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Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 23
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Yeon Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
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Book Description
Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: Santiago Balseiro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
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Book Description
We study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a seller that repeatedly auctions independent items over a discrete time horizon to buyers that face a cumulative budget constraint. A driving motivation behind our model is the emergence of real-time bidding markets for online display advertising in which such budgets are prevalent. We assume the seller has a strong form of limited commitment: she commits to the rules of the current auction but cannot commit to those of future auctions. We show that the celebrated Myersonian approach that leverages the envelope theorem fails in this setting, and therefore, characterizing the dynamic optimal mechanism appears intractable. Despite these challenges, we derive and characterize a near-optimal dynamic mechanism. To do so, we show that the Myersonian approach is recovered in a corresponding fluid continuous time model in which the time interval between consecutive items becomes negligible. Then, we leverage this approach to characterize the optimal dynamic direct-revelation mechanism, highlighting novel incentives at play in settings with buyers' budget constraints and seller's limited commitment. We show through a combination of theoretical and numerical results that the optimal mechanism arising from the fluid continuous time model approximately satisfies incentive compatibility for the buyers and is approximately sequentially rational for the seller in the original discrete time model.
Author: Jean-Pierre Benoit
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.
Author: Yiu Wing Chan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 88
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Book Description
Author: A.J.J. Talman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Abhishek Pani
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Yanwu Yang
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0124115047
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 213
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Book Description
The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization. The highly experienced authors compiled their knowledge and experience to provide insight, algorithms and development techniques for successful optimized/constrained systems. The book presents a cutting-edge budget optimization approach that embraces three-level budget decisions in the life cycle of search auctions: allocation across markets at the system level, distribution over temporal slots at the campaign level, and real-time adjustment at the keyword level. Delivers a systematic overview and technique for understanding budget constraints and ROI optimization in sponsored search auction systems, including algorithms and developer guides for a range of scenarios Explores effects of constraints on mechanisms, bidding and keyword strategies, and the strategies for budget optimization that developers can employ An informative reference source for both software and systems developers working in the search auctions, marketing and sales strategy optimization, services development for online marketing and advertisement, e-commerce, social and economic networking
Author: Lawrence M. Ausubel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
We perform laboratory experiments comparing auctions with endogenous budget constraints. A principal imposes a budget limit on a bidder (an agent) in response to a principal-agent problem. In contrast to the existing literature where budget constraints are exogenous, this theory predicts that tighter constraints will be imposed in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions, offsetting any advantages attributable to the lower bidding strategy of the first-price auction. Our experimental findings support this theory: principals are found to set significantly lower budgets in first-price auctions. Our results help to explain the prevalence of ascending (i.e., second-price) formats in high-stakes auctions.
