Three Essays on Quantal Response Equilibrium Model

Three Essays on Quantal Response Equilibrium Model PDF Author: Kang-Oh Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 182

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Three Essays on Quantal Response Equilibrium Model

Three Essays on Quantal Response Equilibrium Model PDF Author: Kang-Oh Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 182

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Three Essays on Dynamic General Equilibrium Models

Three Essays on Dynamic General Equilibrium Models PDF Author: Francesco Busato
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 264

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Quantal Response Equilibrium

Quantal Response Equilibrium PDF Author: Jacob K. Goeree
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400880920
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 328

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Book Description
Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.

Testing the Foundations of Quantal Response Equilibrium

Testing the Foundations of Quantal Response Equilibrium PDF Author: Mathew D. McCubbins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) has become a popular alternative to the standard Nash equilibrium concept in game theoretic applications. It is well known that human subjects do not regularly choose Nash equilibrium strategies. It has been hypothesized that subjects are limited by strategic uncertainty or that subjects have broader social preferences over the outcome of games. These two factors, among others, make subjects boundedly-rational. QRE, in essence, adds a logistic error function to the strict, knife-edge predictions of Nash equilibria. What makes QRE appealing, however, also makes it very difficult to test, because almost any observed behavior may be consistent with different parameterizations of the error function. We present the first steps of a research program designed to strip away the underlying causes of the strategic errors thought to be modeled by QRE. If these causes of strategic error are correct explanations for the deviations, then their removal should enable subjects to choose Nash equilibrium strategies. We find, however, that subjects continue to deviate from predictions even when the reasons presumed by QRE are removed. Moreover, the deviations are different for each and every game, and thus QRE would require the same subjects to have different error parame-terizations. While we need more expansive testing of the various causes of stra-tegic error, in our judgment, therefore, QRE is not useful at predicting human behavior, and is of limited use in explaining human behavior across even a small range of similar decisions.

Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory

Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory PDF Author: Jack Robles
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Evolution
Languages : en
Pages : 148

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Three Essays in Empirical Auctions

Three Essays in Empirical Auctions PDF Author: Sudip Gupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148

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Journal of Economic Literature

Journal of Economic Literature PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 650

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Positive Changes in Political Science

Positive Changes in Political Science PDF Author: John H. Aldrich
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472069866
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 516

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Book Description
Richard McKelvey's classic papers, accompanied by original essays by leading names in the field

Bounded Rationality

Bounded Rationality PDF Author: Sanjit Dhami
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262369656
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 553

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Book Description
Two leaders in the field explore the foundations of bounded rationality and its effects on choices by individuals, firms, and the government. Bounded rationality recognizes that human behavior departs from the perfect rationality assumed by neoclassical economics. In this book, Sanjit Dhami and Cass R. Sunstein explore the foundations of bounded rationality and consider the implications of this approach for public policy and law, in particular for questions about choice, welfare, and freedom. The authors, both recognized as experts in the field, cover a wide range of empirical findings and assess theoretical work that attempts to explain those findings. Their presentation is comprehensive, coherent, and lucid, with even the most technical material explained accessibly. They not only offer observations and commentary on the existing literature but also explore new insights, ideas, and connections. After examining the traditional neoclassical framework, which they refer to as the Bayesian rationality approach (BRA), and its empirical issues, Dhami and Sunstein offer a detailed account of bounded rationality and how it can be incorporated into the social and behavioral sciences. They also discuss a set of models of heuristics-based choice and the philosophical foundations of behavioral economics. Finally, they examine libertarian paternalism and its strategies of “nudges.”

Dissertation Abstracts International

Dissertation Abstracts International PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 584

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