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Author: Military History Institute of Vietnam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 528
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Book Description
The first English-language translation of the definitive chronicle of the Vietnamese military's view of the Vietnam War, published for the first time in the United States.
Author: Military History Institute of Vietnam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 528
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Book Description
The first English-language translation of the definitive chronicle of the Vietnamese military's view of the Vietnam War, published for the first time in the United States.
Author: William Egan Colby
Publisher: McGraw-Hill/Contemporary
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 470
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Book Description
"For sixteen years, from the time he was assigned Chief of Station for the CIA in Saigon to his appointment as CIA Director, William Colby was deeply involved in America's role in Vietnam. During five presidential administrations -- Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford -- Colby moved from meetings in the Oval Office to the sweltering jungles of Vietnam as the war escalated from Vietcong guerilla terrorism to a massive U.S. military engagement. Lost Victory is his personal account of those years, an insider's view of America's first major military defeat told from a vantage point matched by few other officials."--Book cover, p. [4].
Author: Richard West
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Travel
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Book Description
Author: Van Tien Dung
Publisher: NYU Press
ISBN: 0853454094
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 307
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Book Description
Chronicles the 1975 offensive of the Vietnam People’s Army and the uprisings that secured the liberation of South Vietnam.
Author: Gregory A. Daddis
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199830711
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 354
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Book Description
Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina. Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam. Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.
Author: Cecil B. Currey
Publisher: U of Nebraska Press
ISBN: 1640120823
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 656
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Book Description
Many people do not understand why America lost the Viet Nam War. Author Cecil B. Currey makes one primary reason clear: North Viet Nam's Senior Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. Victory at Any Cost tells the full story of the man who fought three of the world's great powers--and beat them all.
Author: Robert R. Owens
Publisher: Xulon Press
ISBN: 1594672954
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 410
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Book Description
Author: Nguyên Giáp Võ
Publisher: Recon Publications
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : vi
Pages : 72
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Book Description
Den nord-vietnamesiske forsvarsminister og øverstbefaldende Giap samt general Dung fremsætter politiske, strategiske og taktiske tanker om sejren.
Author: James Schmidt
Publisher: WestBow Press
ISBN: 1449746217
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 174
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Book Description
Victory Rests with the Lord is a validation of Proverbs 21:31, “The Horse is made ready for the day of battle, but victory rests with the Lord.” The commander of one of the most successful infantry companies during the Vietnam War makes a strong case that the war was winnable if God would have provided our leaders the wisdom and creativity to employ the correct tactics. Victory Rests with the Lord explains why the most powerful military in the world was defeated in the Vietnam War. It explains why and how God intervened in both victory and defeat within the war. Uncover both the flawed tactics that led to America’s defeat, and the tactics that would have led to victory if used throughout the war. Victory Rests with the Lord reveals a highly effective automated battlefield that employed mechanical ambushes in the latter years of the war. Learn the most important lesson from the Vietnam War and what America must do to prevent another similar defeat. Victory Rests with the Lord provides evidence of the power of Jesus Christ and serves as a warning to America to return to the Bible as its moral compass.
Author: Peter Tilman Schuessler
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638157563
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 7
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Book Description
Essay from the year 2002 in the subject History Europe - Germany - Postwar Period, Cold War, grade: A, University of St Andrews (Department of Modern History), course: America and Vietnam, 18 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: The discussion of this question starts with the definition of "victory". Surprisingly John Kennedy perceived the definition of the victory as difficult when he mentioned: "how can we tell if we ́re winning?" (Herring,1981,p.606). The possible range of victories stretches from setting an end to guerrilla attacks to a complete non-communist Vietnam. The original aim of the U.S. government was most plausibly a situation in which North Vietnam was no threat any more to the South, and the "Communist danger" was banned. Due to various reasons it was impossible to reach that goal. I will show that it was not only the guerrilla warfare that defeated the U.S. Army, it was this special type of insurgency war in this special region under these special circumstances that made this war unwinnable only with military means. If the American generals would have made different decisions they also would have been proven wrong. The war could not end in a victory for the U.S. because there were plenty of constraints which could not be solved in either one way or another. In this context information and trust play an important role. The United States was used to fighting wars that took place in distant regions they were not familiar with before. The difference with this war was that knowledge about this conflict and this land was important. One plausible possibility to gain this information would have been a "combined command" between American and South Vietnam forces as general Westmoreland sought (Herring,1990,p.6). But this was not possible because "the South Vietnamese resisted such an arrangement [...] perceiving it as a form of neo-colonialism" (ibid.) and the U.S. did not trust the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) fearing that they could be infiltrated by communists. It is understandable that the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) were afraid of spies within the army of their ally as the "cells" of the North Vietnamese were practising for subversion and sabotage (Thompson,1969,p.32-33). The American leaders on the other hand enforced Saigon to organise its divisions the same as the U.S. ones to be able to "receive [...] logistical support" (Tran Van Don,1987,p.149). Consequently the Southern troops again lost something of their own structure and self confidence. So there did not exist an alliance strategy the Americans could join in, and their strategy was not suitable for the country.
