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Author: Wayne C. Myrvold
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192634321
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 303
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Book Description
Concepts related to probability permeate physics. This is most obvious in statistical mechanics, in which probabilities appear explicitly, but even in cases when predictions are made with near-certainty, there are implicit probabilistic assumptions in play. How are we to understand these probabilistic concepts? How do they apply to the physical world? Beyond Chance and Credence offers a fresh look at these familiar topics, urging readers to see them in a new light. The book provides an overview of the history of philosophical debates about the nature of probability over the last three centuries, and clear and accessible introductions to conceptual issues in probability theory, thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics. Myrvold argues that the traditional choice between probabilities as objective chances or else as degrees of belief is too limiting, and introduces a new concept, epistemic chances, that combines physical and epistemic considerations. He goes on to show that conceiving of probabilities in this way solves some of the puzzles associated with the use of probability and statistical mechanics. The result is an innovative perspective on one of the most central topics in the philosophy of science.
Author: Wayne C. Myrvold
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192634321
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 303
Get Book Here
Book Description
Concepts related to probability permeate physics. This is most obvious in statistical mechanics, in which probabilities appear explicitly, but even in cases when predictions are made with near-certainty, there are implicit probabilistic assumptions in play. How are we to understand these probabilistic concepts? How do they apply to the physical world? Beyond Chance and Credence offers a fresh look at these familiar topics, urging readers to see them in a new light. The book provides an overview of the history of philosophical debates about the nature of probability over the last three centuries, and clear and accessible introductions to conceptual issues in probability theory, thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics. Myrvold argues that the traditional choice between probabilities as objective chances or else as degrees of belief is too limiting, and introduces a new concept, epistemic chances, that combines physical and epistemic considerations. He goes on to show that conceiving of probabilities in this way solves some of the puzzles associated with the use of probability and statistical mechanics. The result is an innovative perspective on one of the most central topics in the philosophy of science.
Author: Wayne C. Myrvold
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198865090
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 303
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Book Description
Beyond Chance and Credence introduces a new way of thinking of probabilities in science that combines physical and epistemic considerations. Myrvold shows that conceiving of probabilities in this way solves puzzles associated with the use of probability and statistical mechanics.
Author: Marshall Abrams
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226826635
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 293
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Book Description
An innovative view of the role of fitness concepts in evolutionary theory. Natural selection is one of the factors responsible for changes in biological populations. Some traits or organisms are fitter than others, and natural selection occurs when there are changes in the distribution of traits in populations because of fitness differences. Many philosophers of biology insist that a trait’s fitness should be defined as an average of the fitnesses of individual members of the population that have the trait. Marshall Abrams argues convincingly against this widespread approach. As he shows, it conflicts with the roles that fitness is supposed to play in evolutionary theory and with the ways that evolutionary biologists use fitness concepts in empirical research. The assumption that a causal kind of fitness is fundamentally a property of actual individuals has resulted in unnecessary philosophical puzzles and years of debate. Abrams came to see that the fitnesses of traits that are the basis of natural selection cannot be defined in terms of the fitnesses of actual members of populations, as philosophers of biology often claim. Rather, it is an overall population-environment system—not actual, particular organisms living in particular environmental conditions—that is the basis of trait fitnesses. Abrams argues that by distinguishing different classes of fitness concepts and the roles they play in the practice of evolutionary biology, we can see that evolutionary biologists’ diverse uses of fitness concepts make sense together and are consistent with the idea that fitness differences cause evolution. Abrams’s insight has broad significance, for it provides a general framework for thinking about the metaphysics of biological evolution and its relations to empirical research. As such, it is a game-changing book for philosophers of biology, biologists who want deeper insight into the nature of evolution, and anyone interested in the applied philosophy of probability.
Author: Meir Hemmo
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030343162
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 635
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Book Description
This volume provides a broad perspective on the state of the art in the philosophy and conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. Its essays take their starting point in the work and influence of Itamar Pitowsky, who has greatly influenced our understanding of what is characteristically non-classical about quantum probabilities and quantum logic, and this serves as a vantage point from which they reflect on key ongoing debates in the field. Readers will find a definitive and multi-faceted description of the major open questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics today, including: Is quantum mechanics a new theory of (contextual) probability? Should the quantum state be interpreted objectively or subjectively? How should probability be understood in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics? What are the limits of the physical implementation of computation? The impact of this volume goes beyond the exposition of Pitowsky’s influence: it provides a unique collection of essays by leading thinkers containing profound reflections on the field. Chapter 1. Classical logic, classical probability, and quantum mechanics (Samson Abramsky) Chapter 2. Why Scientific Realists Should Reject the Second Dogma of Quantum Mechanic (Valia Allori) Chapter 3. Unscrambling Subjective and Epistemic Probabilities (Guido Bacciagaluppi) Chapter 4. Wigner’s Friend as a Rational Agent (Veronika Baumann, Časlav Brukner) Chapter 5. Pitowsky's Epistemic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem (Yemima Ben-Menahem) Chapter 6. On the Mathematical Constitution and Explanation of Physical Facts (Joseph Berkovitz) Chapter 7. Everettian probabilities, the Deutsch-Wallace theorem and the Principal Principle (Harvey R. Brown, Gal Ben Porath) Chapter 8. ‘Two Dogmas’ Redu (Jeffrey Bub) Chapter 9. Physical Computability Theses (B. Jack Copeland, Oron Shagrir) Chapter 10. Agents in Healey’s Pragmatist Quantum Theory: A Comparison with Pitowsky’s Approach to Quantum Mechanics (Mauro Dorato) Chapter 11. Quantum Mechanics As a Theory of Observables and States and, Thereby, As a Theory of Probability (John Earman, Laura Ruetsche) Chapter 12. The Measurement Problem and two Dogmas about Quantum Mechanic (Laura Felline) Chapter 13. There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Cat: Quantum Information Principles In a Finite World(Amit Hagar) Chapter 14. Is Quantum Mechanics a New Theory of Probability? (Richard Healey) Chapter 15. Quantum Mechanics as a Theory of Probability (Meir Hemmo, Orly Shenker) Chapter 16. On the Three Types of Bell's Inequalities (Gábor Hofer-Szabó) Chapter 17. On the Descriptive Power of Probability Logic (Ehud Hrushovski) Chapter 18. The Argument against Quantum Computers (Gil Kalai) Chapter 19. Why a Relativistic Quantum Mechanical World Must be Indeterministic (Avi Levy, Meir Hemmo) Chapter 20. Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities Should be Realists about Quantum States (Wayne C. Myrvold) Chapter 21. The Relativistic Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument (Michael Redhead) Chapter 22. What price statistical independence? How Einstein missed the photon.(Simon Saunders) Chapter 23. How (Maximally) Contextual is Quantum Mechanics? (Andrew W. Simmons) Chapter 24. Roots and (Re)Sources of Value (In)Definiteness Versus Contextuality (Karl Svozil) Chapter 25: Schrödinger’s Reaction to the EPR Paper (Jos Uffink) Chapter 26. Derivations of the Born Rule (Lev Vaidman) Chapter 27. Dynamical States and the Conventionality of (Non-) Classicality (Alexander Wilce).
