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Author: Mahmoud Shahin
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Mahmoud Shahin
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Russell H. Rollow
Publisher:
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Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In my first chapter, I study how the dollar funding fragility of non-US banks amplifies cyclical patterns in their appetite for credit risk. Global banks outside of the United States finance a significant portion of their dollar-denominated lending with uninsured wholesale dollar funding, the price of which rises with the perceived riskiness of the bank. Using data from the syndicated lending market, I examine the risk appetite of non-US global banks when a broad appreciation of the US dollar expands portfolio tail risk and activates value-at-risk constraints. By orthogonalizing errors in professional forecasts of the broad dollar index to other macroeconomic indicators, I show that following such a dollar appreciation, global banks with a heavy dependence on wholesale dollar funding contract cross-border dollar lending to firms with high credit risk, as measured with loan-specific spreads and borrower-specific characteristics. Based on this evidence, I argue that instability in non-US bank funding structures amplifies cyclical patterns in their appetite for credit risk.In my second chapter, I explore how traditional modeling techniques can be applied to produce density forecasts of interest rates. As spikes in economic uncertainty have grown in prevalence, the projection of financial data has become a more arduous task, which has sharpened the focus of investors and policymakers on forecast risk. By integrating a dynamic factor model into a Bayesian framework, I develop a density forecasting model that projects the predictive density of interest rates. Unlike point forecasts, density forecasts produce probability estimates for the full distribution of potential future outcomes of interest rates, as opposed to solely their central tendency. To assess the viability of my forecasting model, I conduct a robust out-of-sample evaluation of the model's performance, finding the model significantly outperforms a competing benchmark autoregressive model, especially when economic uncertainty is high. By examining density forecasts of Treasury yields during the COVID-19 pandemic and the term spread prior to the financial crisis of 2008, I demonstrate the value of the dynamic factor model in expanding the information set available to forward-looking investors and policymakers.In my third chapter, I analyze the impact of the Federal Reserve's adoption of a floor system of monetary policy implementation on the transmission mechanism of changes in the policy rate to US bank balance sheets. Since 2008, in part due to easy monetary policy, United States interest rates have remained at historically low levels. Using US commercial bank call report data, I examine the response of bank profitability and investment to a rise in the rate of interest on reserve balances (IORB). Specifically analyzing the 2015-18 Federal Reserve monetary tightening cycle, I show that, following a rise in the IORB, holding more reserves buffers bank NII growth and asset growth against the adverse effects of a rise in the IORB. Taken together, these results imply that a rise in the policy rate raise profitability for banks with substantial reserve holdings and, when capital constraints bind, expand investment capacity.
Author: Torsten Ehlers
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 107
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Author: Fulvia Fringuellotti
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Elisheva Stern
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This dissertation includes three chapters discussing the importance of bank heterogeneity in monetary policy implementation using tools such as changes in the interest on reserve and the discount window on bank lending. The first two chapters focus on the implications of differences in government regulation, while the third chapter focuses on market competition. The first chapter assesses the effects of a policy reform changing the relative return of holding reserves on the reserves held by U.S. branches of foreign banks compared to conventional domestic banks, using difference-in-differences regression analysis. The second chapter studies the implications of dispersion in the relative return of holding reserves using a liquidity mismatch banking model with different sectors that can trade reserves in an over-the-counter market for federal funds. The model is used to study the effects of changes to regulation, policy rates, and other market conditions on the distribution of reserves across sectors and the federal funds rate. The third chapter documents changes in competition in the loan and deposit market over the last two decades and considers the implications for monetary policy tools using regression analysis compared to simulations of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model.Chapter 1, titled DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND PORTFOLIO DESIGN OF BANKS, reviews the distinct response of U.S. branches of foreign banks to the monetary policy of interest on reserve balances following a policy reform in 2011. