Adverse Selection, Asymmetric Information and Discrimination in a Labor Market

Adverse Selection, Asymmetric Information and Discrimination in a Labor Market PDF Author: Paulo R. A. Loureiro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The main objective of this study is the application of an adverse selection model to verify the existence of discrimination in a competitive labor market caused by asymmetric information. The most important result obtained is when a group of workers with different productivities earn the same wage characterizing discrimination.

Adverse Selection, Asymmetric Information and Discrimination in a Labor Market

Adverse Selection, Asymmetric Information and Discrimination in a Labor Market PDF Author: Paulo R. A. Loureiro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The main objective of this study is the application of an adverse selection model to verify the existence of discrimination in a competitive labor market caused by asymmetric information. The most important result obtained is when a group of workers with different productivities earn the same wage characterizing discrimination.

Adverse Selection in the Labor Market

Adverse Selection in the Labor Market PDF Author: Bruce C. Greenwald
Publisher: Dissertations-G
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 330

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Book Description


Studies of Labor Market Intermediation

Studies of Labor Market Intermediation PDF Author: David H. Autor
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226032906
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 456

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Book Description
From the traditional craft hiring hall to the Web site Monster.com, a multitude of institutions exist to facilitate the matching of workers with firms. The diversity of such Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) encompasses criminal records providers, public employment offices, labor unions, temporary help agencies, and centralized medical residency matches. Studies of Labor Market Intermediation analyzes how these third-party actors intercede where workers and firms meet, thereby aiding, impeding, and, in some cases, exploiting the matching process. By building a conceptual foundation for analyzing the roles that these understudied economic actors serve in the labor market, this volume develops both a qualitative and quantitative sense of their significance to market operation and worker welfare. Cross-national in scope, Studies of Labor Market Intermediation is distinctive in coalescing research on a set of market institutions that are typically treated as isolated entities, thus setting a research agenda for analyzing the changing shape of employment in an era of rapid globalization and technological change.

"Asymmetric Information and Wage Differences Across Groups

Author: Dwight W. Adamson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Discrimination in employment
Languages : en
Pages : 18

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Hiring and Firing Costs, Adverse Selection and the Presistence of Unemployment

Hiring and Firing Costs, Adverse Selection and the Presistence of Unemployment PDF Author: Adriana D. Kugler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Frictional unemployment
Languages : en
Pages : 60

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Labor Market Discrimination

Labor Market Discrimination PDF Author: Marjorie Baldwin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Discrimination in employment
Languages : en
Pages : 438

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Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets

Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets PDF Author: Daniel Ferreira
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Labor market
Languages : en
Pages : 45

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Book Description
We show that adverse selection in the labor market may generate negative assortative matching of workers and firms. In a model in which employers asymmetrically learn about the ability of their workers, high-productivity firms poach mediocre workers, whereas low-productivity firms retain high-ability workers. We show that this flipping property is caused by information asymmetry alone. Our model has a number of positive and normative predictions: External promotions are not an indication of high talent, within-job wage growth is higher in industries with more revenue dispersion, and non-compete clauses are inefficient in industries with significant firm heterogeneity.

Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry

Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry PDF Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 145195154X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Book Description
The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance PDF Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161

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Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market

Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market PDF Author: Spencer Bastani
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17

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Book Description