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Author: Frank Thuijsman
Publisher: Birkhäuser
ISBN: 3319280147
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 330
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Book Description
This contributed volume considers recent advances in dynamic games and their applications, based on presentations given at the 16th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games, held July 9-12, 2014, in Amsterdam. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, these papers cover various aspects of dynamic game theory including differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. They discuss theoretical developments, algorithmic methods, issues relating to lack of information, and applications in areas such as biological or economical competition, stability in communication networks, and maintenance decisions in an electricity market, just to name a few. Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games presents state-of-the-art research in a wide spectrum of areas. As such, it serves as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and advanced graduate students.
Author: Frank Thuijsman
Publisher: Birkhäuser
ISBN: 3319280147
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Get Book Here
Book Description
This contributed volume considers recent advances in dynamic games and their applications, based on presentations given at the 16th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games, held July 9-12, 2014, in Amsterdam. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, these papers cover various aspects of dynamic game theory including differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. They discuss theoretical developments, algorithmic methods, issues relating to lack of information, and applications in areas such as biological or economical competition, stability in communication networks, and maintenance decisions in an electricity market, just to name a few. Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games presents state-of-the-art research in a wide spectrum of areas. As such, it serves as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and advanced graduate students.
Author: Pierre Cardaliaguet
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0817683550
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 421
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Book Description
This book focuses on various aspects of dynamic game theory, presenting state-of-the-art research and serving as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. Its contributions, written by experts in their respective disciplines, are outgrowths of presentations originally given at the 14th International Symposium of Dynamic Games and Applications held in Banff. Advances in Dynamic Games covers a variety of topics, ranging from evolutionary games, theoretical developments in game theory and algorithmic methods to applications, examples, and analysis in fields as varied as mathematical biology, environmental management, finance and economics, engineering, guidance and control, and social interaction. Featured throughout are valuable tools and resources for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in dynamic games and their applications to mathematics, engineering, economics, and management science.
Author: William H. Sandholm
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262195879
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 618
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Book Description
Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.
Author: Thomas L. Vincent
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107406513
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
All of life is a game, and evolution by natural selection is no exception. The evolutionary game theory developed in this 2005 book provides the tools necessary for understanding many of nature's mysteries, including co-evolution, speciation, extinction and the major biological questions regarding fit of form and function, diversity, procession, and the distribution and abundance of life. Mathematics for the evolutionary game are developed based on Darwin's postulates leading to the concept of a fitness generating function (G-function). G-function is a tool that simplifies notation and plays an important role developing Darwinian dynamics that drive natural selection. Natural selection may result in special outcomes such as the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). An ESS maximum principle is formulated and its graphical representation as an adaptive landscape illuminates concepts such as adaptation, Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, and the nature of life's evolutionary game.
Author: American Mathematical Society. Short Course
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 0821853260
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Book Description
This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Author: Jörgen W. Weibull
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262731218
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 292
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Book Description
Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.
Author: Pierre Bernhard
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0817648348
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 456
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Book Description
This book presents current advances in the theory of dynamic games and their applications in several disciplines. The selected contributions cover a variety of topics ranging from purely theoretical developments in game theory, to numerical analysis of various dynamic games, and then progressing to applications of dynamic games in economics, finance, and energy supply. A unified collection of state-of-the-art advances in theoretical and numerical analysis of dynamic games and their applications, the work is suitable for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students in applied mathematics, engineering, economics, as well as environmental and management sciences.
Author: Tamer Başar
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461202450
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 423
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Book Description
Recent years have witnessed a surge of activity in the field of dynamic both theory and applications. Theoretical as well as practical games, in problems in zero-sum and nonzero-sum games, continuous time differential and discrete time multistage games, and deterministic and stochastic games games are currently being investigated by researchers in diverse disciplines, such as engineering, mathematics, biology, economics, management science, and political science. This surge of interest has led to the formation of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG) in 1990, whose primary goal is to foster the development of advanced research and applications in the field of game theory. One important activity of the Society is to organize biannually an international symposium which aims at bringing together all those who contribute to the development of this active field of applied science. In 1992 the symposium was organized in Grimentz, Switzerland, under the supervision of an international scientific committee and with the help of a local organizing committee based at University of Geneva. This book, which is the first volume in the new Series, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (see the Preface to the Series), is based on presentations made at this symposium. It is however more than a book of proceedings for a conference. Every paper published in this volume has passed through a very selective refereeing process, as in an archival technical journal.
Author: Jun Tanimoto
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 4431549625
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 223
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Book Description
This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Author: Larry Samuelson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262692199
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
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Book Description
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
