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Author: Radovan Vadovic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.
Author: Radovan Vadovic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.
Author: Radovan Vadovic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Clemens van Dinther
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3764381132
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 245
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Book Description
This is one of the first books on the use of software agents to simulate bidding behavior in electronic auctions. It introduces market theory and computational economics together, and gives an overview on the most common and up-to-date agent-based simulation methods. The book will help the reader learn more about simulations in economics in general and common agent-based methods and tools in particular.
Author: Stefan Seifert
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540352686
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 194
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Book Description
Applying a Market Engineering approach, this book introduces a model of an auction with a posted price offer, and investigates the characteristics of such mechanisms. It discusses the respective equilibrium strategies of sellers and the bidders, providing useful insight into actual behavior. The theoretic results are compared with strategies of students in a controlled experiment. The experimental observations expose shortcomings of standard economic theories and help to further improve electronic markets.
Author: Jeffrey A. Livingston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In Internet auctions, bidders alter their strategies as they gain market experience. While inexperienced bidders bid the same high amounts regardless of the seller's reputation, experienced bidders bid substantially less if the seller has yet to establish a reputation and raise their bids as reports are filed that the seller has treated bidders well in the past. Experienced bidders also wait until much closer to the end of the auction to place their bids, although it takes very little experience to learn that waiting to submit one's bid is a superior strategy.
Author: Axel Ockenfels
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 16
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Book Description
Author: Ken Steiglitz
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691233861
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 300
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Book Description
Every day on eBay, millions of people buy and sell a vast array of goods, from rare collectibles and antiques to used cars and celebrity memorabilia. The internet auction site is remarkably easy to use, which accounts in part for its huge popularity. But how does eBay really work, and how does it compare to other kinds of auctions? These are questions that led Ken Steiglitz--computer scientist, collector of ancient coins, and a regular eBay user--to examine the site through the revealing lens of auction theory. The result is this book, in which Steiglitz shows us how human behaviors in open markets like eBay can be substantially more complex than those predicted by standard economic theory. In these pages we meet the sniper who outbids you in an auction's closing seconds, the early bidder who treats eBay as if it were an old-fashioned outcry auction, the shill who bids in league with the seller to artificially inflate the price--and other characters as well. Steiglitz guides readers through the fascinating history of auctions, how they functioned in the past and how they work today in online venues like eBay. Drawing on cutting-edge economics as well as his own stories from eBay, he reveals practical auction strategies and introduces readers to the fundamentals of auction theory and the mathematics behind eBay. Complete with exercises and a detailed appendix, this book is a must for sophisticated users of online auctions, and essential reading for students seeking an accessible introduction to the study of auction theory.
Author: John Duffy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Many internet auction sites implement ascending-bid, second-price auctions. Empirically, last minute or quot;latequot; bidding is frequently observed in quot;hard-closequot; but not in quot;soft-closequot; versions of these auctions. In this paper, we introduce an independent private-value repeated internet auction model to explain this observed difference in bidding behavior. We use finite automata to model the repeated auction strategies. We report results from simulations involving populations of artificial bidders who update their strategies via a genetic algorithm. We show that our model can deliver late or early bidding behavior, depending on the auction closing rule in accordance with the empirical evidence. Among other findings, we observe that hard-close auctions raise less revenue than soft-close auctions. We also investigate interesting properties of the evolving strategies and arrive at some conclusions regarding both auction designs from a market design point of view.
Author: Christian Summerer
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3668876002
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2017 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 2,0, University of Cologne, course: Economic Engineering, language: English, abstract: This termpaper gives a critical synthesis of three scientific contributions dealing with optimal models of charging payments for Internet advertising, an important market of the new economy of the digital era. The theoretical context is game theory. The mentioned papers aim at finding the most efficient form of allocation, that is, a form of allocation which satisfies clients who invest in online advertising as well as search engine companies who offer advertising positions relating to keywords on websites visited by users: Every client should agree with the recent advertisement, and the search engine company should receive the best payment possible. This state of things is called an equilibrium in these papers.
Author: Ali Pilehvar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Online auction environments provide several sources of information that can be used by bidders to form their bids. The impact of this information on bidding is likely to be higher when ambiguously specifi ed products are auctioned. The secondary market represents one such environment, where used and returned items from big-box retailers are auctioned off to other business buyers. Using a proprietary dataset of secondary market auctions hosted on an online B2B platform, we study how market pricing information from other auctions for comparable products a ffects the bidding behavior of the first bidder. First bidders are shown to be influenced by two sets of pricing information: prices from their own historical bidding behavior and concurrent prices, formed from other open and just-finished auctions relative to the focal auction. We also study how the impact of these market pricing information are moderated by bidder heterogeneity, captured by bidder experience and cross bidding activity on the platform across comparable concurrent auctions. Finally, we show the fi rst bid is signi cantly associated with the auction's nal price, contingent on the type of first bidder. Auctions are increasingly being used for the sale of ill-defi ned and idiosyncratic products; our work thus provides managerial implications for how auctioneers may design and manage the flow of relevant information to di erent classes of bidders on their sites in order to enhance their yields.
