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Author: 陳林峰
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 77
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Author: 陳林峰
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 77
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Book Description
Author: Jan Philipp Bender
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 286
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Author: Pier-André Bouchard St Amant
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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This thesis is a collection of three essays. The first two study how ideas spread through a network of individuals, and how it an advertiser can exploit it. In the model I develop, users choose their sources of information based on the perceived usefulness of their sources of information. This contrasts with previous literature where there is no choice made by network users and thus, the information flow is fixed. I provide a complete theoretical characterization of the solution and define a natural measure of influence based on choices of users. I also present an algorithm to solve the model in polynomial time on any network, regardless of the scale or the topology. I also discuss the properties of a network technology from a public economic standpoint. In essence, a network allows the reproduction of ideas for free for the advertiser. If there is any free-riding problem, I show that coalitions of users on the network can solve such problem. I also discuss the social value of networks, a value that cannot be captured for profit. The third essay is completely distinct from the network paradigm and instead studies funding rules for public universities. I show that a funding rule that depends solely on enrolment leads to "competition by franchise" and that such behavior is sometimes inefficient. I suggest instead an alternate funding rule that allows government to increase welfare without increasing spending in universities.
Author: Jae Sung Kang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 194
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Author: Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789051707311
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Author: David Russell Hansen
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 147
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This dissertation is composed of three chapters. All three deal with topics in development economics. The first chapter examines the effects on village institutions of introducing formal financial institution options into the village. The second addresses the effects of government policy on educational investment and crime. The third tests the explanatory power of various explanations of the gender gap in math test scores. The first chapter examines the effects of a transition from a ``traditional'' economy based on an uncertain source of income, with risk fully insured away by one's neighbors in a social network through costly network ties, to a ``modern'' economy in which some agents have access to partial insurance at a lower cost. A theoretical model is used to show that village social networks can break down as some members of the village no longer need the insurance the social network provides, producing a reduction in welfare (if the costs of reducing moral hazard are not too high) for at least some individuals and possibly the village as a whole. This loss of welfare can occur even when networks provide other benefits to those belonging to them and is likely to be heterogeneous, depending on the opportunities and networks available to individuals. This paper tests these predictions using Indonesian data to examine the effect of a change in the banking institutions available to a community on the strength of social networks (measured by community participation) and welfare (measured by household expenditure and by child health). The analysis finds that changing financial institution availability in general does not influence community participation or welfare, but that financial institutions that primarily serve certain groups do relatively reduce the welfare of households not in those groups, which is consistent with the hypotheses generated by the model. Crime is an important feature of economic life in many countries, especially in the developing world. Crime distorts many economic decisions because it acts like an unpredictable tax on earnings. In particular, the threat of crime may influence people's willingness to invest in schooling or physical capital. The second chapter explores the questions "What influence do crime rates and levels of investment have on one another?" and "How do government policies affect the relationship between investment and crime?" by creating a simple structural model of crime and educational investment and attempting to fit this model to Mexican data. A method of simulated moments procedure is used to estimate parameters of the model and the estimated parameters are then used to carry out policy simulations. The simulations show that increasing spending on police or increasing the severity of punishment reduces crime but has little effect on educational investment. Increased educational subsidies increase educational investment but reduce crime only slightly. Thus, one type of policy is insufficient to accomplish the goals of both reducing crime and increasing education. The third chapter is joint work with Prashant Bharadwaj, Giacomo De Giorgi, and Christopher Neilson. Boys tend to have better performances than girls in mathematical testing; in particular, there are significantly more boys than girls among high achievers and the score distribution appears to have a longer right tail for boys. We confirm such results on several low- and middle-income countries. In particular we find that the gender gap is already present by age 10 and substantially increases by age 14 and 15. We propose and try to test a series of explanations for such a gap: (i) parental investment, (ii) ability, (iii) school resources, (iv) individual investment and effort (not tested directly), (v) competitive environment, and (vi) cultural norms. We conclude that none of our proposed explanations can account for a substantial portion of the gap.
Author: Aaron F. Schiff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 364
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Author: Mattea Stein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Social networks affect economic decision-making in all socio-economic contexts, influencing many aspects of social and economic life. They may play a particularly central role in the developing economy where formal institutions, which facilitate anonymous, arm's length transactions, tend to function less well. For example, when commercial courts are inefficient, or are inaccessible to a large share of the entrepreneur population, the social capital inherent in networks may be used to sustain contracting and collaboration. This thesis explores two facets of this thematic cluster. Two of its chapters investigate the mechanisms at work in horizontal business networks between small-scale entrepreneurs in Uganda. Using experimental variation from a randomized training and panel network data, I show that these networks can be endogenous to a public policy intervention, and that observed changes indicate strategic network formation behavior. A third chapter is concerned with how the efficiency of formal commercial dispute resolution can be enhanced, unpacking the mechanisms of institutional reform. Analyzing a reform in Senegal using high-frequency case-level data, it shows that procedural tweaks can have a large effects on speed without jeopardizing quality when judges' incentives are aligned.
Author: Andrin Pelican
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation contains three essays in Game Theory and Network Economics. The First Chapter studies how economic networks are formed. Random networks occur in many economic situations, such as transactions among financial institutions, trade between countries or social relationships. Network formation can be based on utility theory and translates into a game in a normal form. For this formation process, we derive a probability distribution over all networks. Further, we derive a test procedure to test whether the formation only depends on node characteristics or whether it involves strategic interaction. This test procedure does not require knowledge of model parameters. We show how a locally most powerful test statistic can be derived from the utility function. The network formation theory is extended from directed networks to undirected networks, in which a link is formed by bilateral agreement. The test procedure can also be used to test model parameters and to analyze restricted networks. Simulation results support the theory. The Second Chapter analyzes credit networks. Credit contracts among financial institutions form in a natural way a directed network. A default of a financial institution affects another institution via multiple paths in the network. The credit claims are settled in accordance with the seniority of the contract. The objective of this paper is to determine how the network and seniority structures impact the stability under shocks. In order to achieve this goal, we develop a simulation algorithm. The algorithm considers the network as well as the seniority constraints. We prove the correctness of the algorithm and derive a polynomial bound on the runtime. The simulation results indicate that the characteristics of a network have an impact on the overall stability of the financial system. Cyclic borrowing has a negative effect on stability. In a distressed situation, cyclic borrowing structure enhances.
Author: Pablo Daniel Azar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 215
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This thesis is a collection of three chapters, each representing an individual paper. The first chapter studies how the formation of supply chains affects economic growth. It provides a new tractable model for supply chain formation. The main innovation in this model is that, firms can choose suppliers to maximize profits. Individual firms' actions determine the equilibrium input-output network, and affect macroeconomic variables such as GDP. We then apply this model to understand the effect of changing supply chains on American productivity during the 1987-2007 period. The second chapter studies how a monopolist may sell multiple goods to strategic bidders. The monopolist may face a series of combinatorial constraints. For example, it may be forced to allocate at most one good to each bidder, and it may have additional constraints on which bidders can be allocated which goods. Furthermore, the monopolist does not know bidders' demand distributions. Rather, it only knows one sample from the demand distribution corresponding to each bidder. Nevertheless, by developing new online optimization algorithms, we show how simple mechanisms can approximate the monopolist's optimal revenue. Finally, the third chapter, develops a new model of firm optimization to understand how shrinking electronics have contributed to increased productivity and welfare in the United States, during the 2002-2017 period. In this model, firms face constraints on the size of the products they can build. As intermediate inputs, such as electronics, shrink, the firms' production possibilities frontier expands, and GDP increases.
