Author: Paul Kevin DavisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Iran
Languages : en
Pages : 594
Book Description
Great Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 5 November , and two days later landed troops on Turkish soil at the head of the Persian Gulf. Indian Expeditionary Force 'D', commanded by General Sir Arthur Barrett, quickly captured the port of Basra and expanded their hold to encompass the Shatt-al-Arab as far up-river as Kurna, at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. An expedition up the Karun River into Persia secured the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's fields, and the original instructions of Force 'D' were fulfilled. Their orders had been to maintain the British interests and alliances with the Gulf sheikhs, show the Arabs that Britain meant to support them against the Turks, and consolidate the oil fields and pipeline. By April 1915 another division was added to Force 'D' and its new commander, General Sir John Nixon, arrived in Mesopotamia with orders to protect the oil supply, establish British control in the province of Basra, and prepare plans for a possible future offensive on Baghdad. -- From April 1915 to April 1916, the lack of direction, policy and cooperation between Nixon, India and London resulted in the total lack of a suitable logistical framework in Mesopotamia, and only disaster could result. It is the purpose of this paper to examine how the course of Force 'D' altered from its original purpose, what the effects of that change were, and to apportion responsibility for the drift and the calamity that ensued because of it. This paper will also attempt to appraise the conclusions and effects of the Mesopotamia Commission.
