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Author: Cynthia M. Grabo
Publisher: University Press of America
ISBN: 9780761829522
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 188
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Book Description
Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts during the Cold War, has been declassified and condensed to provide wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis for strategic warning. Cynthia Grabo defines the essential steps in the warning process, examines distinctive ingredients of the analytic method of intelligence gathering, and discusses the guidelines for assessing the meaning of gathered information. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. In this book, Grabo suggests ways of improving warning assessments that better convey warnings to policymakers and military commanders who are responsible for taking appropriate action to avert disaster.
Author: Cynthia M. Grabo
Publisher: University Press of America
ISBN: 9780761829522
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Get Book Here
Book Description
Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts during the Cold War, has been declassified and condensed to provide wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis for strategic warning. Cynthia Grabo defines the essential steps in the warning process, examines distinctive ingredients of the analytic method of intelligence gathering, and discusses the guidelines for assessing the meaning of gathered information. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. In this book, Grabo suggests ways of improving warning assessments that better convey warnings to policymakers and military commanders who are responsible for taking appropriate action to avert disaster.
Author: Cynthia M. Grabo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deception
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Book Description
Author: Cynthia Grabo
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781483972404
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
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Book Description
Assigned to the National Indications Center, Cynthia Grabo served as a senior researcher and writer for the U.S. Watch Committee throughout its existence (1950 to 1975), and in its successor, the Strategic Warning Staff. During this time she saw the need to capture the institutional memory associated with strategic warning. With three decades of experience in the Intelligence Community, she saw intelligence and warning failures in Korea, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba. In the summer of 1972, the DIA published her "Handbook of Warning Intelligence" as a classified document, followed by two additional classified volumes, one in the fall of 1972 and the last in 1974. These declassified books have now been condensed from the original three volumes into this one. Ms. Grabo's authoritative interpretation of an appropriate analytic strategy for intelligence-based warning is here presented in a commercial reprint of this classic study. (Originally published by the Joint Military Intelligence College)
Author: John A. Gentry
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626166552
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
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Book Description
John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning—the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action—is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.
Author: Ephraim KAM
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674039297
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 295
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Book Description
Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective offers implications based on the intelligence perspective, providing both historical background and scientific analysis that draws from the author's vast experience. The book is of utmost value to all those engaged in intelligence work, and to those whose operational or political responsibility brings them in touch with intelligence assessments and the need to authenticate and then adopt them or discount them. Similarly, the book will interest any reader intrigued by decision-making processes that influence individuals and nations at war, and sometimes even shape national destiny. --Ehud Barak, Former Prime Minister of Israel
Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815719477
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 333
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Book Description
Long before Germany's blitzkrieg swept the West, European leaders had received many signals of its imminence. Stalin, too, had abundant warning of German designs on Russia but believed that by avoiding "provocative" defensive measures he could avert the attack that finally came in June 1941. And the stories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and three Arab-Israeli conflicts are replete with missed opportunities to react to unmistakable warnings. Richad K. Betts analyzes surprise attacks during the mid-twentieth century to illustrate his thesis: surprise attacks occur, not because intelligence services fail to warn, but because of the disbelief of political leaders. "Although the probability is low that the United States will fail to deter direct attack by the Soviet Union," Betts says, "the intensity of the threat warrants painstaking analysis of how to cope with it." His own investigation of the historical, psychological, political, diplomatic, and military aspects of his subject heightens understanding of why surprise attacks succeed and why victim nations fail to respond to warnings. In discussing current policy he focuses on the defense of Western Europe and applies the lessons of history to U.S. defense planning, offering detailed recommendations for changes in strategy. Obviously some of the potential dangers of military surprise cannot be prevented. The important thing, he emphasizes, is that "without forces that exceed requirements (the solution Moscow appears to have chosen), it is vital to ensure that what forces exist can be brought to bear when needed.
Author: Cynthia M. Grabo
Publisher: Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 338
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Book Description
Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security was written during the Cold War and classified for 40 years, this manual is now available to scholars and practitioners interested in both history and intelligence. Cynthia Grabo, author of the abridged version, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, goes into detail on the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting. The book discusses the problems of military analysis, problems of understanding specific problems of political, civil and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment."
Author: Richard A. Posner
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 9780742549470
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
Posner discusses the utter futilty of this reform act in a searing critique of the 9/11 Commission, its recommendations, Congress's role in making law, and the law's inability to do what it is intended to do.
Author: Cynthia Grabo
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1442248149
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 455
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Book Description
This new and final edition is a follow-up to the author’s first book, Anticipating Surprise (University Press of America, 2002) and the Handbook of Warning Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2010). The first book was an abridged version of Grabo’s 1972 manuscript, of which only 200 pages were allowed to be published by the government. The second book was published after it was agreed that the last 10 chapters would remain classified. These final 10 chapters have recently been released by the government and complete the manuscript as it was originally intended to be published by the author in 1972. The Handbook of Warning Intelligence was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. Originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts, it explains the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting, discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment." Much of what Grabo wrote in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, her book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time. In these last chapters, Grabo discusses scenarios where the United States will need to take action, especially describing Soviet indicators of such action. She also talks on how to influence policymakers to take, or not take, action based on intelligence. After the Soviet Union fell, the government was hesitant to release this information—especially considering what's going on with Putin today.
Author: Avner Barnea
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1793619891
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 233
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Book Description
The disciplines of strategic intelligence at the governmental level and competitive business intelligence constitute accepted methods of decision-supporting to prevent mistakes and strategic surprise. This research discovered that many researchers in the intelligence field feel that intelligence methodology in both contexts has reached a “glass ceiling.” Thus far, research has focused separately on national intelligence and intelligence in business, without any attempt to benchmark from one field to the other. This book shows that it is possible to use experience gained in the business field to improve intelligence practices in national security, and vice versa through mutual learning. The book’s main innovation is its proposition that mutual learning can be employed in the context of a model distinguishes between concentrated and diffused surprises to provide a breakthrough in the intelligence field, thereby facilitating better prediction of the surprise development. We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence focuses on a comparison between how states, through their intelligence organizations, cope with strategic surprises and how business organizations deal with unexpected movement in their field. Based on this comparison, the author proposes a new model which can better address the challenge of avoiding strategic surprises. This book can contribute significantly to the study of intelligence, which will become more influential in the coming years.
