Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information PDF Download

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Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information

Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information PDF Author: Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Publisher:
ISBN: 9782854188455
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Book Description
We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.