Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets PDF Download
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Author: Cory Stephen Capps
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Demand functions (Economic theory)
Languages : en
Pages : 64
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Book Description
Author: Cory Stephen Capps
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Demand functions (Economic theory)
Languages : en
Pages : 64
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Cory S. Capps
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
An increasing number of markets, particularly health insurance, are characterized by option demand. In option demand markets, intermediaries sell networks of upstream suppliers to downstream consumers; in many cases, consumers must attach a value to the network of suppliers before their needs are realized. Building upon a Logit model of demand, we introduce a method for modeling such markets. Ideally, the intermediaries use their expertise and bargaining power to negotiate better terms than could consumers acting on their own. However, the realization of these savings could be thwarted if the upstream suppliers have significant market power, or are allowed to merge and thereby attain market power. We estimate the model using data on inpatient hospital services in San Diego, California and use our results to simulate the effects of hospital mergers. We find that hospital markets are localized in the sense that mergers among suburban hospitals, or mergers among urban hospitals with considerable service overlap, would lead to significant price increases. This is an important finding. The 1990s witnessed a wave of hospital mergers, relatively few of which were challenged by the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice. At trial after trial, the defendant hospitals prevailed; in most of these cases the judge(s) relied upon patient flow data to conclude that the relevant market is large, and therefore the merger would not be anticompetitive. Our results cast serious doubt upon this conclusion.
Author: Cory S. Capps
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We call markets in which intermediaries sell networks of suppliers to consumers who are uncertain about their needs "option demand markets." In these markets, suppliers may grant the intermediaries discounts in order to be admitted to their networks. We derive a measure of each supplier's market power within the network; the measure is based on the additional ex ante expected utility consumers obtain from the supplier's inclusion. We empirically validate the WTP measure by considering managed care purchases of hospital services in the San Diego market. Finally, we present three applications, including an analysis of hospital mergers in San Diego.
Author: Jens-Uwe Franck
Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE)
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Book Description
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
Author: Joan Robinson
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349153206
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 359
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Book Description
Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536
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Book Description
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Author: Richard B. McKenzie
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472116157
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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Book Description
A provocative defense of market dominance
Author: Massimo Motta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521016919
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 650
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Book Description
This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.
Author: Peter C. Carstensen
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178254058X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 265
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive overview of the economic and competition policy issues that buyer power creates. Drawing on economic analysis and cases from around the world, it explains why conventional seller side standards and analyses do not provide an adequate framework for responding to the problems that buyer power can create. Based on evidence that abuse of buyer power is a serious problem for the competitive process, the book evaluates the potential for competition law to deal directly with the problems of abuse either through conventional competition law or special rules aimed at abusive conduct. The author also examines controls over buying groups and mergers as potentially more useful responses to risks created by undue buyer power.
Author: Roger D. Blair
Publisher:
ISBN: 0199859191
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 633
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Book Description
The Handbook examines the most important issues that arise in antitrust economics. Leading scholars in the field provide detailed critical analysis of developments across a number of different antitrust topics along with a detailed review of the literature. The Handbook is invaluable as a research and teaching tool.
