Constraints to Earnings Management

Constraints to Earnings Management PDF Author: Paul Miles Clikeman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 230

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Constraints to Earnings Management

Constraints to Earnings Management PDF Author: Paul Miles Clikeman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 230

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Book Description


Earnings Management Constraints and the Use of Non-GAAP Earnings Management

Earnings Management Constraints and the Use of Non-GAAP Earnings Management PDF Author: Wenming Kang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 101

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Book Description
This paper attempts to shed light upon management choice to engage in earnings management beyond the bounds of Generally Acceptable Accounting Practice. I examine how limitations in accrual earnings management capabilities and unexpected variations in real earnings management can drive more prominent use in non-GAAP earnings management (NGEM). NGEM is approximated using restatements as result of irregularities and AAER enforcements. I have conducted my analyses in three stages. First, I examine a subsample of firms with high probability in engaging in NGEM and conduct a longitudinal analysis on the REM behavior of these firms leading to the period of high probability of restatement. I find that there is indeed more aggressive use of REM leading to the period of high probability of restatement. Next I examined whether firms with unexpected REM fluctuations and constrained AEM behavior are more likely to engage in NGEM behavior. I find weak evidence of constraints in AEM drives NGEM. Finally I examine whether the use of industry specialist auditors can help deter constrained AEM firms from resorting to the use of NGEM. I find no evidence suggesting industry specialist auditors can restrain the use of NGEM for firms with constrained AEM.

Financial Reporting on Earnings Management

Financial Reporting on Earnings Management PDF Author: David Onditi
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3346020452
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 9

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Book Description
Essay from the year 2017 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, University of Nairobi, language: English, abstract: This paper discusses the motives behind earnings management and explains some of the methods used by firms to manage their earnings. Earnings management has been defined differently by a number of scholars. It is important to note that there is a thin line between fraud and earnings management. Hamid, Hashim and Salleh citing the works of Brown, Perols and Lounge and Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew noted the difference in the definitions that are offered by the scholars. According to Perols and Lounge organizations will engage in fraud due to the constraints on earnings management. The research found out that the firms that had engaged in earnings management will be more likely to be involved in cases of fraud. Brown and Erickson et al noted that the difference between earnings management and fraud is that earnings management is usually within the scope of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) while fraud is outside of the boundaries of GAAP. Earnings management has been defined as the manipulation of the financial statements and reports by the managers so that the firms can earn extra profit. It has also been defined as the action where the management of the organizations apply their own self-assessment in the communication of the financial information and transactions to modify the financial data for two main reasons: 1) influencing contractual businesses that solely rely on the financial information or 2) providing the stakeholders with a wrong impression about the financial position of the firm.

Difāʻan ʻan ḥuqūq al-insān

Difāʻan ʻan ḥuqūq al-insān PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 372

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Institutional and Structural Constraints to Detecting Earnings Management of Firms Subjected to Price Regulation

Institutional and Structural Constraints to Detecting Earnings Management of Firms Subjected to Price Regulation PDF Author: S. Lim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Accounting
Languages : en
Pages : 24

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Introduction to Earnings Management

Introduction to Earnings Management PDF Author: Malek El Diri
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319626868
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 120

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Book Description
This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.

Earnings Management and Its Determinants

Earnings Management and Its Determinants PDF Author: Igor Goncharov
Publisher: Europäische Hochschulschriften / European University Studies / Publications Universitaires Européennes
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184

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Book Description
Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--University of Bremen.

Earnings Quality

Earnings Quality PDF Author: Jennifer Francis
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601981147
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 97

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Book Description
This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.

The Effect of Earnings Management Constraints on Management Earnings Forecasts

The Effect of Earnings Management Constraints on Management Earnings Forecasts PDF Author: Tze Yuan (David) Lau
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 430

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Book Description
This thesis examines the role of earnings management constraints, as imposed by firms having higher-quality auditors and lower accounting flexibility at the beginning of the year, in managers’ ability to report less negative earnings surprises from their earnings forecasts. Earnings surprises from management earnings forecasts arise when firms’ realised earnings exceed or fall below the expected earnings of firms’ managers. This thesis argues that managers can report less negative earnings surprises through the use of two techniques: (1) upward earnings management (so that the realised earnings exceed the expected earnings); and (2) downward earnings expectation adjustments (so that the expected earnings fall below the realised earnings). Managers’ incentives to choose upward earnings management over downward earnings expectation adjustments decrease with the degree of earnings management constraints at year t-1. This thesis hypothesises that (1) ceteris paribus, firms with higher-quality auditors at year t-1 are more likely to use downward earnings expectation adjustments in order to report less negative earnings surprises for year t; and (2) ceteris paribus, firms with lower accounting flexibility at year t-1 are more likely to use downward earnings expectation adjustments in order to report less negative earnings surprises for year t. These hypotheses are tested in a unique economy, Japan, where nearly all firms’ managers provide earnings forecasts. Univariate and multivariate analyses of this thesis provide evidence that supports the following conclusions. First, managers of firms with higher-quality auditors and lower accounting flexibility at the beginning of the year are associated with less negative earnings surprises at the end of the year. Second, managers of firms with higher-quality auditors at the beginning of the year use downward earnings expectation adjustments, although the magnitude of these adjustments is lower than the adjustments by firms with lower-quality auditors at the beginning of the year. Third, managers of firms with lower accounting flexibility at the beginning of the year do not consistently use downward earnings expectation adjustments throughout the year to report less negative earnings surprises. Specifically, these firms are more likely to use downward earnings expectation adjustments at the second quarter of the year. Additional tests are conducted to analyse whether the main results are sensitive to alternative specifications of the model. The scope of these tests also extends to other quality aspects of management earnings forecasts and auditing, namely, forecast accuracy and auditor switching, respectively. Overall, these additional analyses indicate that the main results hold after the following empirical considerations are made: (1) self-selection bias; (2) alternative deflators for the response variables; and (3) alternative measures of audit quality and accounting flexibility. The analysis of forecast accuracy reveals that managers of firms with higher-quality auditors at the beginning of the year are more likely to issue accurate earnings forecasts. However, managers of firms with lower accounting flexibility at the beginning of the year are less likely to issue accurate earnings forecasts. The analysis of auditor switches shows firms that switch from lower-quality auditors to higher-quality auditors at the beginning of the year are more likely to report less negative earnings surprises.

Earnings Management

Earnings Management PDF Author: Joshua Ronen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387257713
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 587

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Book Description
This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?