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Author: Saul Lach
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 37
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Book Description
In markets where price dispersion is prevalent the relevant question is not what happens to the price when the number of firms changes but, instead, what happens to the whole distribution of equilibrium prices. Using data from the gasoline market in the Netherlands, we find, first, that markets with a given number of competitors have price distributions that first-order stochastically dominate the corresponding price distributions in markets with one more firm. Second, the competitive response varies along the price distribution and is stronger at prices in the medium to upper part of the distribution. Finally, consumer gains from competition depend on how well informed they are and turn out to be larger for relatively attentive consumers. To account for these empirical results, we propose a generalisation of Varian's (1980) well-known model of sales that allows for richer heterogeneity in consumer price information.
Author: Saul Lach
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 37
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Book Description
In markets where price dispersion is prevalent the relevant question is not what happens to the price when the number of firms changes but, instead, what happens to the whole distribution of equilibrium prices. Using data from the gasoline market in the Netherlands, we find, first, that markets with a given number of competitors have price distributions that first-order stochastically dominate the corresponding price distributions in markets with one more firm. Second, the competitive response varies along the price distribution and is stronger at prices in the medium to upper part of the distribution. Finally, consumer gains from competition depend on how well informed they are and turn out to be larger for relatively attentive consumers. To account for these empirical results, we propose a generalisation of Varian's (1980) well-known model of sales that allows for richer heterogeneity in consumer price information.
Author: Saul Lach
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Makoto Abe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Brand choice
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428958460
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: Raj Sethuraman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Author: Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781514145906
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
By permitting firms to have different entry costs, I generalize two previously studied models of two-stage entry and pricing amongst Bertrand competitors. I find that the existing results depend critically on the symmetry assumption. For example, if firms' entry decisions are observed before price-setting occurs, then total welfare can increase following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous welfare reduction found in the symmetric setting. If firms' entry decisions are unobserved before pricing-setting occurs, then the expected price typically decreases or remains unchanged following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous price increase found in the symmetric setting. In both price-setting environments, competition increases following the introduction of potential entrants with sufficiently low entry costs, a finding that is obscured by focusing on the symmetric models.
Author: Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781523326587
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
By permitting firms to have different entry costs, I generalize two previously studied models of two-stage entry and pricing amongst Bertrand competitors. I find that the existing results depend critically on the symmetry assumption. For example, if firms' entry decisions are observed before price-setting occurs, then total welfare can increase following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous welfare reduction found in the symmetric setting. If firms' entry decisions are unobserved before pricing-setting occurs, then the expected price typically decreases or remains unchanged following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous price increase found in the symmetric setting. In both price-setting environments, competition increases following the introduction of potential entrants with sufficiently low entry costs, a finding that is obscured by focusing on the symmetric models.
Author: Raj Sethuraman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
Author: K. M. Crowe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Author: Charles J. Thomas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
