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Author: Henrik Kleven
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
This paper models complexity in social programs as a byproduct of efforts to screen between deserving and undeserving applicants. While a more rigorous screening technology may have desirable effects on targeting efficiency, the associated complexity introduces transaction costs into the application process and may induce incomplete take up. The paper integrates the study of take up with the study of classification errors of type I and type II, and argue that incomplete take up can be seen as a form of type I error. We consider a government interested in ensuring a minimum income level for as many deserving individuals as possible, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers can choose the rigor of screening (and associated complexity) along with a benefit level and an eligibility criterion. It is shown that optimal program parameters reflect a trade-off at the margin between type I errors (including non-takeup) and type II errors. Optimal programs that are not universal always feature a high degree of complexity. Although it is generally possible to eliminate take up by the undeserving (type II errors), policies usually involve eligibility criteria that make them eligible and rely on complexity to restrict their participation. Even though the government is interested only in ensuring a minimum benefit level, the optimal policy may feature benefits that are higher than this target minimum. This is because benefits generically screen better than either eligibility criteria or complexity. We present numerical simulations on comparative statics with respect to budget size, ability distribution, complexity costs, and stigma. Our results are discussed in light of empirical findings for public programs in the United States.
Author: Henrik Kleven
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Get Book Here
Book Description
This paper models complexity in social programs as a byproduct of efforts to screen between deserving and undeserving applicants. While a more rigorous screening technology may have desirable effects on targeting efficiency, the associated complexity introduces transaction costs into the application process and may induce incomplete take up. The paper integrates the study of take up with the study of classification errors of type I and type II, and argue that incomplete take up can be seen as a form of type I error. We consider a government interested in ensuring a minimum income level for as many deserving individuals as possible, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers can choose the rigor of screening (and associated complexity) along with a benefit level and an eligibility criterion. It is shown that optimal program parameters reflect a trade-off at the margin between type I errors (including non-takeup) and type II errors. Optimal programs that are not universal always feature a high degree of complexity. Although it is generally possible to eliminate take up by the undeserving (type II errors), policies usually involve eligibility criteria that make them eligible and rely on complexity to restrict their participation. Even though the government is interested only in ensuring a minimum benefit level, the optimal policy may feature benefits that are higher than this target minimum. This is because benefits generically screen better than either eligibility criteria or complexity. We present numerical simulations on comparative statics with respect to budget size, ability distribution, complexity costs, and stigma. Our results are discussed in light of empirical findings for public programs in the United States.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Human services
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
This paper models complexity in social programs as a byproduct of efforts to screen between deserving and undeserving applicants. While a more rigorous screening technology may have desirable effects on targeting efficiency, the associated complexity introduces transaction costs into the application process and may induce incomplete take up. The paper integrates the study of take up with the study of classification errors of type I and type II, and argue that incomplete take up can be seen as a form of type I error. We consider a government interested in ensuring a minimum income level for as many deserving individuals as possible, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers can choose the rigor of screening (and associated complexity) along with a benefit level and an eligibility criterion. It is shown that optimal program parameters reflect a trade-off at the margin between type I errors (including non-takeup) and type II errors. Optimal programs that are not universal always feature a high degree of complexity. Although it is generally possible to eliminate take up by the undeserving (type II errors), policies usually involve eligibility criteria that make them eligible and rely on complexity to restrict their participation. Even though the government is interested only in ensuring a minimum benefit level, the optimal policy may feature benefits that are higher than this target minimum. This is because benefits generically screen better than either eligibility criteria or complexity. We present numerical simulations on comparative statics with respect to budget size, ability distribution, complexity costs, and stigma. Our results are discussed in light of empirical findings for public programs in the United States.
Author: Sarah Marchal
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192699377
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
The notion that every person living amidst the relative affluence of the rich world has a right to a minimum income enabling social participation, be it frugally and soberly, holds as a fundamental matter of social justice to most people. But how can we make sure that every person has a decent minimum income allowing for a life with dignity in societies rich enough to afford such a right? How can we ensure that minimum income support is cost-effective and compatible with other goals such as promoting work effort, self-reliance, and upward mobility? How can political support for such schemes be fostered and made robust? Zero Poverty Society assesses the current state of minimum income protection in the rich world, building on original empirical analysis. It also engages with debates on topics as diverse as optimal targeting and means-testing, administrative complexity, non-take-up, behavioural economics, the political economy of minimum income protection, and basic income. Marchal and Marx conclude that more adequate poverty prevention is possible, without the costs having to be prohibitive. However, they are sceptical about 'silver-bullet' solutions such as basic income. Adequate minimum income protection is not a matter of getting one scheme or policy right. It is a matter of getting multiple policy levers right, in the right configuration. Incremental, context-conscious expansion is the way forward if we really care about the most vulnerable.
