Partition Function Form Games PDF Download
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Author: László Á. Kóczy
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319698419
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Book Description
This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.
Author: László Á. Kóczy
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319698419
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Operations research
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
Author: Peter C. Ordeshook
Publisher: New York University Press
ISBN:
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 648
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Logistics, Naval
Languages : en
Pages : 1262
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Book Description
Author: Harold W. Kuhn
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829569
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 118
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Book Description
This book is a spectacular introduction to the modern mathematical discipline known as the Theory of Games. Harold Kuhn first presented these lectures at Princeton University in 1952. They succinctly convey the essence of the theory, in part through the prism of the most exciting developments at its frontiers half a century ago. Kuhn devotes considerable space to topics that, while not strictly the subject matter of game theory, are firmly bound to it. These are taken mainly from the geometry of convex sets and the theory of probability distributions. The book opens by addressing "matrix games," a name first introduced in these lectures as an abbreviation for two-person, zero-sum games in normal form with a finite number of pure strategies. It continues with a treatment of games in extensive form, using a model introduced by the author in 1950 that quickly supplanted von Neumann and Morgenstern's cumbersome approach. A final section deals with games that have an infinite number of pure strategies for the two players. Throughout, the theory is generously illustrated with examples, and exercises test the reader's understanding. A historical note caps off each chapter. For readers familiar with the calculus and with elementary matrix theory or vector analysis, this book offers an indispensable store of vital insights on a subject whose importance has only grown with the years.
Author: Jess Benhabib
Publisher: Newnes
ISBN: 0444537139
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1509
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Book Description
How can economists define and measure social preferences and interactions? Through the use of new economic data and tools, our contributors survey an array of social interactions and decisions that typify homo economicus. Identifying economic strains in activities such as learning, group formation, discrimination, and the creation of peer dynamics, they demonstrate how they tease out social preferences from the influences of culture, familial beliefs, religion, and other forces. Advances our understanding about quantifying social interactions and the effects of culture Summarizes research on theoretical and applied economic analyses of social preferences Explores the recent willingness among economists to consider new arguments in the utility function
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 828
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Book Description
Author: Frank C. Zagare
Publisher: SAGE
ISBN: 9780803920507
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
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Book Description
Professor Zagare provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players.
Author: Jess Benhabib
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444531874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 940
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Book Description
How can economists define and measure social preferences and interactions? Through the use of new economic data and tools, our contributors survey an array of social interactions and decisions that typify homo economicus. Identifying economic strains in activities such as learning, group formation, discrimination, and the creation of peer dynamics, they demonstrate how they tease out social preferences from the influences of culture, familial beliefs, religion, and other forces. Advances our understanding about quantifying social interactions and the effects of culture Summarizes research on theoretical and applied economic analyses of social preferences Explores the recent willingness among economists to consider new arguments in the utility function Matthew O Jackson has contributed to Handbooks in Economics: Social Economics Set as an editor. Matthew O. Jackson is the William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford University
Author: Nicola Friederike Maaser
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642041531
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 141
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Book Description
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
