Adverse Selection in the Credit Life Insurance Market

Adverse Selection in the Credit Life Insurance Market PDF Author: L. Lee Colquitt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Adverse selection plays a prominent role in the insurance literature due to its negative implications for insurer financial performance and stability. However, there is a paucity of empirical evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection in the U.S. insurance market. Potential reasons for the lack of evidence include: (1) that insurers effectively use underwriting and pricing to counteract adverse selection; or (2) that consumers either do not have, or fail to take advantage of, private information. We test for the existence of adverse selection in the credit life insurance market where opportunities to exploit asymmetric information are pronounced due to the lack of underwriting and highly regulated prices. Our analysis provides evidence consistent with adverse selection in the credit life market and suggests that the lack of empirical evidence regarding adverse selection may be due to effective underwriting rather than consumers failing to use informational advantages to their benefit.

Adverse Selection in the Credit Life Insurance Market

Adverse Selection in the Credit Life Insurance Market PDF Author: L. Lee Colquitt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
Adverse selection plays a prominent role in the insurance literature due to its negative implications for insurer financial performance and stability. However, there is a paucity of empirical evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection in the U.S. insurance market. Potential reasons for the lack of evidence include: (1) that insurers effectively use underwriting and pricing to counteract adverse selection; or (2) that consumers either do not have, or fail to take advantage of, private information. We test for the existence of adverse selection in the credit life insurance market where opportunities to exploit asymmetric information are pronounced due to the lack of underwriting and highly regulated prices. Our analysis provides evidence consistent with adverse selection in the credit life market and suggests that the lack of empirical evidence regarding adverse selection may be due to effective underwriting rather than consumers failing to use informational advantages to their benefit.

Adverse Selection, Regulated Prices and Returns to Holders of Credit Life Insurance

Adverse Selection, Regulated Prices and Returns to Holders of Credit Life Insurance PDF Author: Michael L. Smith
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Credit life insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 27

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Book Description


Loss Coverage

Loss Coverage PDF Author: Guy Thomas
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110815834X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 285

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Book Description
Most academic and policy commentary represents adverse selection as a severe problem in insurance, which should always be deprecated, avoided or minimised. This book gives a contrary view. It details the exaggeration of adverse selection in insurers' rhetoric and insurance economics, and presents evidence that in many insurance markets, adverse selection is weaker than most commentators suggest. A novel arithmetical argument shows that from a public policy perspective, 'weak' adverse selection can be a good thing. This is because a degree of adverse selection is needed to maximise 'loss coverage', the expected fraction of the population's losses which is compensated by insurance. This book will be valuable for those interested in public policy arguments about insurance and discrimination: academics (in economics, law and social policy), policymakers, actuaries, underwriters, disability activists, geneticists and other medical professionals.

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets PDF Author: Alma Cohen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Adverse selection (Insurance)
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
"Abstract: This paper reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage--risk prediction of adverse selection theory--that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage--risk correlation may be found in some pools of insurance policies but not in others. We also review the work on the disentangling of adverse selection and moral hazard and on learning by policyholders and insurers"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.

Disrupting Finance

Disrupting Finance PDF Author: Theo Lynn
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3030023303
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 194

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Book Description
This open access Pivot demonstrates how a variety of technologies act as innovation catalysts within the banking and financial services sector. Traditional banks and financial services are under increasing competition from global IT companies such as Google, Apple, Amazon and PayPal whilst facing pressure from investors to reduce costs, increase agility and improve customer retention. Technologies such as blockchain, cloud computing, mobile technologies, big data analytics and social media therefore have perhaps more potential in this industry and area of business than any other. This book defines a fintech ecosystem for the 21st century, providing a state-of-the art review of current literature, suggesting avenues for new research and offering perspectives from business, technology and industry.

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard PDF Author: Gwen Peters Burchett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 144

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Book Description


Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting

Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting PDF Author: Georges Dionne
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74

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Book Description


Consumer Attitudes Toward Credit Insurance

Consumer Attitudes Toward Credit Insurance PDF Author: John M. Barron
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9781461313281
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 158

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Book Description
Consumer Attitudes Toward Credit Insurance provides the findings of a survey of approximately 3600 individuals who had the opportunity to purchase credit life insurance in conjunction with all types of consumer loans, except first mortgages and credit cards. The survey that forms the basis of the book was conducted in 1993 by the Credit Research Center at Purdue University's Krannert Graduate School of Management. It replicates and expands upon four previous national studies of credit insurance consumers, done between 1970 and 1985. Despite the generally positive findings of prior research with respect to consumer attitudes toward credit insurance, several open questions remain of interest to policy makers, specifically the question of whether coercion is involved in the sale of the insurance. Consumer Attitudes Toward Credit Insurance addresses these outstanding issues. It presents a profile of who is currently being served by the credit insurance market, as well as the reasons borrowers purchase the product and their experience with the offer of credit insurance at point of sale.

Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks in Insurance Markets

Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks in Insurance Markets PDF Author: Varun Agarwal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Book Description


Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets

Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets PDF Author: James R. Garven
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry - and therefore, its negative consequences - decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of U.S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) during the period 1993-2012. We find that the amount of reinsurance, insurer profitability, and insurer credit quality all increase with the tenure of the insurer-reinsurer relationship.