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reform changed the relative return of holding reserves for U.S. branches of foreign banks (foreign banks for short) compared to conventional domestic banks (domestic banks for short). The data show higher excess reserves held by foreign banks following this policy change. A fixed-effects model is used to measure the effect of a change in the FDIC policy on excess reserves held by each sector. A difference-in-difference comparison suggests a difference of 0.16 in reserves to assets of domestic banks compared to foreign banks following the policy change and a more considerable gap of around 0.25 for banks with average assets holdings in the top 15 percentile. Furthermore, the event study confirms that these larger banks widely capture the impact of policy. The next chapter, Chapter 2, titled BANK PORTFOLIO CHOICE AND MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION IN THE FACE OF A NEW FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET, studies the implications of differences in regulation of banks for monetary policy. The chapter presents an equilibrium model in the framework of Bianchi and Bigio (2022) to include two types of bank branches instead of one; domestic banks must hold deposit insurance, while U.S. branches of foreign banks cannot. Deposit insurance allows for a more stable funding source but attaches a higher balance-sheet cost. Calibration finds consistent predictions that explain the higher excess reserves and the sequential credit supply of foreign branches. Moreover, findings suggest that foreign branches are more responsive to monetary policy tools, such as interest on reserves, because their funding source is associated with higher volatility in deposit withdrawals. The monetary policy of changes to the corridor rates in the model is the same across all banks. Still, because U.S. branches of foreign banks face different tradeoffs than U.S domestic banks, monetary policy affects each sector differently. Chapter 3, titled CHANNELS OF MONETARY POLICY WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE BANKING SECTOR, uses a relatively new measure of market power proposed by Boone (2008) to estimate the implications of market power on the pass-through of monetary policy for two monetary policy channels. The lending channel and the deposits channel. Data suggest that market power is high in the deposit market and somewhat high in the loan market, with an incline in competition in both sectors in the last two decades preceding 2001. The paper evaluates monetary policy pass-through to deposit and lending rates given the competition across banks using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices. The central assumption of the model is that the pass-through depends on competition across banks. It includes banks with imperfectly competitive markups for loans to firms, markdowns of deposit rates to consumers, and a monetary policy authority that can either change the federal funds rate or the spread between the federal funds rate and the rate paid on excess reserves. The model estimations align with the empirical evidence suggesting banks will compensate on loan spreads to avoid the contraction in lending caused by higher policy rates, while deposits will fluctuate less, and therefore spreads may increase when market rates increase.
Author: Jiahong Gao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banking
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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The focus of my dissertation is to study how the industrial organization of the banking sector affects the risk-taking behavior of financial intermediaries and the degree of instability within the banking system. In the first chapter, I ask whether the notion that market concentration promotes stability survives when the government intervention during a crisis is properly taken into account. To this end, I study suspension policies in an environment without commitment, following Ennis and Keister (2009). When the BA only values the welfare of depositors, the degree of fragility is independent of the competitive structure of the banking system. However, having a BA that puts some weight on the monopolist's welfare can serve as a commitment device in suspending payments earlier to protect bank profits, which reduces fragility under a monopoly. The second chapter investigates how the industrial organization of the banking sector may be associated with different triggers for the system to be unstable. In particular, my analysis is based on a modern version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework in which a self-fulfilling run occurs at a non-trivial probability and banks lack commitment in determining the structure of liabilities as in Ennis and Keister (2010). I find that the possibility that the monopolistic bank may lose its rents in times of stress encourages it to be relatively illiquid. As a result, a monopoly is more stable (fragile) than perfect competition if the ex-ante probability of a financial crisis is below (above) some threshold. The last chapter examines the effects of bank failures and market concentration on credit market activity across United States. In particular, I employ a recent 17-year panel of all FDIC-insured commercial banks over the period 1994Q3 to 2010Q4 and construct state-specific measures of bank failures and deposit concentration. Using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model, I find that over the full sample, banks issued less loans if the likelihood of a bank failure in a given state increased. Further, banks in states with higher degrees of concentration also issued less loans. Interestingly, there appears evidence that market concentration serves as a buffer against instability.
Author: Andrew Crockett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital market
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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Author: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Publisher: Cosimo, Inc.
ISBN: 1616405414
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 692
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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.
Author: Mr.Luc Laeven
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484363728
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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The proposed SDN documents the evolution of bank size and activities over the past 20 years. It discusses whether this evolution can be explained by economies of scale or “too big to fail” subsidies. The paper then presents evidence on the extent to which bank size and market-based activities contribute to systemic risk. The paper concludes with policy messages in the area of capital regulation and activity restrictions to reduce the systemic risk posed by large banks. The analysis of the paper complements earlier Fund work, including SDN 13/04 and the recent GFSR chapter on “too big to fail” subsidies, and its policy message is in line with this earlier work.
Author: Sahminan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages : 170
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