Calculated Risk: Military Theory And The Allies Campaign In Italy, 1943-1944 PDF Download
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Author: Major Daniel W. Krueger
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250632
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 76
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Book Description
In September 1943 allied armies of the United States and Great Britain landed on the European mainland in its “soft underbelly” taking another step toward the defeat of Nazi Germany. Expecting to be in Rome by the end of that year, the Allies instead found themselves embroiled in a prolonged struggle of static warfare reminiscent of the western front of 1915-16. In the end the allied armies suffered 312,000 casualties in a campaign whose purpose was not clearly decided. This monograph examines the Allies campaign in the Mediterranean in 1943-1944 in order to answer the question of whether the Allies could have “won” and, if so, how. More specifically, this study looks at the utility of military theory for explaining cause and effect, and for providing a basis for operational insight and assessment of risk. This particular historical case study is significant in that the challenges of difficult terrain, coalition command, multinational forces, limited resources, and bad weather faced by the operational commanders of this campaign are factors that may weigh heavily for operational commanders in future conflicts. Conclusions reached in this study are threefold. First, the operational commanders involved did not have a true appreciation of the operational risks taken when major operations were designed and executed in January 1944. Second, the operational and strategic commanders may have chosen a different course of action if these risks had been more fully appreciated. Third, classical theory, as represented by the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, and even Liddell Hart, does have utility in explaining cause and effect and may well have provided the commanders concerned in this case clearer insight at the operational level of war.
Author: Major Daniel W. Krueger
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250632
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Get Book Here
Book Description
In September 1943 allied armies of the United States and Great Britain landed on the European mainland in its “soft underbelly” taking another step toward the defeat of Nazi Germany. Expecting to be in Rome by the end of that year, the Allies instead found themselves embroiled in a prolonged struggle of static warfare reminiscent of the western front of 1915-16. In the end the allied armies suffered 312,000 casualties in a campaign whose purpose was not clearly decided. This monograph examines the Allies campaign in the Mediterranean in 1943-1944 in order to answer the question of whether the Allies could have “won” and, if so, how. More specifically, this study looks at the utility of military theory for explaining cause and effect, and for providing a basis for operational insight and assessment of risk. This particular historical case study is significant in that the challenges of difficult terrain, coalition command, multinational forces, limited resources, and bad weather faced by the operational commanders of this campaign are factors that may weigh heavily for operational commanders in future conflicts. Conclusions reached in this study are threefold. First, the operational commanders involved did not have a true appreciation of the operational risks taken when major operations were designed and executed in January 1944. Second, the operational and strategic commanders may have chosen a different course of action if these risks had been more fully appreciated. Third, classical theory, as represented by the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, and even Liddell Hart, does have utility in explaining cause and effect and may well have provided the commanders concerned in this case clearer insight at the operational level of war.
Author: Daniel W. Krueger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Anzio, Battle of, Anzio, Italy, 1944
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This monograph examines the Allies' campaign in the Mediterranean in 1943-1944 in order to answer the question of whether the Allies could have won and, if so, how. This study looks at the utility of military theory for explaining cause and effect, and for providing a basis for operational insight and assessment of risk. It first reviews the strategic background and Allied planning at the campaign and major operation level, focusing on the critical time of December 1943. Then it reviews the results of the execution of those plans. Given these results it turns to analyze the Allied actions, to trace effects back to their causes and to evaluate the means employed utilizing theory as the framework for the analysis. This analysis forms the basis from which to draw conclusions regarding the utility of theory for this campaign. There were three conclusion reached. The operational commanders involved did not have a full appreciation of the operational risks taken when major operations were designed and executed in January 1944. The operational and strategic commanders may have chosen a different course of action if these risks had been more fully appreciated. Classical theory, as represented by the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, and even Liddell Hart, does have utility in explaining cause and effect and may well have provided the commanders concerned in this case clearer insight at the operational level of war.--Abstract.
Author: Milan N. Vego
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9781884733628
Category : Health & Fitness
Languages : en
Pages : 1496
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Book Description
Smallholder farmers and pastoralists fulfil an invaluable yet undervalued role in conserving biodiversity. They act as guardians of locally adapted livestock breeds that can make use of even marginal environments under tough climatic conditions and therefore are a crucial resource for food security. But in addition, by sustaining animals on natural vegetation and as part of local ecosystems, these communities also make a significant contribution to the conservation of wild biodiversity and of cultural landscapes. This publication provides a glimpse into the often intricate knowledge systems that pastoralists and smallholder farmers have developed for the management of their breeds in specific production systems and it also describes the multitude of threats and challenges these often marginalized communities have to cope with.
Author: Captain Stephen P. Gray
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782897267
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
This case study analyzes the role of operational art in Allied operations at Anzio, Italy and the battle for Rome (January 22-June 4, 1944). As part of the Allied Campaign in Italy, the amphibious assault on Anzio-code-named Operation Shingle, and the subsequent drive to Rome remains one of the most controversial military operations in history. Although the Allies eventually captured Rome from the Germans, the failure to use 'operational thinking' led to a poorly planned and executed operation. Most historical accounts blame the failures at Anzio on the lack of aggressiveness by the Operation Shingle commander Major General John P. Lucas. However, when viewed in the larger context of the strategy to defeat Germany and the Allied Campaign in Italy, Operation Shingle is a showcase of failure at the operational level of war. Political rather than military considerations drove Shingle-dooming the operation from the start. Anzio demonstrates the importance of linking tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives. At the strategic level of war, the Allies had a sound strategy to defeat Germany. However, at the operational level of war, the decision to launch Shingle did not adequately assess risk. In operational design, commanders failed to define an objective, lacked sufficient mass, and did not include alternative plans based on potential enemy actions. During planning and preparation, the Allies misjudged the enemy's center of gravity and failed to exploit valuable intelligence. During execution, operational leadership lacked initiative. Finally, the complexity and tensions created by the combined operation made unity of effort difficult. These lessons should benefit future operations.
Author: Gordon A. Harrison
Publisher: BDD Promotional Books Company
ISBN: 9780792458562
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 552
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Book Description
Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 560
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
LIFE Magazine is the treasured photographic magazine that chronicled the 20th Century. It now lives on at LIFE.com, the largest, most amazing collection of professional photography on the internet. Users can browse, search and view photos of today’s people and events. They have free access to share, print and post images for personal use.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government reports announcements & index
Languages : en
Pages : 1084
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Book Description
Author: Michael Julius King
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 102
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Book Description
This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel el Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a variety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be on guard against them in the future. Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, and popular support.
Author: Christopher Richard Gabel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 100
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Book Description
In the seventy years that have passed since the tank first appeared, antitank combat has presented one of the greatest challenges in land warfare. Dramatic improvements in tank technology and doctrine over the years have precipitated equally innovative developments in the antitank field. One cycle in this ongoing arms race occurred during the early years of World War II when the U.S. Army sought desperately to find an antidote to the vaunted German blitzkrieg. This Leavenworth Paper analyzes the origins of the tank destroyer concept, evaluates the doctrine and equipment with which tank destroyer units fought, and assesses the effectiveness of the tank destroyer in battle.
