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Author: M. Çakanyıldırım
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit that depends on his unit production cost. We model this problem as a game of adverse selection. In this model, the retailer offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the ordering quantity and the supplier's share of the channel profit. We show that the optimal contract depends critically on a surrogate measure. This measure represents the size of the outside market that the supplier may serve if not trading with the retailer. An important implication from our analysis is that information asymmetry alone does not necessarily induce loss in channel efficiency. The optimal contract can coordinate the supply chain as long as the size of the outside market is comparable to the quantities required by the retailer. We further discuss the retailer's preference of the supplier's type under different market conditions, as well as evaluate the effects of the supplier's reservation profit, the retail price, and the demand uncertainty on the optimal contract.
Author: M. Çakanyıldırım
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit that depends on his unit production cost. We model this problem as a game of adverse selection. In this model, the retailer offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the ordering quantity and the supplier's share of the channel profit. We show that the optimal contract depends critically on a surrogate measure. This measure represents the size of the outside market that the supplier may serve if not trading with the retailer. An important implication from our analysis is that information asymmetry alone does not necessarily induce loss in channel efficiency. The optimal contract can coordinate the supply chain as long as the size of the outside market is comparable to the quantities required by the retailer. We further discuss the retailer's preference of the supplier's type under different market conditions, as well as evaluate the effects of the supplier's reservation profit, the retail price, and the demand uncertainty on the optimal contract.
Author: Sridhar Tayur
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461549493
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 851
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Book Description
Quantitative models and computer-based tools are essential for making decisions in today's business environment. These tools are of particular importance in the rapidly growing area of supply chain management. This volume is a unified effort to provide a systematic summary of the large variety of new issues being considered, the new set of models being developed, the new techniques for analysis, and the computational methods that have become available recently. The volume's objective is to provide a self-contained, sophisticated research summary - a snapshot at this point of time - in the area of Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management. While there are some multi-disciplinary aspects of supply chain management not covered here, the Editors and their contributors have captured many important developments in this rapidly expanding field. The 26 chapters can be divided into six categories. Basic Concepts and Technical Material (Chapters 1-6). The chapters in this category focus on introducing basic concepts, providing mathematical background and validating algorithmic tools to solve operational problems in supply chains. Supply Contracts (Chapters 7-10). In this category, the primary focus is on design and evaluation of supply contracts between independent agents in the supply chain. Value of Information (Chapters 11-13). The chapters in this category explicitly model the effect of information on decision-making and on supply chain performance. Managing Product Variety (Chapters 16-19). The chapters in this category analyze the effects of product variety and the different strategies to manage it. International Operations (Chapters 20-22). The three chapters in this category provide an overview of research in the emerging area of International Operations. Conceptual Issues and New Challenges (Chapters 23-27). These chapters outline a variety of frameworks that can be explored and used in future research efforts. This volume can serve as a graduate text, as a reference for researchers and as a guide for further development of this field.
Author: Ehsan Bolandifar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
This paper studies a supply contracting problem where a buyer sources a product from a supplier to satisfy uncertain market demand. With the increasing length and complexity of today's global supply chains, the buyer may face two issues when designing the supply contract: adverse selection (i.e., the supplier's cost structure is private information) and lack of enforcement (i.e., the supplier's capacity investment is not enforceable). We derive the buyer's optimal contracting strategies and analyze their properties. We find that although the buyer's optimal mechanism is generally complex, it may reduce to a two-part tariff under certain conditions (i.e., a single, linear contract could be optimal for the buyer). Even when the two-part tariff is suboptimal, it performs nearly as well as the optimal mechanism for a wide range of situations. These findings indicate that the value of achieving enforceability and the value of using complex menu are negligible in such a supply chain setting. Therefore, our research demonstrates that the two-part tariff is an attractive option for buyers whose goal is to ensure supply while facing both cost uncertainty and enforcement issues. It also provides a new explanation for the prevalence of such simple contracts in practice.
Author: Tsan-Ming Choi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642192572
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 651
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Book Description
Channel coordination is a core subject of supply chain management. Over the past decade, much research effort has been devoted to exploring the detailed mechanisms for achieving supply chain coordination under uncertainty, generating many fruitful analytical and empirical results. Despite the abundance of research results, there is an absence of a comprehensive reference source that provides state-of-the-art findings on both theoretical and applied research on the subject. In addition, with the advance of knowledge and technologies, many new topics on supply chain coordination under uncertainty have appeared in recent years. This handbook extensively examines supply chain coordination challenges with a focal point on discovering innovative measures that can help tackle the existing and emerging challenges. The book is organized into five parts, which include chapters on innovative analytical models for coordination, channel power and bargaining, technological advancements and applications, empirical analysis, cases studies and review. This handbook provides new empirical and analytical results with precious insights, which will not only help supply chain agents to understand more about the latest measures for supply chain coordination under uncertainty, but also help practitioners and researchers to know how to improve supply chain performance based on innovative methods.
Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642201326
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Jiuping Xu
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642400817
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 762
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Book Description
This book presents the proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM2013) held from November 7 to 9, 2013 at Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA and organized by the International Society of Management Science and Engineering Management, Sichuan University (Chengdu, China) and Drexel University (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA). The goals of the Conference are to foster international research collaborations in Management Science and Engineering Management as well as to provide a forum to present current research findings. The selected papers cover various areas in management science and engineering management, such as Decision Support Systems, Multi-Objective Decisions, Uncertain Decisions, Computational Mathematics, Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Relationship Management, Scheduling and Control, Data Warehousing and Data Mining, Electronic Commerce, Neural Networks, Stochastic Models and Simulation, Fuzzy Programming, Heuristics Algorithms, Risk Control, Organizational Behavior, Green Supply Chains, and Carbon Credits. The proceedings introduce readers to novel ideas on and different problem-solving methods in Management Science and Engineering Management. We selected excellent papers from all over the world, integrating their expertise and ideas in order to improve research on Management Science and Engineering Management.
Author: Özalp Özer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
We study a supply chain with two suppliers competing over a contract to supply components to a manufacturer. One of the suppliers is a big company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a small part of his business. The other supplier is a small company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a large portion of his business. We analyze the problem from the perspective of the big supplier and address the following questions: What is the optimal contracting strategy that the big supplier should follow? How does the information about the small supplier's production cost affect the profits and contracting decision? How does the existence of the small supplier affect profits? By studying various information scenarios regarding the small supplier's and the manufacturer's production cost, we show, for example, that the big supplier benefits when the small supplier keeps its production cost private. We quantify the value of information for the big supplier and the manufacturer. We also quantify the cost (value) of the alternative-sourcing option for the big supplier (the manufacturer). We determine when an alternative-sourcing option has more impact on profits than information. We conclude with extensions and numerical examples to shed light on how system parameters affect this supply chain.
Author: Bo Li
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 1800610416
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 241
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Book Description
In the era of e-commerce and digitalization, new commercial patterns and opportunities are emerging. For example, in addition to traditional reselling marketing channels, manufacturers can easily open direct channels using a variety of digital marketing strategies. These new marketing channels will cause conflict and competition between manufacturers and resellers. This raises the important question of how to make optimal decisions for multiple players in dual-channel supply chain contexts. Within changing and uncertain operation environments, business enterprises must face tougher challenges than before to survive in competitive markets.This book aims to address representative decision-making problems in dual-channel supply chains with risk-averse channel members. The most recently developed risk assessment technique, Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), will be adopted as the predominant criterion to measure the risk-averse attitude. Based on game theory, important issues such as channel selection, pricing, order quantity, manufacturer encroachment, greening strategy, consumer return policies, financing strategies, channel coordination, contract design, information asymmetry, and capacity constraint will be modeled and analyzed. This book will help readers better understand operations management in dual-channel supply chain contexts with risk-averse behaviors, and will also provide effective techniques and tools for researchers and offer managerial insights for practitioners.
Author: Yahya Pezeshki
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In decentralized Supply Chains, each member decides based on his own interests. Conflict of interests results in suboptimal decisions and poor performance for entire supply chains, as well seriously harms credibly information sharing across them. In this thesis, coordination of decisions in supply chains in the context of Capacity Procurement problem are studied in different situations in form of three models. In first model, a dyadic supply chain with stochastic demand and exogenous price is investigated by taking various costs into account. PARD and RCRS contracts are designed and proposed in order for coordination of decisions respectively in full and partial information updating situations. It is mathematically shown that coordination is achieved by using each contract in its corresponding situation. In second model, endogenous price is assumed. That is, demand is modeled as sum of a decreasing linear function of price and a stochastic parameter. The model is first examined in a dyadic structure, and RSRP contract is proposed for coordinating of price, production time and production rate decisions. It is proved that coordination is achieved by RSRP contract in the dyadic structure. The application of RSRP contract is then extended to be employed in a divergent supply chain with multiple retailers, and shown that the supply chain performs considerably better than the same supply chain with a wholesale contract. In third model, a divergent supply chain comprising a supplier and multiple retailers is studied where retailers face stochastic and price-dependent demand. Since main decision makers in supply chain interactions are human, paying attention to human decision making process and their biases from theoretical predictions are important in designing coordination mechanisms. One of the non-pecuniary factors which cause deviations in human-decisions is Trust. In this model, the retailers have more accurate demand forecast information due to their proximity to market. In order to secure availability of products during the selling season, the retailers have incentives to inflate their private forecast information. A coordination mechanism is proposed, which consists of an optimization model, a scoring system and a rewarding-punishing system, in order to coordinate the supply chain. Using simulation approach, performance of the mechanism is then compared to those of two other mechanisms, namely Without Trust an Asymmetric mechanism. According to the results, employing the mechanism in situations with any demand variability is advised. More accurately, in situations with high demand variability, the mechanism achieves a proper profit improvement and moderate capability for identifying deceptive agents, while in situations with low demand variability, the mechanism shows insignificant profit improvement and considerable ability in identifying deceptive agents.
Author: Guido Voigt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
