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Author: Bettina Kuon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642487777
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 305
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Book Description
Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O
Author: Bettina Kuon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642487777
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 305
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Book Description
Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O
Author: Dionysius Glycopantis
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540269797
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 656
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Book Description
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
Author: Gerd Gigerenzer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262571647
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 404
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Book Description
In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning. This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people's reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments.
Author: Charles R. Plott
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444826424
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1175
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Book Description
While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appears blurred and may produce uncertain results. The contributors to this volume have provided brief notes describing specific experimental results.
Author: Wolfgang Ryll
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642614671
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 177
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Book Description
We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.
Author: Michael Neugart
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642583482
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
Nonlinear Labor Market Dynamics discusses adjustment processes in labor markets. Contrary to linear-stochastic approaches this book is based on a non-linear deterministic framework. It is shown that even textbook-like-models of the labor market can generate long lasting adjustment processes, local instabilities, and chaotic movements, once nonlinear relationships and widely accepted adjustment rules are introduced. Thus, labor market dynamics may have an endogenous component that is governed by a nonlinear deterministic core. Of course, all results are tied to the particular models discussed in this book. Nevertheless, these models imply that by incorporating nonlinear relationships, one may arrive at an explanation of labor market behavior where linear stochastic approaches fell. Time series studies for German labor market data support this point of view.
Author: Geert Dhaene
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642468322
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 169
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Book Description
The history of many sciences is characterized by an almost continuous emer gence of new theories. From a normative point of view, the survival of a new theory should mainly be determined by its ability to explain a new body of facts which the existing theories are unable to explain. If in addition the new theory is able to explain all the results obtained by the existing theories and if it can point out why these theories fail to explain certain facts, it should become the dominant theory. Otherwise, it might coexist with other theories for some time. Hence, a new theory ought to be judged not only by confronting it with existing facts, but also by confronting it with existing theories. The idea that a theory should be able to account for the results ob tained by other theories, although implicitly adhered to by many scientists, has rarely been formalized. The statistics literature on parametric hypoth esis testing, though, might be seen as an instance of such a formalization.
Author: Fernando Lopes
Publisher: Bentham Science Publishers
ISBN: 1608058247
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 439
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Book Description
Agent technology has generated lots of excitement in the past decade. Currently, multi-agent systems (MAS) composed of autonomous agents representing individuals or organizations and capable of reaching mutually beneficial agreements through negotiation and argumentation are becoming increasingly important and pervasive. Research on both automated negotiation and argumentation in MAS has a vigorous, exciting tradition. However, efforts to integrate both areas have received only selective attention in the academia and the practitioner literature. A symbiotic relationship could significantly strengthen each area’s progress and trigger new R&D challenges and prospects toward the advancement of automated negotiators and argumentation tools. Negotiation and Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems presents the current state-of-the-art on the theory and practice of automated negotiation and argumentation in MAS. The eBook encourages the interaction between these two areas in data modelling and attempts to converge them toward mutual enhancement and synergism. Equally, the monograph brings together researchers and industry practitioners specialized in these areas to share R&D results and discuss existing and emerging theoretical and applied problems. This book is intended as a textbook for graduate courses and a reference book for researchers, advanced-level students in Computers Science, and IT practitioners.
Author: Günter Fandel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642591329
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 685
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Book Description
The organizers of the 12th International Conference on Multiple Cri teria Decision Making (MCDM) held June 19-23, 1995 in Hagen received the second time the opportunity to prepare an international conference on MCDM in Germany; the first opportunity has been the 3rd International Conference on MCDM in Konigswinter, 1979. Quite a time ellapsed since then and therefore it might be interesting to compare some indicators of the development of the International Society on MCDM, which has been founded in Konigswinter. Stanley Zionts has been elected first president and all 44 participants of that Conference became founding members. Today our Society has over 1200 members and its own Journal (MCDM World Scan). In Hagen, 1996, we had 152 participants from 34 countries. It is interesting to mention that also other Groups established their organi zation, like the European Working Group on Multiple Criteria Decision Aid, the German Working Group on Decision Theory and Applications, the Multi Objective Programming and Goal Programming Group, ESIGMA, and some others. It is also interesting to note that the intersection of members of all these Groups and Societies is not empty and there is quite a cooperation among them.
Author: Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany)
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781008294
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 924
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Book Description
'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.
