Author: Diego M. Caramuta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
Book Description
Three Essays on Strategy-proofness
Author: Diego M. Caramuta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
Book Description
Three Essays on Strategy-proof Mechanism
Author: Lin Zhou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 132
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 132
Book Description
Essays on Strategy-proofness
Author: Stephen T. F. Ching
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 132
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 132
Book Description
Three Essays in Strategic Trade Policy and International Agreements
Author: Mun-sŏng Kang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Three Essays on Firm Strategy and Public Policy
Author: Byung-Cheol Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Three essays on random mechanism design
Author: Huaxia Zeng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 163
Book Description
"This dissertation studies a standard voting formulation with randomization. Formally, there is a finite set of voters, a finite set of alternatives and a lottery space over the alternative set. Each voter has a strict preference over alternatives. The domain of preferences contains all admissible preferences. Every voter reports a preference in the domain; a preference profile is generated; and the social lottery then is determined by a Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF). This dissertation focuses on RSCFs which provide every voter incentives to truthfully reveal her preference, and hence follows the formulation of strategy proofness in [26] which requires that the lottery under truth telling (first-order) stochastically dominates the lottery under any misrepresentation according to every voter’s true preference independently of others’ behaviors. Moreover, this dissertation restricts attention to the class of unanimous RSCFs, that is, if the alternative is the best for all voters in a preference profile, it receives probability one. A typical class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs is random dictatorships. A domain is a random dictatorship domain if every unanimous and strategy proof RSCF is a random dictatorship... "-- Author's abstract.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 163
Book Description
"This dissertation studies a standard voting formulation with randomization. Formally, there is a finite set of voters, a finite set of alternatives and a lottery space over the alternative set. Each voter has a strict preference over alternatives. The domain of preferences contains all admissible preferences. Every voter reports a preference in the domain; a preference profile is generated; and the social lottery then is determined by a Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF). This dissertation focuses on RSCFs which provide every voter incentives to truthfully reveal her preference, and hence follows the formulation of strategy proofness in [26] which requires that the lottery under truth telling (first-order) stochastically dominates the lottery under any misrepresentation according to every voter’s true preference independently of others’ behaviors. Moreover, this dissertation restricts attention to the class of unanimous RSCFs, that is, if the alternative is the best for all voters in a preference profile, it receives probability one. A typical class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs is random dictatorships. A domain is a random dictatorship domain if every unanimous and strategy proof RSCF is a random dictatorship... "-- Author's abstract.
Three Essays on the Strategies of Mutual Funds
Author: Zhi Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Investments
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Investments
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions
Author: Martin Shubik
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Three Essays in Game Theory
Author: Bo Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design
Author: Jin Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description