Weapons Systems: Annual Assessment and Cybersecurity PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Weapons Systems: Annual Assessment and Cybersecurity PDF full book. Access full book title Weapons Systems: Annual Assessment and Cybersecurity by Dale R. Copley. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Dale R. Copley
Publisher: Nova Snova
ISBN: 9781536155952
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Get Book Here
Book Description
DOD acquires new weapons for its warfighters through a management process known as the Defense Acquisition System. Chapter 1 contains GAOs 16th annual assessment of the Department of Defenses (DOD) $1.66 trillion portfolio of 86 major weapon systems acquisition programs. It examines changes in the portfolio since 2016, including DODs progress implementing acquisition reforms. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Chapter 2 addresses (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity, (2) vulnerabilities in weapons that are under development, and (3) steps DOD is taking to develop more cyber resilient weapon systems.
Author: Dale R. Copley
Publisher: Nova Snova
ISBN: 9781536155952
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Get Book Here
Book Description
DOD acquires new weapons for its warfighters through a management process known as the Defense Acquisition System. Chapter 1 contains GAOs 16th annual assessment of the Department of Defenses (DOD) $1.66 trillion portfolio of 86 major weapon systems acquisition programs. It examines changes in the portfolio since 2016, including DODs progress implementing acquisition reforms. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Chapter 2 addresses (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity, (2) vulnerabilities in weapons that are under development, and (3) steps DOD is taking to develop more cyber resilient weapon systems.
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Weapons systems
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Get Book Here
Book Description
Title 10, section 2229b of the U.S. Code contains a provision for GAO to review DOD’s weapon programs. This report assesses the following aspects of DOD’s costliest weapon programs: their characteristics and performance, planned or actual implementation of knowledge-based acquisition practices, and implementation of selected software and cybersecurity practices. The report also assesses oversight implications of DOD’s changes to its foundational acquisition guidance. GAO recommends DOD develop a reporting strategy to improve oversight of those weapon systems developed using multiple efforts or pathways.
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Weapons systems
Languages : en
Pages : 241
Get Book Here
Book Description
This report, GAO's 20th annual assessment, assesses the following aspects of DOD's costliest weapon programs: their characteristics and performance, and their implementation of knowledge-based acquisition practices, modern software development approaches, and cybersecurity practices. The report also describes industrial base challenges reported by weapon programs and DOD's efforts to assess these challenges. GAO is making two recommendations including that DOD update its industrial base assessment instruction to define the circumstances that would constitute a known or projected problem or substantial risk that a necessary industrial capability may be lost.
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 217
Get Book Here
Book Description
This year’s assessment comes at a time of significant change to how DOD manages and oversees its major weapons programs. At the direction of Congress, DOD restructured the Office of the Secretary of Defense to focus more on capability development and less on program oversight, which now resides primarily with the three military departments. Amid these changes, this year GAO found that cost performance has slipped. Further, unlike prior years, programs initiated after major acquisition reforms were implemented in 2010 are now showing cost growth. This report provides observations on: 1. cost and schedule performance and contract awards for DOD’s 2018 portfolio of 82 programs that provide acquisition reports to Congress and 2. knowledge that 51 selected programs attained at key points in the acquisition process. Further, GAO presents individual assessments of 51 programs.
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
In 2020, in an effort to deliver more timely and effective solutions to the warfighter, DOD revamped its department-wide acquisition policies. These policy changes responded to statutory provisions and long-standing concerns from some members of Congress that the defense acquisition process was overly bureaucratic and too slow. As part of these changes, DOD established the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, which has a variety of pathways for acquisition programs. This framework includes the major capability acquisition pathway to acquire and modernize DOD programs that provide enduring capability, including major defense acquisition programs, and the middle tier of acquisition pathway for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding.
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 140
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 195
Get Book Here
Book Description
While programs initiated since 2010, when sweeping acquisition reforms were implemented, have stayed within their cost estimates better than earlier programs, most continue to proceed without the key knowledge essential to good acquisition outcomes. Historically, this has translated to schedule delays, cost growth, and other inefficiencies that have beset DOD programs for years. This report provides observations on: 1. cost and schedule performance for DOD’s 2017 portfolio of 86 programs that provide annual acquisition reports to congress; 2. implementation of acquisition reforms among 57 individual weapon programs not in serial production or with new capabilities; and 3. knowledge that these 57 programs attained at key points in the acquisition process. GAO also makes observations specific to two sets of programs: those initiated since 2010 and before 2010.
