Three Essays on Repeated Games Without Perfect Information PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Three Essays on Repeated Games Without Perfect Information PDF full book. Access full book title Three Essays on Repeated Games Without Perfect Information by Illtae Ahn. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Illtae Ahn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 134
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Illtae Ahn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 134
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Vicente Madrigal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Yann Bramoullé
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199948275
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 857
Get Book Here
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality.
Author: Pedro Dal Bó
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cooperation
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Pavlo V. Prokopovych
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110703020X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 597
Get Book Here
Book Description
This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Author: Benjamin Leonard Sperisen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 396
Get Book Here
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays on reputation and repeated games. Reputation models typically assume players have full memory of past events, yet in many applications this assumption does not hold. In the first chapter, I explore two different relaxations of the assumption that history is perfectly observed in the context of Ely and Välimäki's (2003) mechanic game, where reputation (with full history observation) is clearly bad for all players. First I consider "limited history," where short-run players see only the most recent T periods. For large T, the full history equilibrium behavior always holds due to an "echo" effect (for high discount factors); for small T, the repeated static equilibrium exists. Second I consider "fading history," where short-run players randomly sample past periods with probabilities that "fade" toward zero for older periods. When fading is faster than a fairly lax threshold, the long-run player always acts myopically, a result that holds more generally for reputation games where the long-run player has a strictly dominant stage game action. This finding suggests that reputational incentives may be too weak to affect long-run player behavior in some realistic word-of-mouth environments. The second chapter develops general theoretical tools to study incomplete information games where players observe only finitely many recent periods. I derive a recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, which allows analysis of both stationary and (previously unexplored) non-stationary equilibria. I also introduce "quasi-Markov perfection," an equilibrium refinement which is a necessary condition of any equilibrium that is "non-fragile" (purifiable), i.e., robust to small, additively separable and independent perturbations of payoffs. These tools are applied to two examples. The first is a product choice game with 1-period memory of the firm's actions, obtaining a complete characterization of the exact minimum and maximum purifiable equilibrium payoffs for almost all discount factors and prior beliefs on an "honest" Stackelberg commitment type, which shows that non-stationary equilibria expand the equilibrium set. The second is the same game with long memory: in all stationary and purifiable equilibria, the long-run player obtains exactly the Stackelberg payoff so long as the memory is longer than a threshold dependent on the prior. These results show that the presence of the honest type (even for arbitrarily small prior beliefs) qualitatively changes the equilibrium set for any fixed discount factor above a threshold independent of the prior, thereby not requiring extreme patience. The third chapter studies the question of why drug trafficking organizations inflict violence on each other, and why conflict breaks out under some government crackdowns and not others, in a repeated games context. Violence between Mexican drug cartels soared following the government's anti-cartel offensive starting in 2006, but not under previous crackdowns. I construct a theoretical explanation for these observations and previous empirical research. I develop a duopoly model where the firms have the capacity to make costly attacks on each other. The firms use the threat of violence to incentivize inter-cartel cooperation, and under imperfect monitoring, violence occurs on the equilibrium path of a high payoff equilibrium. When a "corrupt" government uses the threat of law enforcement as a punishment for uncooperative behavior, violence is not needed as frequently to achieve high payoffs. When government cracks down indiscriminately, the firms may return to frequent violence as a way of ensuring cooperation and high payoffs, even if the crackdown makes drug trafficking otherwise less profitable.
