtain desired outcomes. Political Bargaining provides students with the basic tools for learning about and participating in politics today by richly illustrating how the authoritative allocation of scarce resources is arrived at through a complex bargaining process between competing interests in society. It will be essential reading for student and lecturer alike across political science and the social sciences more widely.
Author: Herman S.J. Cesar
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 364245738X
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 234
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book deals with economic policy regarding the Greenhouse Effect using control and game models. First, a literature review is given of intertemporal optimisation models of environmental issues with special focus on the Greenhouse Effect. Next, the issue of sustainability is discussed for different specifications of the natural assimilation function. Furthermore, capital accumulation is considered both in abatement and in human capital. The international dimension is analysed next with focus on the difference between feedback and open-loop solutions, as well as on cooperative outcomes using trigger and renegotiation-proof strategies. Finally, second best forms of cooperation in the form of "issue linkage" and "technology transfers" are worked out.