Author: Jiaying Zhao
Publisher: University of Toronto Press
ISBN: 1487549474
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 219
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Book Description
The latest title in the Behaviourally Informed Organizations series offers practical advice on how best to successfully design, deliver, and evaluate efficient cash transfer programs, with a view to alleviating poverty. While much progress has been made in reducing poverty worldwide – especially in the pre-pandemic era – it is fair to say that an unacceptably large proportion of the world’s people still live in poverty. Cash Transfers for Inclusive Societies sheds light on the widely prevalent cash transfer programs. The book asks these central questions: What is the state of the art in the development of welfare programs? What do we know works in these programs and what does not? How can an understanding of behavioral science better inform the design, delivery, and evaluation of welfare programs? The latest title in the Behaviourally Informed Organizations series, the book develops a nuanced framework for how governments, practitioners, and society in general should design cash transfer programs to improve inclusivity, reduce poverty, and improve equality. It draws on field experiments and case studies to showcase past successes, while also building frameworks and developing prescriptive advice that we can give to practitioners who are looking to design a behaviorally informed cash transfer program. With contributions from leading academics as well as seasoned practitioners, Cash Transfers for Inclusive Societies presents a new model to policymakers to study and shift the discourse on poverty alleviation from purely economic factors to also behavioral ones.
Author: Frédéric Varone
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1800884893
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 443
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Book Description
This comprehensive Handbook examines public policy evaluation in democracies. Focusing on the political dimension of the evaluation process, it argues that policy evaluation can be an emancipatory tool, reducing social inequalities and exclusion, and offers novel suggestions on how evaluations can be used to improve democratic policymaking.
Author: Bernard Salanie
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262297817
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 249
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Book Description
A concise and rigorous text that combines theory, empirical work, and policy discussion to present core issues in the economics of taxation. This concise introduction to the economic theories of taxation is intuitive yet rigorous, relating the theories both to existing tax systems and to key empirical studies. The Economics of Taxation offers a thorough discussion of the consequences of taxes on economic decisions and equilibrium outcomes, as well as useful insights into how policy makers should design taxes. It covers such issues of central policy importance as taxation of income from capital, environmental taxation, and tax credits for low-income families. This second edition has been significantly revised and updated. Changes include a substantially rewritten chapter on direct taxation; a discussion of recent research in the chapter on mixed taxation; the replacement of the chapter on capital taxation with a chapter on the “new dynamic public finance”; and considerations of environmental taxation in both theory and policy chapters. The book is aimed at graduate students or advanced undergraduates taking public finance classes as well as economists who want to learn more about the topic. It combines discussion of theory, empirical work, and policy objectives in compact form. Appendixes provide necessary background material on consumer and producer theory and the theory of optimal control.
Author: University of Chicago Law Review
Publisher: Quid Pro Books
ISBN: 1610278585
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 580
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Book Description
The University of Chicago Law Review's 4th issue of 2014 features articles and essays from recognized legal scholars, as well as extensive student research. Contents include: Articles: • The Legal Salience of Taxation, by Andrew T. Hayashi • Tax-Loss Mechanisms, by Jacob Nussim & Avraham Tabbach • Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, by Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz • American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, by Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin Comments: • Bursting the Speech Bubble: Toward a More Fitting Perceived-Affiliation Standard, by Nicholas A. Caselli • Payments to Not Parent? Noncustodial Parents as the Recipients of Child Support, by Emma J. Cone-Roddy • Too Small to Fail: A New Perspective on Environmental Penalties for Small Businesses, by Nicholas S. Dufau • Understanding Equal Sovereignty, by Abigail B. Molitor • "Widespread" Uncertainty: The Exclusionary Rule in Civil-Removal Proceedings, by Michael J. O’Brien • Clogged Conduits: A Defendant's Right to Confront His Translated Statements, by Casen B. Ross • "Integral" Decisionmaking: Judicial Interpretation of Predispute Arbitration Agreements Naming the National Arbitration Forum, by Daniel A. Sito Volume 81, Number 4 also features Review Essays by Lisa Bernstein, Avery W. Katz, and Eyal Zamir, analyzing three recent books on contract law and theory.
Author: Kangas, Olli
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1839104856
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
This discerning book provides a comprehensive analysis of the nationwide randomised Finnish basic income experiment 2017 to 2018, from planning and implementation through to the end results. It presents the background of the social policy system in which the experiment was implemented and details the narratives of the planning process alongside its constraints, as well as a final evaluation of the results.
Author: Maura Francese
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 148438881X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
This paper discusses the definition and modelling of a universal basic income (UBI). After clarifying the debate about what a UBI is and presenting the arguments in favor and against, an analytical approach for its assessment is proposed. The adoption of a UBI as a policy tool is discussed with regard to the policy objectives (shaped by social preferences) it is designed to achieve. Key design dimensions to be considered include: coverage, generosity of the program, overall progressivity of the policy, and its financing.