Author: Di Pei (Ph. D.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 189
Get Book Here
Book Description
This thesis consists of three essays on dynamic games with incomplete information. In Chapter 1, I study reputation effects when individuals have persistent private information that matters for their opponents' payoffs. I examine a repeated game between a patient informed player and a sequence of myopic uninformed players. The informed player privately observes a persistent state, and is either a strategic type who can flexibly choose his actions or is one of the several commitment types that mechanically plays the same action in every period. Unlike the canonical models on reputation effects, the uninformed players' payoffs depend on the state. This interdependence of values introduces new challenges to reputation building, namely, the informed player could face a tradeo between establishing a reputation for commitment and signaling favorable information about the state. My results address the predictions on the informed player's payoff and behavior that apply across all Nash equilibria. When the stage game payoffs satisfy a monotone-supermodularity condition, I show that the informed long-run player can overcome the lack-of-commitment problem and secure a high payoff in every state and in every equilibrium. Under a condition on the distribution over states, he will play the same action in every period and maintain his reputation for commitment in every equilibrium. If the payoff structure is unrestricted and the probability of commitment types is small, then the informed player's return to reputation building can be low and can provide a strict incentive to abandon his reputation. In Chapter 2, I study the dynamics of an agent's reputation for competence when the labor market's information about his performance is disclosed by an intermediary who cannot commit. I show that this game admits a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). When the agent is patient, his effort is inverse U-shaped, while the rate of information disclosure is decreasing over time. I illustrate the inefficiencies of the unique MPE by comparing it with the equilibrium in the benchmark scenario where the market automatically observes all breakthroughs. I characterize a tractable subclass of non-Markov Equilibria and explain why allowing players to coordinate on payoff-irrelevant events can improve eciency on top of the unique MPE and the exogenous information benchmark. When the intermediary can commit, her optimal Markov disclosure policy has a deadline, after which no breakthrough will be disclosed. However, deadlines are not incentive compatible in the game without commitment, illustrating a time inconsistency problem faced by the intermediary. My model can be applied to professional service industries, such as law and consulting. My results provide an explanation to the observed wage and promotion patterns in Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994). In Chapter 3, I study repeated games in which a patient long-run player (e.g. a rm) wishes to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g. a sequence or a continuum of consumers) but has a strict incentive to betray them. Her benet from betrayal is persistent over time and is her private information. I examine the extent to which persistent private information can overcome this lack-of-commitment problem. My main result characterizes the set of payoffs a patient long-run player can attain in equilibrium. Interestingly, every type's highest equilibrium payoff only depends on her true benet from betrayal and the lowest possible benet in the support of her opponents' prior belief. When this lowest possible benet vanishes, every type can approximately attain her Stackelberg commitment payoff. My finding provides a strategic foundation for the (mixed) Stackelberg commitment types in the reputation models, both in terms of the highest attainable payoff and in terms of the commitment behaviors. Compared to the existing approaches that rely on the existence of crazy types that are either irrational or have drastically dierent preferences, there is common knowledge of rationality in my model, and moreover, players' ordinal preferences over stage game outcomes are common knowledge.
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483295052
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 449
Get Book Here
Book Description
Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions. Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists
Author: Juan Ignacio Block
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 124
Get Book Here
Book Description
This dissertation studies self-referential games in which agents can learn (perfectly and imperfectly) about an opponents' intentions from a private signal. In the first chapter, my main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of an opponent's code of conduct and indirect observation of the same opponent's play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information I prove a folk theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of self-referentiality on bad reputation games in which the long-run player must choose specific actions to make short-run players participate in the game. Since these particular actions could be interpreted as evidence of perverse behavior, the long-run agent attempts to separate himself from other types and this results in efficiency losses. When players identify intentions perfectly, I show that inefficiencies and reputational concerns due to a bad reputation disappear. In the case of imperfect observation, I find that self-referentiality and stochastic renewal of the long-run player together overcome inefficiencies because of bad reputation. In the third chapter, I address the timing of signals in self-referential games. These models typically suppose that intentions are divined in a pre-play phase; however, in many applications this may not be the case. For games with perfect information when players observe signals in advance, I show that any subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential finite-horizon approximation of the original game. Then, I focus on two specific classes of games. First, in finitely repeated games with discounting I show that a version of the folk theorem holds regardless of the time at which signals are observed. Second, I examine exit games in which players can terminate the game at any stage. In contrast to repeated games, I find that the equilibrium outcome of the self-referential exit game is unique if signals arrive after the first stage, whereas a folk theorem results only if they occur before the first stage. Finally, I explore asynchronous monitoring of intentions where players may not receive signals simultaneously. With asynchronicity, a folk theorem continues to apply for repeated games; however, for exit games there is a unique equilibrium outcome independent of signal timing, or indeed, independent of having a signal.
