A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection. Chapter 5: The Solution Concept PDF Download
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Author: John Charles Harsanyi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
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Book Description
Author: John Charles Harsanyi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: John C. Harsanyi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: E. van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642499708
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
Author: Werner Güth
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642483674
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
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Book Description
This book develops a general solution concept for strategic games which resolves strategic uncertainty completely. The concept is described by a mathematically formulated solution procedure and illustrated by applying it to many interesting examples. A long nontechnical introduction tries to survey and to discuss the more technical parts of the book. The book and especially the introduction provide firm and consistent guidance for scholars of game theory. There are many open problems which could inspire further research efforts.
Author: Joseph Harrington
Publisher: Macmillan
ISBN: 9780716766308
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 600
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Book Description
This book on game theory introduces and develops the key concepts with a minimum of mathematics. Students are presented with empirical evidence, anecdotes and strategic situations to help them apply theory and gain a genuine insight into human behaviour. The book provides a diverse collection of examples and scenarios from history, literature, sports, crime, theology, war, biology, and everyday life. These examples come with rich context that adds real-world meat to the skeleton of theory. Each chapter begins with a specific strategic situation and is followed with a systematic treatment that gradually builds understanding of the concept.
Author: Gustav Feichtinger
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400979010
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 512
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Book Description
Proceedings of the Joint Meeting of the Austrian and Swiss Operations Research Societies, Vienna, September 22-24, 1980
Author: Gábor Kassay
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0128110309
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 442
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Book Description
Equilibrium Problems and Applications develops a unified variational approach to deal with single-valued, set-valued and quasi-equilibrium problems. The authors promote original results in relationship with classical contributions to the field of equilibrium problems. The content evolved in the general setting of topological vector spaces and it lies at the interplay between pure and applied nonlinear analysis, mathematical economics, and mathematical physics. This abstract approach is based on tools from various fields, including set-valued analysis, variational and hemivariational inequalities, fixed point theory, and optimization. Applications include models from mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium of non-cooperative games, and Browder variational inclusions. The content is self-contained and the book is mainly addressed to researchers in mathematics, economics and mathematical physics as well as to graduate students in applied nonlinear analysis. A rigorous mathematical analysis of Nash equilibrium type problems, which play a central role to describe network traffic models, competition games or problems arising in experimental economics Develops generic models relevant to mathematical economics and quantitative modeling of game theory, aiding economists to understand vital material without having to wade through complex proofs Reveals a number of surprising interactions among various equilibria topics, enabling readers to identify a common and unified approach to analysing problem sets Illustrates the deep features shared by several types of nonlinear problems, encouraging readers to develop further this unifying approach from other viewpoints into economic models in turn
Author: John C. Harsanyi
Publisher: Mit Press
ISBN: 9780262582384
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
Author: Wulf Albers
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642604951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 526
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Book Description
Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
Author: Vitaly Pruzhansky
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN: 9051708254
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
