A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement PDF Download
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Author: Prakash Chander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Income tax
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: Prakash Chander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Income tax
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: Parkash Chander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Risk management
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
Author: Joel Slemrod
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780472103386
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 361
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Book Description
Experts discuss strategies for curtailing tax evasion
Author: Benno Torgler
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Book Description
The question of why citizens pay their taxes has attracted increased attention in the tax compliance literature of late. In this book, Benno Torgler considers the evidence that suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance within society. To attempt to resolve this puzzle, numerous researchers have argued that citizens' attitudes towards paying taxes (defined as tax morale) help to explain the high degree of compliance. Yet most have treated tax morale itself as a black box, failing to discuss the issues influencing it. This unique volume provides important new insights into the factors that shape the emergence and maintenance of citizens' willingness to cooperate with tax legislations in different societies. Distinctive in its examination of citizen tax morale and tax compliance, this book will be of great interest to academics, researchers and students concerned with economics, political science, sociology, social psychology and accounting. It will also appeal to policymakers and practitioners.
Author: Leandro Arozamena
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
This paper presents a two-period model, with a utilitarian government and a continuum of taxpayers. In the first period, the government designs the tax law, which comprises taxes and fines to impose on evaders. Contrary to the previous literature on optimal tax-enforcement policies, the government cannot commit to any future audit policy. In the second period, evasion and costly enforcement take place. Taxpayers report their income to the government. Then, the government decides whether to audit each report or not. If a misreport is detected, evaders are penalized; otherwise, taxpayers pay their due tax.We obtain the optimal tax law by solving the model backwards. In the second period, the dynamic inspection game has, depending on parameter values and first-period choices, either (i) a pure strategy equilibrium, with full evasion; or (ii) a mixed strategy equilibrium, with partial evasion and random auditing. Next, we move back to the first period, where we completely characterize the tax law that maximizes expected social welfare. The main results of the paper are the following. First, the characterization of the optimal tax law crucially depends upon the existence of honest taxpayers. Second, in the partial evasion regime, the tax monotonically decreases with the audit cost whereas, in the full evasion regime, the tax weakly increases with the audit cost. Third, for some parameter values, it may be optimal for the government to impose no fines for evaders as a way to commit not to audit. Finally, we show that, when some individuals are honest, expected social welfare is non-monotonic in the audit cost. We illustrate these results with a numerical example.
Author: Gabriel Zucman
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022624556X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 142
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Book Description
We are well aware of the rise of the 1% as the rapid growth of economic inequality has put the majority of the world’s wealth in the pockets of fewer and fewer. One much-discussed solution to this imbalance is to significantly increase the rate at which we tax the wealthy. But with an enormous amount of the world’s wealth hidden in tax havens—in countries like Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands—this wealth cannot be fully accounted for and taxed fairly. No one, from economists to bankers to politicians, has been able to quantify exactly how much of the world’s assets are currently hidden—until now. Gabriel Zucman is the first economist to offer reliable insight into the actual extent of the world’s money held in tax havens. And it’s staggering. In The Hidden Wealth of Nations, Zucman offers an inventive and sophisticated approach to quantifying how big the problem is, how tax havens work and are organized, and how we can begin to approach a solution. His research reveals that tax havens are a quickly growing danger to the world economy. In the past five years, the amount of wealth in tax havens has increased over 25%—there has never been as much money held offshore as there is today. This hidden wealth accounts for at least $7.6 trillion, equivalent to 8% of the global financial assets of households. Fighting the notion that any attempts to vanquish tax havens are futile, since some countries will always offer more advantageous tax rates than others, as well the counter-argument that since the financial crisis tax havens have disappeared, Zucman shows how both sides are actually very wrong. In The Hidden Wealth of Nations he offers an ambitious agenda for reform, focused on ways in which countries can change the incentives of tax havens. Only by first understanding the enormity of the secret wealth can we begin to estimate the kind of actions that would force tax havens to give up their practices. Zucman’s work has quickly become the gold standard for quantifying the amount of the world’s assets held in havens. In this concise book, he lays out in approachable language how the international banking system works and the dangerous extent to which the large-scale evasion of taxes is undermining the global market as a whole. If we are to find a way to solve the problem of increasing inequality, The Hidden Wealth of Nations is essential reading.
Author: University of Chicago Law Review
Publisher: Quid Pro Books
ISBN: 1610278771
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 387
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Book Description
The first issue of 2014 features articles and essays from internationally recognized legal and economics scholars, including an extensive Symposium on "Revelation Mechanisms and the Law." Topics include voting options and strategies to reveal preferences, corporate governance, regulatory intensity, tort calculations of risk, mandatory disclosure of choices, partitioning interests in land, and shopping for expert witnesses. In addition, Issue 1 includes an article, "Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law," by Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams. Applications include smoking bans and seat belt laws. Also included is a student Comment, "Too Late to Stipulate: Reconciling Rule 68 with Summary Judgments," by Channing J. Turner; and a Book Review, "Common Good and Common Ground: The Inevitability of Fundamental Disagreement," by Rebecca L. Brown, reviewing Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues. The issue serves, in effect, as a new and extensive book on cutting-edge issues of revelation mechanisms, strategies, prompts, nudges, and effects. The Symposium's contents are: * "Governing Communities by Auction," by Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky * "Partition and Revelation," by Yun-chien Chang & Lee Anne Fennell * "Savage Tables and Tort Law: An Alternative to the Precaution Model," by Janet M. Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod * "Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining Models," by Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum * "The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems," by Richard A. Epstein * "Expert Mining and Required Disclosure," by Jonah B. Gelbach * "Renegotiation Design by Contract," by Richard Holden & Anup Malani * "Audits as Signals," by Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach & Richard J. Zeckhauser * "Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock," by Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier * "From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities," by Saul Levmore * "Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance," by Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl * "The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements," by Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston Quality ebook formatting includes active TOC, linked notes, active URLs in notes, and all the charts, tables, and formulae found in the original print version.
Author: Louis Kaplow
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 069114821X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 494
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Book Description
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics presents a unified conceptual framework for analyzing taxation--the first to be systematically developed in several decades. An original treatment of the subject rather than a textbook synthesis, the book contains new analysis that generates novel results, including some that overturn long-standing conventional wisdom. This fresh approach should change thinking, research, and teaching for decades to come. Building on the work of James Mirrlees, Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, and subsequent researchers, and in the spirit of classics by A. C. Pigou, William Vickrey, and Richard Musgrave, this book steps back from particular lines of inquiry to consider the field as a whole, including the relationships among different fiscal instruments. Louis Kaplow puts forward a framework that makes it possible to rigorously examine both distributive and distortionary effects of particular policies despite their complex interactions with others. To do so, various reforms--ranging from commodity or estate and gift taxation to regulation and public goods provision--are combined with a distributively offsetting adjustment to the income tax. The resulting distribution-neutral reform package holds much constant while leaving in play the distinctive effects of the policy instrument under consideration. By applying this common methodology to disparate subjects, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics produces significant cross-fertilization and yields solutions to previously intractable problems.
Author: Stuart Adam
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199553742
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 552
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Book Description
Based on the findings of a commission chaired by James Mirrlees, this volume presents a coherent picture of tax reform whose aim is to identify the characteristics of a good tax system for any open developed economy, assess the extent to which the UK tax system conforms to these ideals, and recommend how it might be reformed in that direction.
Author: Joel Slemrod
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262319012
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 235
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Book Description
An approach to taxation that goes beyond an emphasis on tax rates to consider such aspects as administration, compliance, and remittance. Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy.
