Incentives

Incentives PDF Author: Donald E. Campbell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108546854
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 699

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Book Description
When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.

Incentives

Incentives PDF Author: Donald E. Campbell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108546854
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 699

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Book Description
When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.

Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial Auctions PDF Author: Peter C. Cramton
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 678

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Book Description
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

Discovering Prices

Discovering Prices PDF Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023154457X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 222

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Book Description
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.

Putting Auction Theory to Work

Putting Auction Theory to Work PDF Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378

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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design PDF Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107135346
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 935

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Book Description
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

Topics in Microeconomics

Topics in Microeconomics PDF Author: Elmar Wolfstetter
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521645348
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 394

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Book Description
This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.

Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms

Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms PDF Author: Han La Poutré
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3540462430
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 236

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Book Description
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, AMEC VII 2005, held in Utrecht, Netherlands in July 2005, as part of AAMAS 2005, and the third Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis, TADA 2005, held in Edinburgh, UK in August 2005, in the course of the IJCAI 2005 conference meetings. The seven revised full AMEC 2005 papers presented were carefully selected.

The Handbook of Market Design

The Handbook of Market Design PDF Author: Nir Vulkan
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191668435
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 706

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Book Description
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.

Market Design

Market Design PDF Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316800245
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 297

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Book Description
The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.

Contract Theory

Contract Theory PDF Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262025768
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 746

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Book Description
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.