Three Essays in the Theory of Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Jörg Nikutta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 99
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Author: Jörg Nikutta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 99
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Author: Yumiko Baba
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 214
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Author: Emmanuel Lorenzon
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.
Author: Yong Sui
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Rebecca Catherine Elskamp
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.
Author: Cédric Wasser
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783866244771
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 138
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Author: Anne Elizabeth Lacey
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which addresses a different aspect of reputation in independent private values auctions. Each essay presents a model where a single long-run player faces short-run opponents in a sequence of auctions. Bidding is costly, and each auction has a reserve price.
Author: Xiaoshu Xu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Abstract: My dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical auction analysis. The first chapter considers optimal sequential auctions with new bidders arriving in each period. The second chapter examines how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in an auction environment with costly entry. The third chapter investigates how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in a sequential auction setting where the values of items auctioned in different periods exhibit synergies. The first chapter gives a full characterization of the optimal sequential second-price (or ascending English) auctions with sequentially arriving bidders. There are n bidders in the first period and m new bidders arrive in the second period. Based on the auctioneer's commitment power, we study two cases: full commitment and noncommitment. In both cases, we establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium characterized by a threshold strategy - -a bidder does not bid in the first auction when her valuation is below this threshold and bids according to an increasing function otherwise. In the noncommitment case, the auctioneer chooses an optimal reserve price to maximize the expected revenue from the second period; thus her decision of whether to include previous bidders as potential buyers is endogenously determined by the reserve price in the first auction. This might create multiple equilibria depending on the beliefs of the auctioneer and the bidders. We apply a fairly intuitive rule to establish the uniqueness. We also extend our analysis to allow for opportunities for resale, where the winner in the first auction can opt to resell the item to new bidders. The second chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where an arbitrary number of bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and bargain hunting abstentions. By following the uniform distribution for numerical analysis, our results suggest that while the entry probability and efficiency are always higher when resale is allowed, the auctioneer's expected revenue is lower when resale is allowed for almost all parameter values. We also compare this model to one where bidders may follow "strong" or "weak" distributions in terms of valuations. The third chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies a sequential second-price auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. I find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in resale, there is no equilibrium where at least one bidder reveals her type with positive probability. When buyer makes the offer instead, there exist symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, I demonstrate that the effect of resale is ambiguous on expected revenue as Ill as the probability of exposure. I also extend this model to allow for three bidders and provide the equilibrium analysis.
Author: Minbo Xu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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The dissertation includes three research papers on all-pay auctions. The first paper (Chapter 1) considers an all-pay auction for a product in which there is an option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified posted price P at any time. We find the symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the first- and second-price all-pay auctions (also called war of attrition) with a buy-price option. Under these equilibria the buy-price option will affect high-value bidders' behavior, and improve their welfare. At the same time, the seller can select the optimal posted price to collect more revenue, and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds as well. The second paper (Chapter 2) conducts empirical analysis on online penny auctions, which are seen as an adaptation of the famous dollar auction and as "the evil stepchild of game theory and behavioral economics." We use the complete bid and bidder history at a website to study if penny auctions can sustain excessive profits over time. The overwhelming majority of new bidders lose money, but they quit quickly. A very small percentage of bidders are experienced and strategically sophisticated, but they earn substantial profits. Our evidence thus suggests that penny auctions cannot sustain excessive profits without attracting a revolving door of new customers who will lose money. The third paper (Chapter 3) proposes a nonparametric estimation approach to empirical analysis of the war of attrition. In order to construct a tractable model, we consider the uncertain competition and derive a structural model with a stochastic number of bidders. We admit the contamination from observables and introduce a deconvolution problem with heteroscedastic errors into the nonparametric approach. By a two-step nonparametric procedure, we can attain a consistent estimator of the distribution of bidders' private values from the observables. Finally, we apply the estimation procedure to field data from penny auctions.
Author: Sudip Gupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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