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Author: A.E. Roth
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642515703
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 129
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Book Description
The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.
Author: A.E. Roth
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642515703
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Get Book Here
Book Description
The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.
Author: H.J. Peters
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401580227
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach, bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach. The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the relevant demands from utility theory.
Author: A.E. Roth
Publisher: Springer
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 188
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Book Description
The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Axiomatic set theory
Languages : en
Pages : 140
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Book Description
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521267579
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.
Author: Emin Karagözoğlu
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030766667
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 486
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Book Description
This Edited Collection provides a rigorous and rich overview of current bargaining research in economics and related disciplines, as well as a discussion of future directions. The Editors create cross-disciplinary and cross-methodological synergies by bringing together bargaining researchers from various fields, including game theory, experimental economics, political economy, autonomous negotiations, artificial intelligence, environmental economics and behavioral operations management; as well as using various methods, including the strategic approach, axiomatic approach, empirical research, lab and field experiments, machine learning and decision support systems. Offering insights into the theoretical foundations of bargaining research, traditional applications to bargaining research and topics of growing importance due to new advances in technology and the changing political and physical landscape of the world, this book is a key tool for anyone working on or interested in bargaining.
Author: Abhinay Muthoo
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521576475
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.
Author: H. C. M. de Swart
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540207805
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
Relational structures abound in our daily environment: relational databases, data mining, scaling procedures, preference relations, etc. As the documentation of scientific results achieved within the European COST Action 274, TARSKI, this book advances the understanding of relational structures and the use of relational methods in various application fields. The 12 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected for presentations. The papers are devoted to mechanization of relational reasoning, relational scaling and preferences, and algebraic and logical foundations of real world relations.
Author: Wilko Bolt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0306475391
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 330
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Book Description
The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation’s announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2.
Author: A. V. Fiacco
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642464149
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 554
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Book Description
The papers appearing in this Volume were selected from a collec tion of papers presented at the Internationa~ Symposium on Extrema~ Methods and Systems Ana~ysis on the Occasion of Professor A. Charnes' 60th Birthday, at the University of Texas in Austin, 13-15 September 1977. As coeditors, we have followed the normal editorial procedures of scholarly journals. We have obtained invaluable assistance from a number of colleagues who essentially performed the duties of associate editors, coordinating most of the reviews. All papers except those appearing in the Historica~ Perspectives section were refereed by at least two individuals with competency in the respective area. Because of the wide range and diversity of the topics, it would have been im possible for us to make a consistently rational selection of papers without the help of the associate editors and referees. We are indeed grateful to them. The breadth of extremal methods and systems analysis, suggested by the range of topics covered in these papers, is characteristic of the field and also of the scholarly work of Professor Charnes. Extre mal methods and systems analysis has been a pioneering and systematic approach to the development and application of new scientific theories and methods for problems of management and operations in both the pri vate and public sectors, spanning all major disciplines from economics to engineering.