Author: United States. Government Accountability Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Computer security
Languages : en
Pages : 35
Get Book Here
Book Description
DOD’s network of sophisticated, expensive weapon systems must work when needed, without being incapacitated by cyberattacks. However, GAO reported in 2018 that DOD was routinely finding cyber vulnerabilities late in its development process. GAO’s report addresses (1) the extent to which DOD has made progress in implementing cybersecurity for weapon systems during development, and (2) the extent to which DOD and the military services have developed guidance for incorporating weapon systems cybersecurity requirements into contracts. GAO is recommending that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps provide guidance on how programs should incorporate tailored cybersecurity requirements into contracts.
Author: U S Military
Publisher: Independently Published
ISBN: 9781795729994
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Get Book Here
Book Description
Released in early 2019, this comprehensive Pentagon report from the Operational Test and Evaluation (OTE) Director contains extensive detailed information about over 100 major weapons systems under development by the Department of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force - including such consequential systems as the F-35, the Ford Aircraft Carrier, and Ballistic Missile Defense. The report outlines problems, deficiencies, capabilities, attributes, and successes for these vital military systems.Some of the weapons included: International Test and Evaluation (IT&E) Program * Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) * DOD Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) * F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) * Global Command and Control System - Joint (GCCS-J) * Joint Information Environment (JIE) * Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS) * Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) * Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) Increment 2 * Next Generation Diagnostic System (NGDS) Increment 1 * Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Increment 2 * Army Programs * Army Network Modernization * Abrams M1A1 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Main Battle Tank (MBT) * Active Protection Systems (APS) Program * AH-64E Apache * Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV) * Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Modification (MOD) * Bradley Family of Vehicles (BFoV) Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) * Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) * Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool (EWPMT) * Javelin Close Combat Missile System - Medium * Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) * Joint Assault Bridge (JAB) * Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) * M109A7 Family of Vehicles (FoV) * Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) * MQ-1C Extended Range Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) * Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 * Soldier Protection System (SPS) * Spider Increment 1A M7E1 Network Command Munition * Stinger Proximity Fuze * Stryker 30 mm Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon (ICV-D) * Stryker Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station - Javelin (CROWS-J) * UH-60V BLACK HAWK * Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) * XM17/XM18 Modular Handgun System (MHS) * Navy Programs * Acoustic Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf Insertion (A-RCI) for AN/BQQ-10(V) Sonar * Aegis Modernization Program * Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) * AN/APR-39D(V)2 Radar Signal Detection Set (RSDS) * AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 Integrated Undersea Warfare (USW) Combat System Suite * CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement Program. * Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) System * CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford-Class Nuclear Aircraft Carrier * Distributed Aperture Infrared Countermeasure System (DAIRCM) * Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) * Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) * LHA 6 New Amphibious Assault Ship (formerly LHA(R)) * MK 48 Torpedo Modifications * Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) * MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System * Multi-Static Active Coherent (MAC) System * Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1 * P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) * Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2 * SSN 774 Virginia-Class Submarine * Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) * Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) System: Torpedo Warning System (TWS) and Countermeasure Anti-Torpedo (CAT) * VH-92A Presidential Helicopter Fleet Replacement Program * Air Force Programs * AC-130J Ghostrider * AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) * Air Operations Center - Weapon System (AOC-WS) * B61 Mod 12 Life Extension Program Tail Kit Assembly * C-130J * Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) * Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) * Enhanced Polar System (EPS) * F-22A - RAPTOR Modernization * Global Positioning System (GPS) Enterprise * more
Author: Robert T. Ungerman (III)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cyberterrorism
Languages : en
Pages : 22
Get Book Here
Book Description
"Most DOD major weapon systems were designed before 1990 and were never deemed susceptible to a "hacking" threat. Decades of subsequent engineering focused on information availability and usability rather than security. Today we are left with a fleet of aircraft operating in a system of systems that has much vulnerability and little cyber hardening. Current guidance is not sufficient to obtain mission assurance, and without clarification, the DOD cannot assure mission success in the face of cyber threats. The author argues that three major guidance changes are needed. First, a functional mission analysis (FMA) should be conducted on every major weapon system. This will determine (and prioritize) the minimum requirements and subsystems needed for critical mission execution. Identification and prioritization of these systems will enable more focused and efficient vulnerability assessments that will eventually drive mission assurance to be "baked in" to system design. Second, FMAs and vulnerability assessments should be conducted prior to every acquisition milestone. Earlier assessments (in contrast to current guidance) will allow for timely and cost-effective changes to system design. Without a change in guidance, the DOD runs the risk of finding vulnerabilities that are either too costly to fix or too unsecure to field. Lastly, the DOD must mandate the inclusion of uniquely-qualified Cyber Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) Engineers at all vulnerability assessments. The extremely limited availability of these professionals may drive (and allow) a program to conduct halfhearted assessments unless current guidance is modified. Current direction allows a program strapped for time and money to execute (and pass) a vulnerability assessment that is too late, conducted without the proper experts, and does not address the most critical aspects of mission execution. Changes are needed."--Abstract.