Author: Eleanor Knox
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 131722714X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 787
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Book Description
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics is a comprehensive and authoritative guide to the state of the art in the philosophy of physics. It comprisess 54 self-contained chapters written by leading philosophers of physics at both senior and junior levels, making it the most thorough and detailed volume of its type on the market – nearly every major perspective in the field is represented. The Companion’s 54 chapters are organized into 12 parts. The first seven parts cover all of the major physical theories investigated by philosophers of physics today, and the last five explore key themes that unite the study of these theories. I. Newtonian Mechanics II. Special Relativity III. General Relativity IV. Non-Relativistic Quantum Theory V. Quantum Field Theory VI. Quantum Gravity VII. Statistical Mechanics and Thermodynamics VIII. Explanation IX. Intertheoretic Relations X. Symmetries XI. Metaphysics XII. Cosmology The difficulty level of the chapters has been carefully pitched so as to offer both accessible summaries for those new to philosophy of physics and standard reference points for active researchers on the front lines. An introductory chapter by the editors maps out the field, and each part also begins with a short summary that places the individual chapters in context. The volume will be indispensable to any serious student or scholar of philosophy of physics.
Author: Valia Allori
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9811211736
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 698
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Book Description
The book explores several open questions in the philosophy and the foundations of statistical mechanics. Each chapter is written by a leading expert in philosophy of physics and/or mathematical physics. Here is a list of questions that are addressed in the book:
Author: Katie Robertson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192677497
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 433
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Book Description
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. The different sciences furnish us with a wide variety of explanations: some work at macroscopic scales, some work at microscopic scales, and some operate across different levels. How do these different explanatory levels relate to one another, and what is an explanatory level in the first place? Over the last 50 years, more and more philosophers--both reductionists and anti-reductionists--no longer subscribe to the idea that the best explanation resides at the fundamental physical level. New challenges arise from the success of scientific explanations employing multi-level models which mix levels of explanation, from distinctive differences between levels structures in biology, cognitive science, and social science, from the apparently radical reimagining of the explanatory role of spacetime in our current best theories of fundamental physics, and from the enduring mystery of how higher-level explanations are possible in the first place. These questions naturally connect to classic philosophical ways of thinking about the relationships between levels: reduction, emergence, and fundamentality. This volume presents a snapshot of cutting-edge research on explanatory levels, from their conceptual foundations to the details of how they are used in scientific practice.
Author: Richard Pettigrew
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198732716
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 251
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Book Description
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
Author: Remy Lestienne
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 1800613865
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 367
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Book Description
The present volume of Time and Science series is devoted to Physical Sciences and Cosmology. Today more than ever, the question 'is Time an ontological property, a necessary ingredient for the physical description of the world, or a purely epistemological element, relative to our situation in the world?' worry physicists and cosmologists alike. For many of them, Relativity (and particularly General Relativity), as well as its reconciliation with quantum mechanics in the elaboration of a quantum theory of gravitation, points to a negative answer to the first alternative, and leads them to deny the objective reality of time. For others, the answer is nuanced by the evidence of an emerging temporal property when one climbs the scales of the complexity of systems and/or the applicability of the statistical laws of thermodynamics. But for some, the illusion of the unreality of time comes from certain confusions that they denounce, and plead for the re-establishment of time at the heart of physical theories.
Author: Roman Frigg
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009036092
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 153
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Book Description
Statistical mechanics is the third pillar of modern physics, next to quantum theory and relativity theory. It aims to account for the behaviour of macroscopic systems in terms of the dynamical laws that govern their microscopic constituents and probabilistic assumptions about them. In this Element, the authors investigate the philosophical and foundational issues that arise in SM. The authors introduce the two main theoretical approaches in SM, Boltzmannian SM and Gibbsian SM, and discuss how they conceptualise equilibrium and explain the approach to it. In doing so, the authors examine how probabilities are introduced into the theories, how they deal with irreversibility, how they understand the relation between the micro and the macro level, and how the two approaches relate to each other. Throughout, the authors also pinpoint open problems that can be subject of future research. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
