Three Essays on Game-theoretic Applications to Public Finance and Sovereign Debt PDF Download
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Author: Der-Yuan Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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Author: Der-Yuan Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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Author: Huseyin Yildirim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Author: Kien-Tsu James Lin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 252
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Author: Martin Shubik
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
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Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Author: Akram Temimi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118
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This dissertation is divided into three essays. The first essay focuses on the question of enfranchisement of groups of individuals. Existing research work in the area has not adequately addressed this question. Indeed, previous analyses have focused on the value of a vote for a single individual. We considered a totally different approach whereby the central players are groups of individuals rather than single individuals. Within this framework, we have provided an answer to the question as to why groups of individuals struggle to gain the right to vote. We also provided an explanation of why the group in power may voluntarily extend the franchise to groups which have conflicting preferences. The second essay introduces the concept of coalition structure value to differential information economies. This extends the work of Krasa and Yannelis (1994) who introduced the concept of private value allocation to measure the information superiority of agents in an economy with differential information. The coalition structure value allows us to analyze the implications of coalition structures on the value of information. Contrary to our expectations, we found that the bargaining strength of an agent with superior information does not decrease if the rest of the agents collude and bargain as a unit with him. This is in sharp contrast to the one seller and two buyers example in full information economies where the buyers are better off if they bargain as a unit with the seller. The third paper generalizes the crowding types model introduced by Conley and Wooders (1994a) by allowing variable usage of local public goods within jurisdictions. We investigate the possibility of anonymous decentralizations of core allocations. It turns out that it is possible to decentralize core allocations with anonymous admission prices. However these prices are infinite dimensional. This leads us to investigate Lindahl decentralization. While it is possible to get nonanonymous Lindahl decentralization, the core is generally larger than the set of anonymous Lindahl equilibria.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 398
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 614
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 848
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Author: Richard M. Salsman
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1785363387
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
How have the most influential political economists of the past three centuries theorized about sovereign borrowing and shaped its now widespread use? That important question receives a comprehensive answer in this original work, featuring careful textual analysis and illuminating exhibits of public debt empirics since 1700. Beyond its value as a definitive, authoritative history of thought on public debt, this book rehabilitates and reintroduces a realist perspective into a contemporary debate now heavily dominated by pessimists and optimists alike.
Author: David Hyman
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781408094426
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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